








Link to publication in Tilburg University Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Louro, M. J. S. (2005). Leaving pleasure: Positive emotions and goal-directed behavior. CentER, Center for
Economic Research.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.






























































ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor aan de Universiteit van 
Tilburg, op gezag van de rector magnificus, prof. dr. F. A. van der 
Duyn Schouten, in het openbaar te verdedigen ten overstaan van een 
door het college voor promoties aangewezen commissie in de aula 
van de Universiteit op vrijdag 2 september 2005 om 14.15 uur door  
 
 
Maria João Soares Louro 
 










Prof. Dr. Rik Pieters 














The research on which this dissertation is based was supported by a grant from the 
Foundation for Science and Technology (Portugal) and the European Social Fund 









Charles Carver, PhD, Professor of Psychology, Department of Psychology, 
University of Miami, Coral Gables, Florida. 
 
Els Gijsbrechts, PhD, Professor of Marketing and Chairman of the Department 
of Marketing, Department of Marketing, Tilburg University, Tilburg, The 
Netherlands. 
 
Rik Pieters, PhD, Professor of Marketing, Department of Marketing, Tilburg 
University, Tilburg, The Netherlands. 
 
Diederik A. Stapel, PhD, Professor of Cognitive Social Psychology, Department 
of Social and Organizational Psychology, University of Groningen, Groningen, 
The Netherlands. 
 
Jan-Benedict E. M. Steenkamp, PhD, CentER Research Professor of Marketing 
& GfK Professor of International Marketing Research, Department of Marketing, 
Tilburg University, Tilburg, The Netherlands. 
 
Theo M. M. Verhallen, PhD, Professor of Marketing and Dean of the Faculty of 
Economics, Department of Marketing, Tilburg University, Tilburg, The 
Netherlands. 
 
Marcel Zeelenberg, PhD, Professor of Social Psychology, Department of Social 




















Thanks are first due to the immensely wonderful Rik Pieters and Marcel Zeelenberg. I 
am proud to say Rik and Marcel were my mentors. And still are. It’s been my good 
fortunate to have been able to team up with you both. Thank you for your wisdom, 
your kindness, your patience, and the many hours you have spent working with me. I 
will be forever grateful for everything you’ve done–you’re the best! 
I would also like to thank Charles Carver, Els Gijsbrechts, Diederik Stapel, 
Jan-Benedict Steenkamp, and Theo Verhallen. It’s an honor to have you in my 
dissertation committee and I highly appreciate your time and suggestions. To Theo, 
my heartfelt gratitude for the generosity and support when I first came to Tilburg. 
A special word of thanks also goes out to my other colleagues at the marketing 
department for providing a truly inspiring environment to work in.  
For love, encouragement, and belief in me every step of the way, words are 
never enough to thank my parents Albano and Deolinda. I’m truly blessed to have you 
as parents and best friends. Thank you. 
And, above all, lots and lots of thanks to Paulo whose help, intelligence, and 
love I can always rely on. You were always there for me, you helped me keep 












1. Leaving Pleasure: An Introduction 1 
Overview of the Dissertation 4 
Looking Ahead 7 
2. Negative Returns on Positive Emotions: The Influence of Pride and  
Self-Regulatory Goals on Repurchase Decisions 11 
Pride and Repurchase Decisions 12 
The Influence of Self-Regulatory Goals 13 
Information Requirements as a Mediational Mechanism 15 
Study 1: Situationally Induced Self-Regulatory Goals and the  
Pride-Repurchase Link 16 
Study 2: Individual Differences in Regulatory Focus and the  
Pride-Repurchase Link 23 
Study 3: Information Requirements as the Mediating Mechanism 28 
General Discussion 36 
3. Dynamics Of Multiple Goal Pursuit 39 
The Multiple Goal Pursuit Model 41 
Motivational Influences of Goal-Relevant Emotions 42 
The Role of Goal Proximity 45 
Formation of Goal Expectancies 48 
 xii 
Summary 50 
Study 1 50 
Study 2 63 
General Discussion 81 
4. Taking Off The Rose-Colored Glasses: Preventing Affect-Based Bias in 
Decision Making 87 
Positive Emotions and Bias Prevention 89 
Decision Complexity and Bias Awareness 92 
Consideration of Future Consequences 93 
The Debiasing Outcomes of Dampening 95 
The Present Research 96 
Study 1 97 
Study 2 108 
General Discussion 123 
5. Concluding Thoughts: Looking Backward, Looking Forward 129 
Two Traditions in the Study of Affective Functioning 132 
The Pleasure Principle 132 
The Principle of Hedonic Homeostasis 134 
An Allodynamic Model of Affect 138 
Mechanisms of Allodynamic Regulation 139 
Evidence for the Allodynamic Model of Affect 144 
Concluding Remarks 148 
References 151 


















SHOULD I RETURN to that restaurant where I had so much fun in the past? Should I buy 
these shoes that I like so much? This chocolate cake looks so yummy–and I have 
already lost so much weight–is it okay if I have just a bite? Should I keep working so 
hard and saving so much money or should I enjoy life more, perhaps spend more? 
Small temptations, important choices and occasionally existential dilemmas, these are 
the questions that pervade our everyday experience, and emotions feature in all of 
them. But how do emotions shape these consumption decisions? Do we always do 
what feels good right now or do we sometimes do what feels bad but is perhaps better 
in the long run? When do we listen to our emotions and when do we try to avoid 
them? These are the questions to which this dissertation is devoted. 
In the psychology of consumption, with joy as well as pride, with delight as 
well as hope, addressing these questions requires understanding the role of positive 
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emotions in shaping consumers’ experiences, judgments and choices.1 There is 
evidence that pursuing and experiencing positive emotions is central to consumption. 
To achieve happiness is the most important goal for most people in almost every 
culture (Diener 2000) and consumption itself has become a culturally accepted route 
to attain it (Csikszentmihalyi 2000; Holbrook and Hirschman 1982; Kahneman et al. 
2004; Schor 1998). Richins (1997) found, for instance, that the majority of consumers 
typically report experiencing positive emotions across a wide variety of consumption 
contexts (see also Derbaix and Pham 1991; Kahneman et al. 2004). Research has also 
shown that the belief that consumption is integral to the pursuit of happiness is central 
to today’s increasingly materialistic lifestyle (Belk 1985; Richins and Dawson 1994). 
People often identify big-ticket consumer goods such cars, traveling abroad, 
swimming pools, and vacation homes as part of “the good life”–a life of happiness 
and pleasure to which they aspire (Easterlin 2003). Also, consumers have been found 
to consciously give themselves gifts for the sole purpose of making themselves feel 
better and experiencing pleasure (Mick 1996). Research has further shown that not 
only is consumption a means of pursuing pleasure by acquiring desired possessions, 
but also that the process of searching and buying can be itself a source of positive 
feelings (Babin, Darden, and Griffin 1994; Bloch, Sherrell, and Ridgway 1986; 
O’Guinn and Faber 1989). 
The pursuit of happiness through consumption as a central and defining 
phenomenon of contemporary societies is also reflected in the marketing activities of 
companies across a wide range of industries, from low-involvement consumer 
                                                           
1  Throughout this dissertation, the focus is on emotions that arise in response to a specific target (i.e., 
what we feel emotional about, such as a product, a brand, an event, an advertisement, a person, or a 
place), not on other levels of affective phenomena such as broad, free-floating affective states or moods 
that lack a specific referent and arise from background conditions (e.g., fatigue, exercise, or finding a 




package goods to high-involvement service industries. From McDonald’s Happy 
Meal to Prozac (“The happy pill”), from self-help books to toys, from Hollywood to 
Disney (“The Happiest Place on Earth”), selling happiness has become a core element 
of the marketing strategy of many companies. As research by Belk and Pollay (1985) 
shows, over the past 100 years advertising has progressively portrayed consumption 
as the primary vehicle for pursuing pleasure. 
The primacy of positive emotions in consumption highlights the importance of 
developing a deeper understanding of the anatomy of positive emotions and their 
effects on consumer behavior–how positive emotions are cultivated and how they 
shape a variety of consumption outcomes.2 The assumption that consumers are 
motivated to feel good, move toward pleasure and away from pain, has dominated 
psychological theories on the role of emotions in consumption (e.g., Holbrook and 
Hirschman 1982; Pham 1998) and daily life (e.g., Freud 1920/1950; Larsen 2000). 
The prevalent notion arising from this pleasure principle is that it is good to feel good, 
that consumers always choose the options that elicit more positive feelings, and that 
the ability to generate positive emotions is unvaryingly rewarded with favorable 
                                                           
2 Interestingly, the importance of studying positive emotions has been recently recognized in 
psychology, a field which has traditionally been biased towards the study of negative emotions (for a 
detailed review see Fredrickson 1998). The appreciation of the significance of positive emotions 
became widely acknowledged with Martin Seligman’s presidency of the American Psychological 
Association in 1998. In his Presidential Address he called for research examining human strengths and 
virtues, which he termed positive psychology. As Seligman put it “[there is one area] in which 
psychology of the late 20th century has not played a large enough role in making the lives of people 
better . . . . [this] area cries out for what I call ‘positive psychology,’ that is, a reoriented science that 
emphasizes the understanding and building of the most positive qualities of the individual” (Seligman 
1999, p. 559). 
This call to action has had a profound impact on both scholarly work and mass media interest. For 
instance, it has stimulated a considerable growth in research on positive emotions and the positive 
aspects of human functioning (Carver 2003; Fredrickson 1998, 2001; Special issue on Positive 
Psychology, American Psychologist 2000). In 1999, “Well-Being: The Foundations of Hedonic 
Psychology” appeared as the title of a book announcing the existence of a new field of psychology–
hedonic psychology–the study of what makes experiences in life pleasant or unpleasant (Kahneman, 
Diener, and Schwarz 1999). There have even been proposals for the use of national indexes of 
happiness as important instruments for the development and evaluation of public and corporate policies 
(e.g., Diener 2000; Veenhoven 2002). Recently, on January 17, 2005, Time magazine devoted an entire 




behaviors such as loyalty and positive word-of-mouth. In other words, people always 
return to the places they like, buy the shoes they love and eat the cake. 
In this dissertation, I propose to go beyond the pleasure principle of human 
motivation and argue that, rather than uniformly pursuing pleasure or invariably 
reiterating the choices that have produced pleasure in the past, consumers do not 
always follow and sometimes even avoid positive emotions (and accept pain) in the 
service of other consumption goals. People do not always return to the places they 
like, buy the products they love or eat the forbidden delights, no matter how strong 
their feelings. Instead, they sometimes decide to search for better options, save their 
money or, in their eagerness to attain slimness, stick to their diet. The purpose of this 
dissertation is then to explore how people adapt their emotional responses and their 
affect-laden behaviors to meet the motivational and situational demands of the task at 
hand. In attempting to understand the contingencies of emotional responding, I view 
affect as a highly versatile system that provides individuals with a rich repertoire of 
affective response options that can be flexibly employed. I provide empirical evidence 
on the versatility of the affective system, its limits, and the processes underlying it. 
 
OVERVIEW OF THE DISSERTATION 
An overview of the empirical chapters in this dissertation (Chapters 2-4) is presented 
in Table 1.1. The central theme underlying all the chapters is the notion that, rather 
than invariably pursuing pleasure, consumers’ affective responding can be highly 
versatile allowing them to respond meaningfully and adaptively to both ongoing goals 
and the perceived demands of the tasks at hand. I discuss and investigate different 
facets of this versatility in the linkage between emotional experiences and behavioral 
responses across a variety of consumption phenomena including judgments, decision-
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making, product choice and post-purchase behavior, and a diverse set of products 
such as shoes, computers, weight-loss drinks, and digital cameras. In doing so, I 
employed a wide range of approaches. The studies varied from experiments to more 
naturalistic longitudinal daily diary questionnaires and experience-sampling surveys, 
took place in the field and in the laboratory, and ranged from fully randomized to 
cross-sectional and longitudinal designs. 
The chapters provide diverse perspectives on the notion that consumers can go 
beyond the pursuit of pleasure by examining the shifting links between emotions, 
goals and consumer behavior. Chapters 2 and 3 address the motivational 
contingencies of the linkage between experienced emotions and subsequent behavior. 
In contrast, Chapter 4 examines how the anticipated influences of current emotions on 
behavior impacts emotion regulation. These dynamics are investigated for single 
(Chapters 2 and 4) and multiple goal environments (Chapter 3), and for both 
generalized goal orientations (Chapter 2) and specific goals set by consumers 
themselves or experimentally manipulated (Chapters 3 and 4). Although the focus 
throughout the chapters is primarily on positive emotions–both general (Chapters 3 
and 4) and specific (Chapter 2)–Chapter 3 also explores the effects of negative 
emotions, striking a balance between the positive and the negative in consumption. 
Finally, while Chapters 2 and 3 emphasize how emotions shape consumer responses, 
Chapter 4 examines how consumers can sometimes shape their own emotions. The 
closing chapter (Chapter 5) complements and extends the previous chapters by 
exploring the notion that consumers possess a rich and varied repertoire of responses 
to their emotional experiences, and delineating a model that outlines the mechanisms 
by which consumers’ affective response is continuously adjusted to match ongoing 
variations in motivational and environmental demands.  
 
 
TABLE 1.1. Overview of Empirical Chapters 
 Chapter 2 Chapter 3 Chapter 4 
Focus Behavioral consequences of 
positive emotions 
Emotions and resource allocation 
across multiple goals 
 
Self-regulation of positive emotions 
in consumption environments of 




Pride Goal-related positive and negative 
emotions 
 
Product-induced positive emotions  
Motivational 
context 
Self-regulatory goals: promotion 
versus prevention goals 
Goal prioritization in multiple-goal 
environments 
Temporal focus: proximal versus 
distal goal attainment 
 
Temporal focus: consideration of 
immediate versus future 
consequences of current actions 
Behavior Repurchase intentions Allocation of goal-directed effort: 
persisting versus shifting 
 





sufficiency versus necessity 
 
Goal expectancy  
Methodology Experiments Longitudinal daily diary + Experiment 
 
Experience sampling + Experiment 
Key findings Consumers do not always repeat 
behaviors that have led to positive 
emotions in the past. The link 
between emotion and behavior is 
contingent on consumers’ self-
regulatory goals. 
In multiple-goal environments, 
consumers can both repeat and 
avoid behaviors that have led to 
positive or negative emotions in the 
past as a function of goal distance. 
Consumers do not invariably strive 
to maintain positive emotions; 
instead they can dampen them in 
the service of other consumption 
goals. Dampening varies as a 
function of consumers’ temporal 
focus and decision complexity. 
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The collection of chapters in this dissertation draws on multiple literatures 
such as emotion theory, goal theory, self-regulation, mental control, behavioral 
decision-making, and temporal focus. It builds on the work of leading scholars 
including Carver and Scheier (1998), Fredrickson (2001), Freud (1920/1950), Higgins 
(1997), Schwarz and Clore (1996), Simon (1967), and Wilson and Brekke (1994). An 
important premise of these chapters is that in order to account for the multifaceted 
role of emotions in consumption academic inquiry must go beyond the pleasure 
principle and explore the motivational contingencies of consumer behavior. 




The rest of the dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 explores how 
differences in regulatory focus influence whether or not consumers’ decisions and 
choices are driven by the pursuit of pleasure. Contrary to the common assumption that 
positive emotions generally lead to favorable behavioral intentions, feelings of pride 
can decrease consumers’ repurchase intentions. Results from three experimental 
studies demonstrate that the impact of pride on repurchase intentions is indeed 
contingent on consumers’ self-regulatory goals but that this is so only among 
consumers with high levels of pride. Specifically, consumers with high prevention 
pride are less likely to repurchase than those with high promotion pride, whereas no 
difference arises between consumers with low promotion pride and those with low 
prevention pride. These effects generalize across situational and chronic differences in 
self-regulatory goals and are accompanied by differences in consumers’ information 
requirements. 
                                                                                                  
 8 
Chapter 3 shows that, in multiple-goal environments, whether or not goal-
directed behavior is congruent with the hedonic principle of approaching pleasure and 
avoiding pain or with the operation of a homeostatic control process that promotes 
affective neutrality (Carver and Scheier 1998) is determined by goal distance. The 
chapter presents and tests a model of multiple goal pursuit that specifies how 
individuals selectively allocate effort among multiple goals over time. The model 
predicts that whether individuals decide to step up effort, coast, give up the current 
goal, or take up pursuit of another goal is determined jointly by the emotions that flow 
from goal progress and by the proximity to future goal attainment. In support of the 
proposed model, results from a longitudinal diary study and a controlled laboratory 
experiment show that positive and negative goal-dependent emotions do not 
universally lead to persisting or shifting in goal pursuit, but instead that both can have 
diametrically opposing effects on goal-directed behavior depending on goal 
proximity. Results also reveal that these effects are linked to a pattern of change in 
goal expectancy. The findings resolve contrasting predictions about the influence of 
positive and negative emotions in volitional behavior, and provide new insights into 
the dynamics and determinants of multiple goal pursuit. 
Chapter 4 addresses whether and when consumers who already experience 
positive emotions toward a product are willing to forsake the basic human motive of 
pursuing pleasure in order to satisfy other consumption goals, such as making good 
decisions. To function effectively, consumers must be able to prevent the biasing 
influence of positive emotions that may lead to erroneous or suboptimal judgments or 
decisions. Contrary to the common assumption that people are generally blind to their 
own biases, this chapter shows that consumers can detect bias and inoculate their 
decision behavior against the biasing influences of positive emotions. They do so by 
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dampening their positive emotions toward a tentatively preferred product. Using both 
experience sampling and experimental methodologies, the results show that 
dampening is jointly determined by the complexity of the specific decision and the 
weight attached to the immediate or future outcomes of the decision. Dampening is 
highest when decision complexity is moderate and consumers focus primarily on the 
future outcomes of their current actions. Results also reveal that dampening positive 
emotions has clear and adaptive implications for the depth of decision processing, 
purchase decisions, and choice confidence. 
Taken together, the findings reported in the following chapters suggest that the 
affective system can be highly versatile and adapt to variations in consumers’ goals 
and environmental demands by oscillating between distinct patterns of affective 
functioning. More specifically, to meet shifting contingencies the affective system (a) 
may or may not be driven toward pleasure (pleasure principle), (b) may or may not be 
driven toward a baseline level of affect (principle of hedonic homeostasis), or (c) may 
alternate between these two principles. Chapter 5 takes a step further and outlines the 
fundamentals of a more general model of affective functioning that attempts to 
reconcile and extend these seemingly contrasting conceptualizations on the 
fundamental dynamics of the affective system: the pleasure principle and the principle 
of hedonic homeostasis. The pleasure principle views affect as a system for signaling 
sources of pleasure and pain in the environment that directs consumer actions toward 
positivity. The principle of hedonic homeostasis views affect as a system for signaling 
discrepancies from a baseline level of affect that activates discrepancy-reducing 
responses once such deviations emerge. In this chapter, I propose an allodynamic 
model of affective functioning that affords consumers considerably versatility in 
matching the emotion-behavior link to shifting motivational and environmental 
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demands. This perspective may offer an important advance over prior 
conceptualizations of the affect system: it suggests that the pattern of affective 
response may be variable rather than fixed (approach pleasure vs. maintain a baseline 
level of affect). In this way, it sheds new light on how consumers continuously adapt 
how they respond to consumption emotions in order to produce the right responses, 
about the right stimuli, at the right time. 






Negative Returns on Positive Emotions 
___________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
The Influence of Pride and Self-Regulatory Goals  





A COMMON ASSUMPTION in marketing is that positive consumption-related emotions 
stimulate subsequent positive behaviors, such as repurchase at a particular store. This 
assumption stems from the valence approach to emotions (Bagozzi et al. 2000; Lerner 
and Keltner 2000), which posits that the influence of emotions on behavior is 
determined only by their valence (positive or negative). Hence, different positive 
emotions should exert a similar, positive, influence on behavior because they share 
the same, positive, valence. However, recent theorizing suggests that positive 
emotions may broaden individuals’ thought-action repertoires with, for instance, pride 
driving individuals toward greater future achievements (Fredrickson 2001). Thus, 
pride may expand consumers’ search and decision processes, leading to lower 
                                                           
3 This chapter is adapted from Louro, Maria J., Rik Pieters, Marcel Zeelenberg (2005), “Negative 
Returns on Positive Emotions: The Influence of Pride and Self-Regulatory Goals on Repurchase 
Decisions,” Journal of Consumer Research, 31 (March), 833-840. 
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repurchase intentions. It is therefore unclear whether or not all positive emotions 
generally lead to repurchase. 
This chapter investigates how feelings of pride may influence consumers’ 
repurchase intentions. Because pride is associated with goal attainment, we conjecture 
that the effect of pride on repurchase intentions may depend on the type of self-
regulatory goals that consumers have. According to regulatory focus theory (Higgins 
et al. 2001), pride may stem from the attainment of promotion or prevention self-
regulatory goals. For example, a consumer could see his/her success in negotiating a 
discount as a way to gain money (promotion pride) or to avoid paying extra money 
(prevention pride). Results from three experimental studies demonstrate that, rather 
than all positive emotions being generally conducive to repurchase, pride can decrease 
repurchase intentions depending on consumers’ self-regulatory goals. Also, this 
phenomenon is independent of consumer satisfaction and emerges across situational 
and chronic differences in self-regulatory goals. Finally, the effects reflect differences 
in consumers’ information requirements. Taken together, these results provide support 
for a self-regulation framework that accounts for when and why positive emotions do 
and do not promote repurchase intentions. 
 
PRIDE AND REPURCHASE DECISIONS 
Pride is a positive emotion that is experienced following a positive evaluation of one’s 
competence or effort in achieving a goal (Weiner 1986), such as feeling responsible 
for obtaining a discount (Schindler 1998). It is a pleasant feeling, associated with self-
achievement, autonomy, and disengagement from others (Rodriguez Mosquera, 
Manstead, and Fischer 2000). 
Previous work on the influence of emotions on satisfaction and subsequent 
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behaviors has generally contrasted positive versus negative emotions elicited during 
consumption, highlighting the extent to which these emotions have distinct effects on 
behavior (e.g., Oliver 1980; Nyer 1997). This stream of research, adopting a valence 
approach to emotions, has found that positive emotions generally increase 
satisfaction, leading to subsequent favorable behavioral intentions, whereas negative 
emotions have the opposite effect (Szymanski and Henard 2001). Generalizing 
previous research within the valence approach, one would predict that pride, being a 
positive emotion, should also promote repurchase intentions. 
Yet, another line of evidence suggests that pride, despite its positive valence, 
may have the opposite effect, leading to lower repurchase intentions. Fredrickson 
(2001) suggests that pride may expand individuals’ scope of attention and broaden 
their action repertoires by driving them toward greater achievements in the future. 
Pride can thus lead to a broadening of consumers’ search and decision processes, 
which may in turn reduce the likelihood of repurchase. In addition, pride elicits a 
sense of autonomy by focusing individuals on their own role in attaining desired ends 
(Rodriguez Mosquera et al. 2000), which should inform consumers that they are 
capable of attaining positive outcomes through their personal effort or ability (i.e., 
independently of the chosen provider). This may also lower the likelihood of 
repurchase. 
 
The Influence of Self-Regulatory Goals 
Because pride is the emotional consequence of successful goal attainment, its effect 
on repurchase intentions may depend on the type of goals that consumers pursue. 
There is evidence that goals can take the form of pursuing desirable ends (promotion 
goals) or avoiding undesirable ends (prevention goals) (Higgins 2002). Regulatory 
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focus theory (Higgins et al. 2001) differentiates promotion pride, which originates 
from achieving positive outcomes and involves behavioral self-regulation toward the 
achievement of ideals, from prevention pride, which arises from avoiding negative 
outcomes and involves behavioral self-regulation toward security.  
Building on regulatory focus theory, we conjecture that consumers with high 
prevention pride will be less likely to repurchase than those with high promotion 
pride. This prediction is based on evidence that consumers with high promotion pride 
and those with high prevention pride are likely, in new purchase situations, to use 
different means to achieve their desired ends (Higgins et al. 2001). Specifically, high 
promotion-pride consumers are sensitive to the opportunities that arise, in order to 
minimize the absence of positive outcomes (i.e., nongains). Having found a 
satisfactory provider, they should be more likely to consider repurchase at this 
provider as an opportunity for goal achievement. Conversely, high prevention-pride 
consumers are motivated to minimize the presence of negative outcomes (i.e., losses) 
by being vigilant and restraining their impulses. They should be more sensitive to the 
potential negative outcomes associated with the decision to immediately return to a 
provider, in particular to the loss of attractive offers that might be available elsewhere. 
Thus, they should be less likely to return to the current provider. Low-pride 
consumers, in contrast, believe that their success stems from the actions of others 
(e.g., a particular provider). Hence, they should be likely to return to the current 
satisfactory provider, regardless of their self-regulatory goals. Thus, we predict that: 
H1a: Consumers with high prevention pride will be less likely to 
repurchase than consumers with high promotion pride. 
H1b: Consumers with low pride will be likely to repurchase independent 
of differences in self-regulatory goals. 
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If consumers with high prevention pride would at the same time be less 
satisfied than those with high promotion pride, then this could account for their lower 
repurchase intentions. However, there is reason to believe that consumers with high 
promotion pride and those with high prevention pride may be equally satisfied, 
because both succeed in attaining their goals. Thus, it is important to examine the 
predictions while controlling for satisfaction. Building on research showing that 
specific negative emotions influence behavior over and above satisfaction (Bougie, 
Pieters, and Zeelenberg 2003; Zeelenberg and Pieters 1999), we predict that: 
H2: The effects of pride and self-regulatory goals on repurchase 
intentions are independent of consumer satisfaction. 
 
Support for these predictions would imply that, rather than positive emotions 
being generally conducive to repurchase, the effect of pride on repurchase intentions 
is contingent on consumers’ self-regulatory goals. It would also demonstrate that 
these effects are independent of consumer satisfaction. These predictions are tested in 
Study 1. 
 
Information Requirements as a Mediational Mechanism 
Thus far, we have reasoned that the moderating effect of self-regulatory goals on the 
link between pride and repurchase intentions operates only for consumers with high 
pride, but we have not detailed the underlying process. We expect that differences in 
consumers’ information requirements may account for this effect. Specifically, 
because consumers with high prevention pride are inclined to adopt precautionary 
measures to avoid mistakes (Higgins et al. 2001), they should be sensitive to the 
possibility of losing attractive outcomes by failing to consider other providers. Hence, 
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we predict that they will consider obtaining information on alternative providers as a 
necessary means to avoid losses, and thus will be less likely to repurchase. 
Conversely, because consumers with high promotion pride focus on taking advantage 
of the opportunities that arise, they should consider having information about a 
satisfactory provider as a sufficient means to immediately achieve their goals, and thus 
will be more likely to repurchase. There is some, albeit indirect, support for this 
prediction from research by Roese, Hur, and Pennington (1999) suggesting that 
promotion-focused individuals are more likely to specify just one counterfactual as 
sufficient to obtain a desired end, whereas prevention-focused individuals are more 
likely to identify multiple counterfactuals as necessary to avoid an undesirable end.  
In addition, because consumers with low pride attribute their success to a 
specific provider rather than to themselves, they should be more likely to consider 
having information on a satisfactory provider as a sufficient means to achieve their 
desired ends regardless of their self-regulatory goals, and thus will be more likely to 
repurchase. Hence, we hypothesize that: 
H3: The influence of pride and self-regulatory goals on repurchase 
intentions is mediated by consumers’ information requirements. 
 
STUDY 1: SITUATIONALLY INDUCED SELF-REGULATORY 
GOALS AND THE PRIDE-REPURCHASE LINK 
Study 1 tests the prediction that consumers’ self-regulatory goals influence the pride-
repurchase link (hypotheses 1a and 1b) by temporarily manipulating promotion and 
prevention goals. Also, it tests hypothesis 2 that these effects are independent of 
consumer satisfaction. 
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Method 
A total of 120 undergraduate students (66 females) participated in return for course 
credit. They were randomly assigned to the cells of a 2 (high vs. low pride) × 2 
(promotion vs. prevention goals) between-subjects design. Participants were 
instructed to read a scenario about a computer purchase. To manipulate participants’ 
feelings of pride, we varied their role in obtaining a discount price for a laptop 
computer. In the high-pride condition, participants read that they got a discount due to 
their good negotiation skills. In the low-pride condition, the discount was obtained 
because the computer was on sale. Self-regulatory goals were manipulated by using 
language that emphasized the discount as either a gain or a nonloss; that is, the word 
“gain” was used to evoke promotion goals and the phrase “avoid losing” was used to 
evoke prevention goals. The scenario for the high-pride/promotion [prevention] 
condition is reported below: 
 
You want to buy a laptop computer. Last week, you saw the computer that you want 
at the InfoShop at a reduced price of $1500 instead of its regular price of $2000. 
Because you want to take advantage of this $500 gain [to avoid paying an extra 
$500], you decide to buy this computer at InfoShop, but you have not done this yet. 
Today, you return to InfoShop to buy the computer. You realize that the promotion 
was over two days ago and that the price of the computer is again the regular $2000. 
You think to yourself: “If I can convince the salesperson to sell me the computer at 
the promotional price, I will gain [avoid paying an extra] $500.” Meanwhile, you 
notice another customer who tries to get the promotional price for the same computer 
and fails. The salesperson indicates that the price is nonnegotiable. In spite of this, 
you decide to give it a try. Due to your good negotiation skills, you succeed in 
gaining [avoid losing] the $500. 
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In the low-pride/promotion [prevention] condition the last sentences read: 
“Today, you return to InfoShop to buy the computer. You think to yourself: “If I buy 
this computer now, I will gain [avoid paying an extra] $500.” Meanwhile, you notice 
that another customer in the store is just finishing buying the same computer for the 
promotional price. Afterwards, you approach the salesperson. The salesperson is 
willing to help you, and you buy the computer. With this purchase you gained 
[avoided losing] $500.” 
After reading the scenario, participants completed manipulation checks and 
reported their satisfaction and repurchase intentions. First, participants completed a 
check on the manipulation for regulatory focus (Roese, Hur, and Pennington 1999, p. 
1113). The pride manipulation check had two items (r = .79): “To what extent did 
getting the $500 discount make you feel good about yourself?” (1 = Not at all; 7 = 
Very much) and “Think about your ability in getting the $500 discount. How much 
pride did you feel?” (1 = None; 7 = Very much).  
Next, satisfaction was assessed by two items (r = .50) adapted from Oliver 
(1997):  “Overall, how satisfied did you feel with the price you paid?” (1 = Not at all 
satisfied; 7 = Very much satisfied) and “Overall, how good or bad did you feel after 
this experience?” (1 = Bad; 7 = Good). As a test of discriminant validity, we 
compared a measurement model with the satisfaction and pride items loading on 
separate factors against an alternative model with all items loading on a single factor. 
A chi-square difference test (Kline 1998) demonstrated that the two-factor solution 
was superior (χ2difference (1, N = 120) = 21.27, p < .001), indicating discriminant 
validity between the measures.  
Finally, repurchase intentions were PHDVXUHGE\IRXULWHPV  DGDSWHG
from Zeithaml, Berry, and Parasuraman 1996): “The next time that you want to buy 
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new computer hardware or software, will you immediately go back to InfoShop?” (1 
= Definitely will not go back; 7 = Definitely will go back); “How likely are you to 
consider InfoShop your first choice the next time you buy new computer hardware or 
software?” (1 = Not likely; 7 = Extremely likely); “The next time you are considering 
buying new computer hardware or software, what is the probability that you would 
buy it at InfoShop?” (1 = Not probable; 7 = Very probable); and “Even though new 
computer hardware or software is available in a number of different stores, how often 
would you buy at InfoShop in the next few years?” (1 = Never or seldom; 4 = 
Sometimes; 7 = Always). As expected, a principal components analysis with varimax 
rotation showed that all four items strongly load on one factor accounting for 69% of 
the variance (eigenvalue = 2.77; average loading = .83). The entire procedure was 
presented on a personal computer, using the software program Authorware 6.0 




Manipulation Checks  
As expected, promotion-framed scenarios were perceived to reflect greater achieving 
relative to prevention-framed scenarios (M = 6.08 vs. 4.20; F(1, 116) = 53.64, p < 
.001). Also, participants reported greater pride in the high-pride than in the low-pride 
conditions (M = 5.70 vs. 4.42; F(1, 116) = 26.30, p < .001). No other effects were 
significant (see Table 2.1). 
                                                                                                  
 
TABLE 2.1. Study 1: Means as a Function of Pride and Self-Regulatory Goals 














Manipulation check for self-regulatory goals  3.83 (1.86)  6.07 (0.78)  4.57 (1.72)  6.10 (0.96) 
Pride  4.40 (1.68)  4.43 (1.57)  5.63 (1.14)  5.77 (0.96) 
Satisfaction  5.58 (0.78)  5.70 (0.60)  5.85 (0.78)  6.12 (0.63) 
Repurchase intentions  5.05 (0.88)  4.87 (0.69)  4.19 (0.78)  4.98 (0.70) 
NOTE.–All variables range from 1 to 7. Standard deviations are shown in parentheses. n = 30 for each cell.  
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Satisfaction 
Results of a 2 × 2 ANOVA of satisfaction yielded only a significant main effect of 
pride (F(1, 116) = 7.16, p < .01). Participants reported higher satisfaction in the high-
pride conditions (M = 5.98) than in the low-pride conditions (M = 5.64). 
 
Repurchase Intentions 
Hypothesis 1a predicts that consumers with high prevention pride will have lower 
repurchase intentions than those with high promotion pride. Hypothesis 1b predicts 
that consumers with low pride will be likely to repurchase, independent of their self-
regulatory goals. A 2 × 2 ANOVA of repurchase intentions revealed a main effect of 
pride (F(1, 116) = 7.14, p < .01) and self-regulatory goals (F(1, 116) = 4.57, p < .05). 
Repurchase intentions were lower in the high-pride conditions (M = 4.58) than in the 
low-pride conditions (M = 4.96), and lower in the prevention conditions (M = 4.62) 
than in the promotion conditions (M = 4.92). More importantly, these main effects 
were qualified by a significant pride × self-regulatory goals interaction, F(1, 116) = 
11.87, p < .01 (see Figure 2.1). In support of hypothesis 1a, planned contrasts showed 
that participants with high prevention pride were less likely to repurchase (M = 4.19) 
than those with high promotion pride (M = 4.98; F(1, 116) = 15.58, p < .001). In 
support of hypothesis 1b, participants with low promotion (M = 4.87) and those with 
low prevention pride (M = 5.05) were equally likely to repurchase, irrespective of 
their self-regulatory goals (F < 1). 
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To test whether this effect is independent of satisfaction (hypothesis 2), we 
performed a 2 × 2 ANCOVA on repurchase intentions, in which satisfaction was a 
significant covariate (F(1, 115) = 8.24, p < .01), and did not interact with any of the 
experimental factors. In support of hypothesis 2, all of the significant relationships 
documented in the 2 × 2 ANOVA, including the predicted pride × self-regulatory 
goals interaction (F(1, 115) = 11.48, p = .001), remained significant. Again, 
participants with high prevention pride reported lower repurchase intentions (M = 
4.18) than participants with high promotion pride (M = 4.89; F(1, 115) = 13.26, p < 
.001). No effects were evident for participants with low pride (MPrevention = 5.12 vs. 
MPromotion = 4.90; F(1, 115) = 1.26, p > .25). This shows that pride and self-regulatory 
goals influence consumers’ repurchase decisions over and above consumer 
satisfaction.  
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Discussion 
Study 1 indicates that, rather than all positive emotions being generally conducive to 
repurchase, the effect of pride on consumers’ repurchase intentions is contingent on 
their self-regulatory goals. Consumers with high prevention pride are less likely to 
repurchase than those with high promotion pride; in contrast, no such difference 
arises for low-pride consumers. Also, these effects are independent of consumer 
satisfaction. Hence, to understand the behavioral consequences of emotions it seems 
important to consider the type of self-regulatory goals that consumers pursue. 
 
STUDY 2: INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN REGULATORY 
FOCUS AND THE PRIDE-REPURCHASE LINK 
Study 2 tests whether the findings of Study 1 generalize to chronic individual 
differences in self-regulatory goals. It thus allows us not only to replicate the results 
of Study 1, but also to extend them to situations where differences in self-regulatory 
goals are chronic. 
 
Method 
A total of 204 undergraduate students (171 females) participated in return for class 
credit. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the conditions in a two-group 
design (high vs. low pride). Participants first completed the 11-item Regulatory Focus 
Questionnaire (RFQ; Higgins et al. 2001), that consists of two orthogonal subscales 
assessing chronic promotion and chronic prevention goal orientation. The promotion 
subscale (6 items) measures the extent to which an individual has chronically 
experienced promotion success (e.g., “I feel like I have made progress toward being 
successful in my life”). The 5-item prevention subscale assesses the extent to which 
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an individual has chronically experienced prevention success (e.g., “How often did 
you obey rules and regulations that were established by your parents?”). These items 
are rated on a 5-point scale (1= Never or seldom; 5 = Very often), and the responses 
are averaged to calculate distinct promotion and prevention scores. Higher scores on 
the separate subscales indicate greater chronic promotion and prevention goal 
orientations. The RFQ has displayed good reliability, validity, and strong test-retest 
reliability (Higgins et al. 2001). In the present study, both subscales were reliable 
 Promotion  Prevention = .73) and uncorrelated (r = .10, p > .15), which is desirable. 
Next, participants were introduced to the same stimuli and measures used in Study 1 
(rPride = .67, rSatisfaction    Repurchase Intentions = .87), with the only difference that 
manipulations for regulatory goals were not included in the scenarios. That is, the 
word “gain” and the phrase “avoid losing” were not used. As in Study 1, the pride 
manipulation was effective (see Table 2.2). 
 
Results and Discussion 
To test whether pride and chronic individual differences in self-regulatory goals 
influence repurchase intentions in the hypothesized directions, repurchase intentions 
were submitted to a multiple regression with the following five predictors: (1) type of 
pride (-1 = low pride, 1 = high pride), (2) RFQ promotion, (3) RFQ prevention, (4) 
the interaction between 1 and 2, and (5) the interaction between 1 and 3. The results 
are summarized in Table 2.3. 
                                                                                                  
 
TABLE 2.2. Study 2: Effects of Pride and Chronic Differences in Regulatory Focus on Repurchase Intentions, With and Without 
Controlling for Satisfaction 
Satisfaction omitted  Satisfaction included  
Predictors 
  t p   t p 
Pride -.25 -3.83 <.001  -.30 -4.71 <.001 
RFQ promotion .10 1.39 .167  .08 1.24 .215 
RFQ prevention -.18 -2.67 .008  -.18 -2.82 .005 
Pride ° RFQ promotion .03 .45 .653  .02 .25 .800 
Pride ° RFQ prevention -.20 -2.98 .003  -.15 -2.32 .022 
Satisfaction  --- --- ---  .33 5.16 <.001 
R2 .134  .237 
F (df), p value 6.104 (5, 198), p < .001  10.118 (6, 197), p <.001 
 
                                                                                                  
 
TABLE 2.3. Study 2: Means as a Function of Pride and Self-Regulatory Goals 














Pride  3.96 (1.50)  4.29 (1.39)  5.52 (1.29)  5.84 (0.89) 
Satisfaction  5.61 (0.77)  5.41 (0.81)  5.65 (1.26)  5.95 (0.79) 
Repurchase intentions  4.89 (0.84)  4.91 (0.93)  3.99 (0.96)  4.82 (0.78) 
NOTE.–All variables range from 1 to 7. Standard deviations are shown in parentheses. n = 51 for each cell.  
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Hypotheses 1a and 1b predict that chronic prevention pride, but not chronic 
promotion pride, will lead to lower repurchase intentions among consumers with high 
pride. Consistent with Study 1, the main effects of pride (β = -.25, p < .001) and RFQ 
prevention (β = -.18, p = .008) show that both decreased repurchase intentions. More 
importantly, there was a significant negative interaction between pride and RFQ 
prevention (β = -.20, p = .003), indicating that higher levels of both lead to lower 
repurchase intentions. This supports hypothesis 1a. In contrast, the interaction 
between pride and RFQ promotion was non-significant (β = .03, p = .653). This 
result, together with the negative main effect of pride, supports hypothesis 1b that 
lower pride leads to higher repurchase intentions, independent of promotion focus.  
In order to clarify the nature of this two-way interaction, we used the 
procedure proposed and implemented by Higgins et al. (2001). Participants were 
classified in terms of whether, compared to others, they were relatively more chronic 
promotion- or chronic prevention-oriented on the basis of a median split on the 
difference between their RFQ promotion and RFQ prevention scores (the median was 
-.07). As a check, a t-test was run to ascertain whether the two groups formed actually 
differed in their regulatory focus scores. As expected, the chronic promotion focus 
group had a higher promotion orientation (M = 3.97) than the chronic prevention 
focus group (M = 3.47; t(202) = -7.58, p < .001). Similarly, the chronic prevention 
focus group had a higher prevention orientation (M = 4.21) than the chronic 
promotion focus group (M = 3.31; t(202) = 10.66, p < .001). 
A two-way ANOVA with repurchase intentions as the dependent variable 
revealed a significant pride × self-regulatory goals interaction, F(1, 200) = 10.65, p = 
.001. Within the high-pride condition, participants with chronic prevention orientation 
reported having lower repurchase intentions (M = 3.99) than participants with chronic 
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promotion orientation (M = 4.82; F(1, 200) = 19.74, p < .001). As expected, no 
differences were found for low-pride participants (MPrevention = 4.89 vs. MPromotion = 
4.91), F < 1. Consistent with Study 1, the effect of pride on repurchase intentions is 
contingent on consumers’ chronic regulatory focus, but only among consumers with 
high pride (hypotheses 1a and 1b). 
We tested hypothesis 2’s prediction that the influence of pride and self-
regulatory goals on repurchase intentions is independent of consumer satisfaction by 
adding satisfaction to the original multiple regression analysis, and by examining the 
change in the original parameters. The results are shown in the last column of Table 
2.3. As expected, satisfaction significantly predicts repurchase intentions (β = .33, p < 
.001). More importantly, in support of hypothesis 2, the pride × RFQ prevention 
interaction remains significant after controlling for satisfaction (β = -.15, p = .022). 
As in Study 1, pride and self-regulatory goals, rather than satisfaction, account for the 
pattern of results observed for the repurchase measure. 
Jointly, Studies 1 and 2 show that situational and chronic individual 
differences in self-regulatory goals influence the emotion-behavior link in a similar 
manner. In high pride, situational or chronic prevention orientation is associated with 
lower intention to repurchase than is situational or chronic promotion orientation; no 
differences arise in low pride. Again, these effects are independent of consumer 
satisfaction. 
 
STUDY 3: INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS AS THE  
MEDIATING MECHANISM 
Study 3 tests whether the phenomenon observed in the first two studies is caused by 
differences in consumers’ information requirements (hypothesis 3). An additional 
                                                                                                  
 29 
objective of Study 3 is to provide a more direct test that the effects uncovered in the 
prior studies do not reflect the effects of negative self-conscious emotions. 
Specifically, one could argue that, in the high prevention-pride condition, negotiating 
a discount to avoid paying extra money may have triggered negative self-conscious 
emotions (e.g., embarrassment) in addition to pride, thereby reducing repurchase 
intentions. Finally, we use a new product category to increase generalizability. 
 
Method  
A total of 192 undergraduate students (107 females) participated in return for course 
credit and were randomly assigned to a 2 (high vs. low pride) ° 2 (promotion vs. 
prevention goals) between-subjects design. Participants read a shoe-purchasing 
scenario. Pride and self-regulatory goals were manipulated as in Study 1. The 
scenario for the high-pride/promotion [prevention] condition is reported below: 
 
You are planning to buy a new pair of shoes. You start looking for it today. You find 
a nice pair of shoes at the Foot and Co. shoe store and you decide to buy these shoes. 
Although some shoes are on sale with a $25 discount, the specific shoes that you like 
are not. These shoes are priced at $100. You realize that you could gain [avoid losing] 
money if the shoes you like were also on sale. You decide to approach the 
salesperson. The salesperson indicates that the price is nonnegotiable. Yet, due to 
your good negotiation skills, you successfully manage to gain [avoid losing] $25. 
 
In the low-pride/promotion [prevention] condition the last sentences read: 
“Like the other shoes in the store, the specific shoes that you like are on sale. These 
shoes, regularly priced at $100, have a $25 discount. You realize that you could gain 
[avoid losing] money if you buy the shoes now. You decide to approach the 
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salesperson. The salesperson is willing to help you, and you buy the shoes. With this 
purchase you gained [avoided losing] $25.” 
After reading the scenario, participants were first asked to assess both the 
necessity of obtaining information on other providers and the sufficiency of having 
information on the current provider in order to make a decision in the future. Each 
measure consisted of four seven-point items anchored at “not at all/very much.” The 
order of the items measuring necessity and sufficiency was systematically varied 
across participants, and no order effect was found. The items measuring necessity 
ZHUH  ³7RZKDWH[WHQWLVYLVLWLQJPDQ\VKRHVWRUHVQHFHVVDU\IRUPDNLQJD
good decision?”; “Do you think that you must look in several different stores before 
choosing where to buy shoes?”; “How important is it to obtain information on other 
shoe stores to make a good purchase in the future?”; and “Before deciding where to 
buy shoes, do you feel that it is required to check multiple stores?” The items 
measuring sufficiencyZHUH  ³'R\RXWKLQNWKDWRQDVLPLODURFFDVLRQJRLQJ
to Foot and Co. is sufficient in order to make a good decision?”; “Do you feel that 
you can make a good decision by simply considering the Foot and Co. store after this 
experience?”; “To what extent is having information on the Foot and Co. store 
enough to choose where to buy shoes?”; and “Is visiting the Foot and Co. store 
something that you feel is suitable to make a good purchase in the future?” Both 
scales were negatively correlated with each other (r = -.28, p < .001), and a factor 
analysis resulted in a two-factor solution (variance explained = 61%) with the 
predicted factor loadings. 
1H[W SDUWLFLSDQWV UHSRUWHG WKHLU UHSXUFKDVH LQWHQWLRQV      FRPSOHWHG
manipulation checks for pride (r = .65) and regulatory focus, and reported their 
satisfaction (r = .65) on the same scales as in Studies 1 and 2. An extra item was 
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added to check the regulatory focus manipulation (r = .73): “Obtaining the $25 
discount was, in your opinion, a way to:” (1 = Move away from a negative outcome; 
7 = Move toward a positive outcome). Finally, negative emotions were assessed by 
three seven-SRLQWLWHPV  DQFKRUHGDW³QRWDWDOOJXLOW\YHU\JXLOW\´³QRWDWDOO




Manipulation Checks  
The manipulation for self-regulatory goals was effective (MPrevention = 3.09 vs. 
MPromotion = 5.64; F(1, 188) = 235.20, p < .001). The pride manipulation was also 
effective. High-pride scenarios (relative to low-pride scenarios) were associated with 
greater pride (M = 5.77 vs. 4.14; F(1, 188) = 86.19, p < .001). No other effects were 
significant for all measures (see Table 2.4). 
 
Satisfaction 
Replicating Studies 1 and 2, a 2 ° 2 ANOVA on satisfaction yielded only a main 
effect of pride (MLow Pride = 5.39 vs. MHigh Pride = 5.77; F(1, 188) = 8.20, p < .01). 
 
Negative Self-Conscious Emotions 
As expected, there were no differences between conditions on participants’ self-
reports of negative self-conscious emotions (all F’s < 1). Overall, participants did not 
report feeling negative self-conscious emotions (MOverall = 2.24). 
                                                                                                  
 
TABLE 2.4. Study 3: Means as a Function of Pride and Self-Regulatory Goals 














Manipulation check for self-regulatory goals  3.05 (1.11)  5.57 (1.11)  3.14 (1.18)  5.70 (1.19) 
Pride  4.08 (1.48)  4.20 (1.34)  5.82 (0.87)  5.72 (1.08) 
Satisfaction  5.30 (1.03)  5.48 (0.86)  5.76 (0.91)  5.77 (0.83) 
Negative self-conscious emotions  2.07 (1.01)  2.27 (1.02)  2.35 (1.19)  2.26 (1.01) 
Sufficiency  4.72 (1.07)  4.60 (0.84)  3.51 (0.90)  4.55 (1.14) 
Necessity  3.29 (1.08)  3.28 (0.79)  4.80 (1.01)  3.42 (0.91) 
Repurchase intentions  4.90 (0.99)  4.81 (0.75)  3.83 (1.12)  4.84 (1.10) 
NOTE.–All variables range from 1 to 7. Standard deviations are shown in parentheses. n = 48 for each cell.  
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Repurchase Intentions 
The results of a 2 ° 2 ANOVA on repurchase intentions replicated the findings 
obtained in the prior studies (see Table 2.4). In particular, the expected pride ° self-
regulatory goals interaction was significant (F(1, 188) = 14.39, p < .001). Repurchase 
intentions were lower in the high prevention-pride condition than in the high 
promotion-pride condition (M = 3.83 vs. 4.84; F(1, 188) = 24.31, p < .001), and there 
were no differences in the low-pride conditions (F < 1). Thus, as in the previous 
studies, hypotheses 1a and 1b are supported. Consistent with hypothesis 2, this 
interaction remained significant after controlling for satisfaction (F(1, 187) = 17.89, p 
< .001), again reflecting the same pattern of means. 
 
Information Requirements: Sufficiency versus Necessity 
In support of our reasoning, the pride × self-regulatory goals interaction significantly 
predicted both sufficiency (F(1, 188) = 16.49, p < .001) and necessity (F(1, 188) = 
24.67, p < .001). That is, examining the means across conditions (see Table 2.4), 
participants in the high prevention-pride condition were less likely to consider 
information on the current provider sufficient to make a decision than those in the 
high promotion-pride condition (M = 3.51 vs. 4.55; F(1, 188) = 26.56, p < .001), 
whereas participants in the low-pride conditions were equally likely to consider 
information on the current provider sufficient (MPrevention = 4.72 vs. MPromotion = 4.60; 
F < 1). In contrast, participants in the high prevention-pride condition were more 
likely to consider information on alternative providers necessary than those in the 
high promotion-pride condition (M = 4.80 vs. 3.42; F(1, 188) = 50.10, p < .001), 
whereas there was no difference in the low-pride conditions (MPrevention = 3.29 vs. 
MPromotion = 3.28; F < 1).  
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Mediation analysis  
For more support that information requirements (sufficiency vs. necessity) account 
for the influence of pride and self-regulatory goals on repurchase intentions 
(hypothesis 3), we conducted mediational analyses according to the guidelines 
proposed by Baron and Kenny (1986). In the following set of regression analyses, 
pride was coded as a 1 for the high-pride condition, and as -1 for the low-pride 
condition. The promotion condition was coded as 1, and the prevention condition as a 
-1. As displayed in Figure 2.2, the first regression showed that the pride × self-
regulatory goals interaction had a significant effect on repurchase intentions (  = .25, 
t = 3.79, p < .001). The following regressions showed that the pride × self-regulatory 
goals interaction also had a significant effect on both sufficiency (  = .27, t = 4.06, p 
< .001) and necessity (  = -.30, t = -4.97, p < .001). Finally, when pride, self-
regulatory goals, and information requirements were simultaneously entered into the 
model to predict repurchase intentions, the effects of necessity (  = -.20, t = -2.63, p < 
.01) and sufficiency (  = .34, t = 4.90, p < .001) were significant in the expected 
directions. That is, considering information on alternative providers as necessary was 
related to lower intentions to repurchase, whereas considering information on the 
current provider as sufficient was related to higher intentions to repurchase. 
Importantly, in this latter model, the interactive effect of pride and self-regulatory 
goals lost its significance (  = .10, t = 1.52, p > .12). Together, these results provide 
support for the mediational role of information requirements.   
                                                                                                  
 
FIGURE 2.2. Study 3: Results of the Mediation Analysis 
 
 
Note.–Numbers are standardized regression weights.  
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Discussion 
The results of Study 3 replicate once more the effects observed in the previous 
studies. More importantly, the results indicate that the effect of pride and self-
regulatory goals on repurchase intentions is mediated by consumers’ information 
requirements, as hypothesized. In addition, Study 3 shows no influence of the 
manipulations on self-reported feelings of negative self-conscious emotions, 
suggesting that the observed behavioral effects are driven by pride and regulatory 
goals, an not by negative self-conscious emotions.  
 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Contrary to common thinking in marketing that positive emotions are generally 
conducive to favorable behavioral intentions, pride can reduce consumers’ repurchase 
intentions. This research demonstrates that the type of self-regulatory goals that 
consumers have is a key factor moderating the impact of pride on repurchase 
intentions. Results from three studies show that consumers with high prevention pride 
are less likely to repurchase than those with high promotion pride, whereas no 
difference arises for low-pride consumers. This phenomenon generalizes across 
situational (Studies 1 and 3) and chronic differences in regulatory focus (Study 2), 
and the effects are independent of satisfaction (Studies 1-3), and negative self-
conscious emotions (Study 3). Finally, this research shows that these effects are 
paralleled by differences in consumers’ information requirements (sufficiency vs. 
necessity) (Study 3). The consistency of the findings across multiple measures of self-
regulatory goals and different stimuli highlights the importance of specific emotions 
and regulatory focus effects in consumer behavior contexts. 
These findings contribute to regulatory focus research in several ways. First, 
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previous research has shown that regulatory focus influences the type and intensity of 
experienced emotions (Higgins, Shah, and Friedman 1997), and the reliance on 
affective information in persuasion (Pham and Avnet 2004). Our results extend this by 
demonstrating that consumers’ self-regulatory goals are also a key factor moderating 
the impact of emotions on behavior. Second, to our knowledge the present research is 
the first to show that consumers with high promotion pride and those with high 
prevention pride differ in the information they require in order to make a decision. 
Our research shows that, in high pride, consumers with a promotion focus consider 
current information as sufficient to make a decision, whereas consumers with a 
prevention focus consider that obtaining additional information is necessary to make a 
decision. This extends previous work that links the promotion and prevention systems 
with the use of distinct strategic means (eagerness vs. vigilance) to attain desired ends 
(Higgins et al. 2001), by showing that these two systems also differ in the type of 
information requirements (sufficiency vs. necessity) that they evoke. 
The current research also has implications for recent theorizing on positive 
emotions. Research by Fredrickson (2001) suggests that positive emotions may 
broaden individuals’ thought-action repertoires. Our results extend this by suggesting 
that this broadening effect may be contingent on consumers’ regulatory goals, and that 
narrowing may occur under a promotion focus. Further research is needed to examine 
whether this broadening versus narrowing effect emerges for other positive emotions 
and motivational principles beyond the ones studied here. 
The findings reported in this research also speak to the pricing and promotions 
literature. Previous research has found that perceived responsibility for obtaining a 
discount elicits positive feelings (with pride being the dominant emotion), and 
enhances the likelihood of repurchase (Schindler 1998). Our research extends this by 
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showing when and why the reverse effect can occur. We found that the impact of 
pride on repurchase intentions is contingent on consumers’ regulatory focus, and that 
this effect reflects differences in consumers’ information requirements. Also, our 
findings indicate that this phenomenon is independent of satisfaction, underscoring 
the relevance of adopting a specific-emotion approach (e.g., Zeelenberg and Pieters 
1999). 
Future research could draw on the notion of regulatory fit (Higgins 2002) to 
explore the joint effects of chronic individual and temporarily induced differences in 
regulatory focus on behavior. For instance, one could argue that consumers’ response 
to price promotions framed as opportunities to gain or to avoid paying extra money 
may differ according to their chronic regulatory focus. Specifically, consumers with 
chronic promotion pride may derive higher subjective value from price promotions 
framed as gains than as nonlosses. 
In conclusion, the present research sheds light on an important and unexplored 
aspect of consumer behavior. We show that, in addition to their independent 
influences on behavior, positive emotions and motivational principles jointly 
influence both the decisions that consumers make and the patterns of information 
acquisition that they use to reach these decisions. In this way, the present chapter 
shows how positive emotions may have negative returns. 















BECAUSE PEOPLE OFTEN strive to attain multiple goals simultaneously, everyday life 
seems a juggling act between, among others, working, making time to be with family 
and friends, trying to find that special someone, and exercising. Although “having it 
all” is certainly an attractive prospect, there are often limits on how many goals one 
can pursue at a given time. Attempts to attain all of one’s goals are constrained by the 
fact that pursuing each goal requires energy, time, and attention, with only a limited 
pool of personal resources being available for pursuing those goals at any point in 
time (Muraven, Tice, and Baumeister 1998; Shallice 1972; Wilensky 1983). Indeed, 
the presence of two or more desirable goals leads to an approach-approach conflict in 
which moving toward one of the goals may even result in moving away from at least 
one other goal, as suggested by classic research on motivation (Miller 1944; Lewin 
1935). For example, it is hard to quit smoking and try to control eating behavior 
(Mizes et al. 1998) or alcohol consumption (Hays et al. 1999) at the same time. As a 
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result, much of our daily activity involves making decisions about in which goals to 
invest time and energy next. This task of reconciling the competing demands that 
multiple goals place on an individual’s pool of limited resources calls for a theory of 
multiple goal pursuit that accounts for selectivity in effort allocation among different 
goals over time.  
Although the simultaneous pursuit of multiple goals appears to be the norm in 
everyday life (Atkinson and Birch 1970; Dodge, Asher, and Parkhurst 1989; Miller, 
Galanter, and Pribram 1960; Simon 1967) and we know much about the well-being 
implications of multiple goal conflicts (e.g., Emmons and King 1988; Riediger and 
Freund 2004; Schmuck and Sheldon 2001) and the determinants of successful single-
goal pursuit (cf. Austin and Vancouver 1996; Locke and Latham 1990; Vohs and 
Baumeister 2004), much less is known about the flow of goal-directed behavior in 
multiple-goal striving. This leaves foundational questions regarding the dynamics of 
multiple goal pursuit unanswered. 
Given multiple goals, how do individuals determine which goals are most 
important to attend to at a given time? And when do individuals recalibrate their 
system of goal priorities from one time to the next? Specifically, when will 
individuals, already pursuing one goal, persist in that goal domain, abandon the goal, 
or shift to an alternative goal? In this chapter, we address these questions by 
developing and testing a model of how individuals regulate the allocation of effort 
between multiple goals over time. Understanding this may provide important insights 
into the dynamics of goal system functioning. We propose that the course of action 
that an individual will follow when striving toward multiple goals is guided jointly by 
the emotions that flow from ongoing goal pursuit and the proximity to goal 
attainment. In particular, we predict that both positive and negative goal-related 
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emotions can lead to persisting and shifting in goal pursuit, and that these seemingly 
opposing effects depend on the pattern of change in goal proximity.  
Results from two studies, using longitudinal daily-diary (Study 1) and 
experimental (Study 2) methodologies, support the model and its predictions. 
Specifically, they demonstrate that when attaining a focal goal is remote, positive 
emotions lead to an increase in effort in that domain, by diverting resources from 
alternative goal strivings. In contrast, negative emotions in that case prompt 
individuals to disengage from further effort, and instead to shift effort to other goals. 
However and importantly, these relationships are reversed when goal attainment is 
nearby. Close to the goal, positive emotions lead to coasting, and promote a shift of 
effort to alternative goals. Negative emotions, on the other hand, trigger increases in 
goal effort, which entail a reduction of effort in pursuing other goals. Moreover, as 
predicted by the model, these effects are mediated by changes in expectancies of goal 
success.  
Taken together, the findings demonstrate that people respond flexibly and 
adaptively to the ongoing challenge of simultaneously pursuing multiple goals by 
using emotions and goal proximity to regulate the flow of goal-directed effort 
between these goals over time. This provides a parsimonious account of the dynamics 
of multiple goal pursuit. 
 
THE MULTIPLE GOAL PURSUIT MODEL 
Our model of the dynamics of multiple goal pursuit and the predictions that 
follow from it are depicted in Figure 3.1. It distinguishes three ways in which 
individuals can target their effort in multiple-goal environments: (a) 
sustaining/increasing effort in the focal goal, (b) reducing effort in that goal domain 
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and reallocating effort to alternative goals, or (c) disengaging from the focal goal and 
shifting effort allocation toward other goals. The specific course of action that the 
individual will follow is expected to be contingent on the emotions stemming from 
goal pursuit and, critically, on the proximity to goal attainment. Further, we predict 
that these influences are driven by a pattern of change in expectancies about the 
likelihood of goal success. The following sections describe the components of the 
model in more detail. 
 
Motivational Influences of Goal-Relevant Emotions 
Emotion is integral to goal pursuit,4 and much of goal-directed behavior is 
accompanied by positive and negative emotions (Bagozzi, Baumgartner, and Pieters 
1998; Carver and Scheier 1990; Frijda, Kuipers, and ter Schure 1989). Simon (1967) 
already suggested that emotions are a central mechanism driving moment-to-moment 
reevaluation and reprioritization of one’s goals in multiple-goal environments, and 
this is central in our research here. Positive goal-related emotions arise when 
individuals move toward or have succeeded in reaching a given goal. Negative goal-
related emotions occur when they are moving away from a goal or have failed to 
attain it (see Figure 3.1). Because emotions provide a signal for the effectiveness of 
goal-directed behavior, they are likely to also play an important role in the selective 
investment of personal resources across multiple goals over time, but the issue is how. 
                                                           
4 Throughout this chapter, we focus on emotions that occur in response to goal strivings, rather than on 
broad affective states (i.e., moods) that lack a specific referent and are thus not specific to goal pursuit 
(Clore, Schwarz, and Conway 1994). 
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Figure 3.1. Multiple goal pursuit model 
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Negative emotions
Failed goal? Attained goal?
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Two opposing predictions concerning the motivational role of goal-related 
emotions on multiple goal pursuit, however, can be derived from the literature. One 
stream of research builds on the well-known hedonic principle of human motivation, 
which suggests that people want to approach pleasure and avoid pain (Bentham 
1789/1948; Freud 1920/1950). Accordingly, it predicts that positive emotions 
stemming from goal pursuit should lead individuals to continue an ongoing activity or 
even to immerse themselves in it more deeply, and negative emotions to disengage 
from ongoing activities or goals (e.g., Cofer 1981; Fredrickson 2001; Herrald and 
Tomaka 2002). As a case in point, Ford (1987) concluded, in a literature review, that 
positive emotions (e.g., satisfaction, joy) evolved to encourage people to sustain 
effective behaviors in which they are making progress toward a valued goal that has 
not yet been achieved. Negative emotions (e.g., discouragement, downheartedness), 
on the other hand, evolved to encourage people to abandon ineffective behaviors and 
unrewarding persistence toward unattainable goals. 
If this logic is extended to a multiple goal context, it would imply that positive 
emotions should call for greater investments of effort in the goal domain to which 
they are attached, by diverting resources from alternative goals. Negative emotions, 
on the other hand, would then lead individuals to disengage from additional effort to 
pursue the current goal, and instead to redirect the effort to valued alternative goals, in 
an attempt to minimize the unpleasant feelings stemming from failure in goal pursuit. 
Although this account of the role of emotions in effort allocation across 
multiple goals seems plausible, a recently advanced second stream of research 
suggests that the opposite effect may occur as well. Carver and Scheier (1998; Carver 
2003) have taken a very different stance based on evidence that positive emotions 
serve as a cue that progress toward a goal is unfolding at a faster and negative 
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emotions at a slower than expected rate (see also Hsee and Abelson 1991; Lawrence, 
Carver, and Scheier 2002). Building on this velocity hypothesis, they further 
hypothesized that, given multiple goals, positive emotions should always prompt 
individuals to coast or slow down in the goal domain to which the emotions pertain, 
so that the rate of progress returns to the criterion rate, freeing up personal resources 
that can then be channeled toward other goals. In contrast, negative emotions should 
prompt individuals to work harder (e.g., Cervone et al. 1994), in an attempt to reverse 
the insufficiency of progress in that goal domain, which entails a reduction of effort 
allocation to other goals (see also Simon 1967). However, as Carver (2004) recently 
pointed out, “the ideas just outlined are more than just a little speculative” (p. 33). 
Empirical research has yet to address these predictions.  
These two contrasting predictions about the effects of positive and negative 
emotions on multiple goal pursuit that can be derived from the application of the 
hedonic principle of human motivation and Carver and Scheier’s (1998) cybernetic 
control model to multiple-goal environments appear conflicting. The question thus 
remains how positive and negative emotions influence the selective allocation of 
effort between alternative goals over time. We discuss next how these opposing 
predictions can be reconciled.  
 
The Role of Goal Proximity 
We propose that whether positive and negative emotions ultimately cause one to step 
up, coast, give up the current goals, or take up pursuit of another goal is determined 
by goal proximity; that is, the size of the discrepancy between the present and the 
desired goal state (see Figure 3.1). The importance of distance to the goal, in general, 
has been emphasized early on in motivation research (Lewin 1938; Locke and Latham 
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1990). Indeed, goal proximity plays a major role in directing attention, motivation, 
and goal effort. Goal discrepancies, for instance, trigger in individuals attempts to 
reduce them by increasing goal-directed efforts (Carver and Scheier 1998). 
Nonetheless, when the magnitude of the discrepancies is seen as being too large, goal-
directed effort may not take place at all, rather than being maximal in response to the 
high need for corrective action (Kernan and Lord 1988). This suggests, as shown in 
Figure 3.1, that the pattern of resource allocation among multiple goals is not only 
sensitive to the rate of goal progress, signaled by the valence of goal-related emotions 
(positive or negative), but also to the state of goal progress, indicated by goal 
proximity (distant or close).  
In other words, we propose that experiencing positive and negative goal-
related emotions when goal attainment is distant has diametrically opposed 
motivational implications relative to experiencing those same emotions when goal 
attainment is close. Specifically, we predict that individuals who experience positive 
emotions following success in goal pursuit are likely to increase their goal-directed 
efforts when they are far from reaching the goal, but instead to decrease such efforts 
when they are closer (see Figure 3.1, right route). That is, in situations where 
individuals are initially doing well but the effort required to reach the goal is still 
large, positive emotions lead individuals to believe that the goal is attainable if they 
maintain or increase their goal-directed effort. However, as proximity to the goal 
increases we expect that positive emotions take on a different tone. Because at this 
point the amount of effort required for goal completion is relatively low, positive 
emotions may lead individuals to coast in that domain, by rendering them complacent. 
Individuals may feel as if they have already attained the goal. Given that individuals 
have multiple goals, such tendency to coast may, in turn, promote a shift of effort to 
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other goals. 
We further predict that individuals who experience negative emotions due to 
failure in goal pursuit are likely to decrease their subsequent goal-directed effort when 
they are far from reaching the goal, but to increase it when they get closer to the goal 
(see Figure 3.1, left route). Individuals experiencing such negative emotions in the 
early stages of goal pursuit, where the amount of additional effort required for goal 
attainment is high, are likely to perceive that the goal is lost and that further effort is 
pointless. As a result, they should disengage from the focal goal and instead shift their 
efforts toward valued alternative goals in place of the current one. In contrast, when 
the goal is close, negative emotions should have the opposite effect, leading to 
increases in effort. At this point, individuals are likely to perceive that further effort 
can improve progress or even lead to goal attainment. Therefore, when individuals fall 
behind but the goal is not seen as lost, negative emotions will enhance goal-directed 
efforts, by signaling that they are not putting sufficient effort toward the goal. 
In sum, the proposed model of multiple goal pursuit specifies that whether 
positive and negative goal-related emotions will promote a concentration of effort on 
the focal goal or its reallocation to alternative goals is a changing function of moment-
to-moment goal proximity. We reason that these relationships operate within a 
feedback process in which individuals continuously revise and update the flow of 
goal-directed effort in response to the emotional and motivational outcomes of prior 
goal-directed behavior and the current goal proximity (see feedback loops in Figure 
3.1). In this way, the proposed model builds a bridge between different accounts of 
the role of emotions in multiple goal pursuit that can be derived from the traditional 
hedonic principle of human motivation and Carver and Scheier’s (1998) more recent 
cybernetic control model and shows how these are complementary rather than 
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mutually exclusive.  
 
Formation of Goal Expectancies 
Thus far, we examined how goal-related emotions and goal proximity influence the 
dynamics of multiple goal pursuit, but we did not detail the underlying process. As 
illustrated in Figure 3.1, we expect that these effects depend on the pattern of change 
in individuals’ expectancies about the degree to which the focal goal is attainable. The 
importance of goal expectancy in accounting for individuals’ level of motivation to 
work hard is central in, for instance, expectancy-value theories of achievement 
motivation (Atkinson 1964; Atkinson and Birch 1970), work motivation (Vroom 
1964), and in goal setting theory (Locke and Latham 1990). Along these lines, Carver 
and Scheier (1998) speculated that positive emotions might be linked to favorable 
expectancies and negative emotions to unfavorable expectancies, which in turn should 
shape subsequent goal pursuit. This is supported by findings that positive and negative 
affect are positively and negatively related with perceptions of expectancy, 
respectively (e.g., Erez and Isen 2002; Herrald and Tomaka 2002), and that positive, 
as opposed to negative, future expectancies are associated with higher levels of effort 
(e.g., Carver, Blaney, and Scheier 1979; Van Eerde and Thierry 1996).  
Importantly, Carver and Scheier (1998) raised the possibility that factors other 
than emotions may also influence the formation of goal expectancies, and we believe 
goal proximity to be such a factor. That is, we hypothesize that individuals will 
consider both their goal-related emotions and how close they are to goal attainment 
when forming expectancies about the likelihood of reaching a given goal. The 
resulting expectancy should, in turn, influence subsequent goal-directed efforts, as 
depicted in Figure 3.1. Specifically, when individuals are far from goal attainment 
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they will be particularly sensitive to current goal progress, signaled by the valence of 
their goal-related emotions, in assessing their expectancy of future success. Hence, 
positive emotions will lead individuals to believe that because they are doing well 
they are likely to succeed, even though considerable effort is still required to attain the 
goal. As a result, individuals should engage in effortful goal-directed behavior. In 
contrast, individuals who experience negative emotions will feel that, because they are 
doing poorly and perhaps even moving away from an already distant goal, the 
likelihood of goal attainment is low. This low expectancy might, in turn, lead them to 
disengage from the goal and to reallocate their efforts toward valued alternative goals.  
When goal attainment is near, individuals will have a generally high 
expectancy of success based on what they have already achieved. In this context, 
positive emotions will lead individuals to believe that goal attainment is certain. This 
very high expectancy may lead to coasting, by rendering individuals complacent, and 
in turn to a shift of effort to other goals. In contrast, experiencing negative emotions 
will signal that, although the goal is within reach, additional effort is still required. 
This moderate level of expectancy should, in turn, lead individuals to increase their 
effort toward the goal.  
As a consequence, whereas prior research has generally emphasized a positive 
linear link between goal expectancy and effort (Locke and Latham 1990; Mitchell 
1974; Van Eerde and Thierry 1996), our model predicts a curvilinear relationship 
between goal expectancy and effort toward the focal goal, with goal effort lowest at 
low and high levels of goal expectancy, and highest at moderate levels of goal 
expectancy. This prediction is consistent with Atkinson’s (1957) motivation theory 
which posits an inverse-U function between probability of success and performance. 
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Summary 
The proposed account of multiple goal pursuit specifies how individuals dynamically 
regulate the allocation of effort among multiple goals over time. According to the 
model, multiple goal pursuit is jointly determined by the valence of goal-related 
emotions and distance to the goal, and proximally driven by a pattern of change in 
goal expectancy over time. We now report two studies with complementary 
methodologies to test the model’s predictions. Study 1 used a longitudinal daily-diary 
approach; Study 2 was a controlled laboratory experiment.  
 
STUDY 1 
Study 1 tests our predictions about the dynamics of multiple goal pursuit using a 
daily-diary study design. This design allows us to examine how goal-related emotions 
and goal proximity influence participants’ effort allocation in pursuing two valued 
personal goals on a day-to-day basis throughout a 21-day period. In this study, we 
targeted the pursuit of a weight-loss goal and another unrelated (but also important) 
personal goal identified individually by each participant. We chose the domain of 
weight-loss as a focal goal because it is an everyday goal of importance for most 
people. For example, as many as 15 to 35% of Americans are trying to lose weight on 




Participants and Design 
Participants were recruited to participate in a study of weight-loss and daily life. The 
study was restricted to women who wanted to decrease their bodyweight over a period 
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of 21 days. Compared to men, women are about twice as likely to report a desire to 
lose weight (Horm and Anderson 1993). To ensure that weight-loss would be largely 
a function of personal effort, women who wanted to lose weight via dieting and 
exercising (i.e., without professional help or weight-loss medication) were selected. 
The starting date for the study was set for the second week of January, which is a 
typical weight-loss period as New Year’s resolutions predominantly address plans to 
lose weight (Norcross, Ratzin, and Payne 1989). A total of 82 female undergraduate 
students (mean age = 19.04 years) who met the criteria participated in return for 
course credit. Of the 82 participants, 62 participants were randomly assigned to the 
diary condition, and 20 participants were randomly assigned to the control (no-diary) 
condition, described in more detail later. 
 
Procedure 
Upon arrival for the first session, participants were seated at a table in a private room. 
After reading and signing an informed consent form, each participant attended a 15-20 
minutes orientation session individually. At this orientation session, participants were 
first weighed, and then completed a questionnaire in which they indicated what their 
ideal body weight was, and how much weight they wanted to lose in the next three 
weeks. Participants were also asked to identify another important personal goal that 
they wanted to accomplish over the next three weeks; that is, a goal that they expected 
to be on their minds during the three-week course of this study. All participants were 
able to identify another personal goal. Of the 82 participants, 71 identified a study 
goal (e.g., increase the time devoted to study; keep up with homework), 8 a financial 
goal (e.g., work more hours in a paid job; increase monetary savings; pay off debts), 
and 3 other goals (e.g., stop biting nails; devote more time to helping others). To 
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check whether the two personal goals were independent of each other and important, 
participants were then asked to rate the degree to which this other goal was related to 
their weight-loss goal, and how important it was for them to attain each of the 
personal goals (1 = not at all, 7 = very much). 
Participants assigned to the diary condition agreed to keep a daily record of 
their behavior for a total of 21 days, and were then introduced to the daily-diary form 
and the procedures for completing it. Specifically, participants were instructed to 
begin filling out the diaries the following day, complete the diaries before going to 
bed, and return each week’s set of diaries on completion. Diary forms were distributed 
in 7-day packets so that each packet would have to be completed and handed in when 
the next weekly packet was picked up, for a total of three consecutive weeks (21 
days). All participants were assured of the confidentiality and anonymity of their 
responses. At the end of the three-week period, participants attended a follow-up 
session, where they were asked to indicate the degree to which each of their personal 
goals was achieved: “To what extent were you successful in achieving this goal?” (1 = 
not at all, 7 = completely). Finally, participants were weighed again and debriefed.  
Participants in the control condition did not keep a daily diary. Their task was 
to attempt to attain their weight-loss goal and their other goal, but without keeping a 
record of their daily behavior. Hence, these participants skipped the introduction to 
the daily-diary forms and were directly scheduled for the follow-up session at the end 
of the three-week period. This control group provided an undistorted baseline against 
which the attainment of the two goals in the diary group could be compared. This 
allows us to examine whether the behavioral monitoring associated with keeping a 
daily diary induced reactive effects or not (Affleck et al. 1999). The absence of any 
differences in goal attainment between the experimental and control groups would 
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suggest that the findings are not attributable to reactivity to the diary condition, and 
generalize to individuals who do not monitor their behavior so exactingly. 
 
Diary Measures 
During the study, participants answered daily several questions about each of the 
personal goals that they had defined at the orientation session. For their weight-loss 
goal, participants were first asked to keep a record of the type and amount of food and 
beverage intake during meals and in-between meals (snacks), as well as of their 
physical activity (in minutes). They were then asked to assess how much effort they 
exerted in pursuing their weight-loss goal each day on three seven-point items 
anchored at “not at all/very much”. The items were: “How much effort have you made 
today toward achieving this goal?”; “Today, to what extent were you self-disciplined 
in pursuing this goal?”; and  “How hard did you work today toward this goal?” The 
average Cronbach’s alpha across the three weeks was .87.5 
Participants were then asked to assess the extent to which they experienced a 
number of emotions regarding their level of effort exerted to lose weight during that 
day (Bagozzi et al. 1998). They rated to what extent they experienced positive 
emotions (proud with myself, good about myself, happy with myself, and satisfied 
with myself) and negative emotions (guilty, ashamed with myself, angry at myself, 
and regretful). Ratings were made on seven-point scales (1 = not at all, 7 = very 
much). In the present study, the average reliability for both scales across the three 
                                                           
5 As a check, a follow-up content analysis of participants’ eating behavior was conducted by two 
independent coders, blind to the hypotheses, who subjectively rated how much effort each participant 
actively made toward losing weight on each day, along a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 
(very much). Inter-rater reliability was high, r = .81, p < .001. Subsequent analyses showed a high 
correlation between coder ratings and participants’ own assessment of their goal effort (r = .67, p < 
.001). More importantly, the pattern of results remained unchanged when the analyses were performed 
using these scores, as expected. 




Next, participants indicated (1 = none, 7 = a lot) how much progress they 
made toward achieving their weight-loss goal on each day (i.e., goal progress). Goal 
proximity was measured each day with two seven-point items: “In your opinion, how 
close are you to attaining your weight-loss goal?” (1 = not at all, 7 = very much) and 
“How large is the distance between your current weight and target weight?” (1 = 
small, 7 = large [reversed scored]). The average correlation between these two items 
across the three weeks was high, r = .76 (p < .001). Finally, participants were asked to 
UDWHKRZPXFKHIIRUWWKH\H[HUWHGLQSXUVXLQJWKHLURWKHUSHUVRQDOJRDOHDFKGD\  = 
.95), on the same scale used for weight loss. 
 
Diary-Data Analyses 
To test whether goal proximity moderates the impact of goal-related emotions on 
effort allocation across multiple goals in the hypothesized directions, we used the SAS 
Proc Mixed procedure for multilevel-regression models (SAS Institute 1989). This 
approach exploits the hierarchically nested design of our dataset, in which a lower 
unit (days) is nested within a higher-level unit (persons) and, thus, allows the 
simultaneous analysis of within- and between-person variation (Kenny, Kashy, and 
Bolger 1998). In line with previous diary research (Affleck et al. 1999; Mohr et al. 
2001), we included a first-order autoregressive error structure in our analyses, because 
daily observations tend to be associated with auto-correlated residuals that may bias 
standard errors and significance levels.  
                                                           
6 To test the discriminant validity of the positive and negative emotions, we conducted a confirmatory 
factor analysis (CFA). We compared a measurement model with the positive and negative items 
loading on separate factors against an alternative model with all items loading on a single factor. A chi-
square difference test (Kline 1998) demonstrated that the two-factor solution was superior (χ2difference (1) 
= 2424.38, p < .001), indicating discriminant validity between the measures. 
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In the first stage of analysis, we estimated a multilevel-regression model 
separately on the level of effort in pursuing the weight-loss goal (Ewlit) and the other 
personal goal (Eogit) on a given day with the following predictors: (1) the positive 
emotions stemming from weight-loss behavior on the previous day (PEwlit-1), (2) the 
negative emotions stemming from weight-loss behavior on the previous day (NEwlit-
1), (3) the proximity to attaining the weight-loss goal (GPwlit-1), (4) the interaction 
between positive emotions and goal proximity, (5) the interaction between negative 
emotions and goal proximity, (6) the average level of effort (b0i and c0i, which 
randomly varies across individuals), (7) the level of effort in pursuing that goal on the 
previous day to control for possible carryover effects from one day to the next day 
(Ewlit-1; Eogit-1), (8) an error term that reflects each person’s daily deviation from his 
or her own mean level of effort (weight-loss: eit1; other goal: eit2), and (9) an error term 
(weight-loss: ui1; other goal: ui2) that reflects how much each person’s average 
deviates from the overall average.  
Following recommendations by Bryk and Raudenbush (1992), all the predictor 
variables are centered around each person’s mean for each variable. This allows us to 
decompose responses at a daily level into two components, one, the average level, and 
two, changes on each day from the average level. For convenience, it is appropriate to 
interpret day-level coefficients in terms of the effects of a person being high or low on 
a given day relative to his or her own mean for that variable across days. We 
estimated the following equations predicting the level of effort for person i on day t 
(b1 to b6 and c1 to c6 represent fixed effects; i.e., the average within-person slope 
across all individuals): 
Ewlit = b0i + b1 PEwlit-1 + b2 NEwlit-1 + b3 GPwlit-1 + b4 (PEwlit-1 × GPwlit-1)  
+ b5 (NEwlit-1 × GPwlit-1) + b6 Ewlit-1 + ui1 + eit1      (1) 
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Eogit = c0i  + c1 PEwlit-1 + c2 NEwlit-1 + c3 GPwlit-1 + c4 (PEwlit-1 × GPwlit-1)  
+ c5 (NEwlit-1 × GPwlit-1) + c6 Eogit-1 + ui2 + eit2      (2) 
 
In brief, the multilevel model defined by these equations investigates whether 
and how effort allocation across multiple goals is a joint function of goal-related 
emotions and goal proximity. Our predictions about the changing role of positive and 
negative emotions in multiple goal pursuit depending on goal proximity would be 
supported if the following interaction variables in the multilevel model would be 
statistically significant for both personal goals: Positive emotions × Goal proximity 
(b5 and c5), and Negative emotions × Goal proximity (b6 and c6). To rule out the 
possibility that daily goal pursuit varied significantly as a function of individual traits, 
and how they impact the underlying processes, we included three measures that have 
EHHQ VKRZQ WR LPSDFW LQGLYLGXDOV¶ HIIRUW LQ GLHWLQJ WKH UHVWUDLQW VFDOH     
Herman and Polivy 1980), brief self-FRQWUROVFDOH  7DQJQH\%DXPHLVWHUDQG
Boone 2004), and the state self-HVWHHP VXEVFDOHV  performance    appearence = .86; 
social = .64; Heatherton and Polivy 1991). In addition, to control for goal difficulty 
effects (Locke and Latham 1990) in the weight-loss goal, we included a measure of 
goal difficulty, assessed as the amount of weight that participants’ wanted to lose as a 
percentage of their initial weight. Support for our predictions over and above these 





Participants’ mean initial weight was 146.82 lb (SD = 18.28; range: 115.08-192.68 
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lb). They ranged from 1.68% to 31.69% above the bodyweight they indicated as being 
ideal (M = 10.94%, SD = 5.72) and wanted to lose between 1.98 lb and 22.05 lb in the 
three weeks (M = 7.58 lb, SD = 3.23). Overall, participants indicated their weight-loss 
goal to be unrelated to the other personal goal that they indicated (M = 2.37, SD = 
1.41), which is desirable. Participants also reported that both personal goals were 
important for them to attain, with weight-loss being the dominant goal (MWeight-loss = 
6.04, SD = .94 vs. MOther goal = 4.98, SD = .89), F(1, 81) = 115.57, p < .001. After the 
three weeks, participants had lost on average 2.32 lb (SD = 3.05), ranging from an 
8.82 lb loss to a 3.97 lb gain. Similarly, participants reported being moderately 
successful in attaining their two personal goals at the end of the three weeks (MWeight-
loss = 3.05, SD = 1.92; MOther goal = 4.66, SD = 1.80). Importantly, there were no 
significant differences between the diary group and the control group on any of the 
measures reported above, all Fs < 1. This suggests that the behavioral monitoring 
associated with keeping a daily diary did not induce reactive effects, which is 
desirable. 
 
Influence of Goal Effort and Goal Progress on Goal-Related Emotions 
We predicted that positive goal-related emotions arise in response to movement 
toward the focal goal, and negative goal-related emotions to movement away from the 
focal goal. Thus, as depicted in Figure 3.1, high effort in goal pursuit should be 
accompanied by a perception that progress is being made toward the focal goal, which 
in turn should lead to positive goal-related emotions. In contrast, low effort should be 
accompanied by a perception of lack of progress toward the focal goal, which in turn 
should elicit negative goal-related emotions. In support of this, higher levels of effort 
in pursuing the weight-loss goal indeed elicited more positive emotions, b = .797, t = 
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51.61, p < .001, and less negative emotions, b = -.639, t = -30.98, p < .001, for each 
day. Moreover, following the mediation guidelines by Baron and Kenny (1986), the 
link between goal effort and emotions was mediated by goal progress, although not 
completely. That is, goal effort was found to influence not only the type of emotions, 
as described above, but also goal progress, b = .725, t = 25.30, p < .001. When goal 
progress was added to the regression analyses as a predictor of goal-related emotions, 
its parameter was significant for both positive, b = .087, t = 5.92, p < .001, and 
negative emotions, b = -.102, t = -5.19, p < .001, in the expected directions. In this 
latter regression, the parameter estimates for goal effort, although still significant, 
were significantly reduced for both positive, b = .734, t = 39.42, p < .001, and 
negative emotions, b = -.564, t = -22.64, p < .001, as confirmed by Sobel (1982) tests 
of mediation (ZPositive emotions = 5.76, p < .001; ZNegative emotions = 5.08, p < .001). These 
results remained unchanged after controlling for goal difficulty. Together, these 
findings indicate that, as expected, positive and negative goal-related emotions 
emerge as a result of the level of effort and progress in pursuing the focal goal. If and 
how these emotions influence future goal striving, as a function of goal proximity, is 
examined next. 
 
Multiple Goal Pursuit and the Motivational Effects of Emotions and Goal 
Proximity 
The results of the regression analyses are summarized in Table 3.1. Importantly and as 
we hypothesized, goal proximity indeed moderated the influence of goal-related 
emotions on effort allocation across multiple goals. Specifically, we found significant 
interactions between prior day’s positive emotions, following high effort in losing 
weight, and goal proximity to the weight-loss goal on next day’s effort in pursuing 
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both personal goals. We also found significant interactions between prior day’s 
negative emotions, following low effort in losing weight, and goal proximity to the 
weight-loss goal, on next day’s effort in pursuing both personal goals. Note that only 
the interaction effects were statistically significant, but none of the main effects of the 
positive and negative emotions or of goal proximity, which provides strong support 
for the proposed mechanism. 
Figure 3.2 displays these significant interaction effects graphically. In the 
figure, we plotted the predicted values of effort in pursuing the weight-loss goal and 
the other goal for participants scoring 1 SD above and below the mean of positive 
emotions, negative emotions, and goal proximity, employing common regression 
techniques (Aiken and West 1991). Clearly, when participants were far from attaining 
their weight-loss goal, positive emotions stemming from high effort in weight-loss led 
to increased subsequent effort in pursuing the weight-loss goal, b = .275, t = 4.14, p < 
.001, and to decreased subsequent effort in pursuing the other goal, b = -.270, t = -
3.11, p < .01, as predicted by our model. Conversely, when participants were close to 
attaining their weight-loss goal, positive emotions were significantly related to 
decreased subsequent effort in pursuing the weight-loss goal, b = -.341, t = -5.15,  p < 
.001, and to increased subsequent effort in pursuing the other goal, b = .188, t = 2.17,  
p < .04. 
                                                                                                  
 
TABLE 3.1. Study 1: Predicting Daily Effort Allocation 
Effort: focal goal  
(weight-loss) 
 Effort: other goal  
 
Predictors b SE  b SE 
Intercept      4.584*** .102       3.829*** .123 
Focal goal (weight-loss):      
Prior day’s positive emotions -.033 .053  -.041 .061 
Prior day’s negative emotions  .036 .040  -.003 .061 
Prior day’s goal proximity       -.004 .023   .012 .035 
Prior day’s positive emotions × Prior day’s goal proximity     -.252*** .033       .187*** .050 
Prior day’s negative emotions × Prior day’s goal proximity      .227*** .034     -.164** .053 
Prior day’s effort        -.015 .043    
Other goal:       
Prior day’s effort       -.074** .028 
† p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001.
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Figure 3.2. Today’s effort in pursuing the weight-loss goal (A) and the other 
personal goal (B) as a function of prior day’s positive and negative emotions 
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As predicted, these relationships were reversed when participants had negative 
emotions following low effort in weight-loss. When participants were far from 
attaining their weight-loss goal, negative emotions were significantly related to 
decreased subsequent effort in pursuing that goal, b = -.242, t = -4.19, p < .001, and to 
increased subsequent effort in pursuing the other goal, b =.198, t = 2.29, p < .03. 
When participants were close to their weight-loss goal, negative emotions were 
significantly related to increased subsequent effort in pursuing the weight-loss goal, b 
= .313, t = 5.29, p < .001, and to decreased subsequent effort in pursuing the other 
personal goal, b = -.203, t = -2.26, p < .03.  
 
Controlling for Individual Differences and Goal Difficulty 
For control purposes, we also examined whether the average level of effort in 
pursuing each goal varied systematically as a function of individuals’ chronic levels 
of dietary restraint, self-control, and self-esteem, and of goal difficulty. The predicted 
Positive emotions × Goal proximity (weight-loss: b = -.253, t = -7.73, p < .001; other 
goal: b = .187, t = 3.74, p < .001), and Negative emotions × Goal proximity (weight-
loss: b = .224, t = 6.50, p < .001; other goal: b = -.163, t = -3.09, p < .001) interactions 
remained significant after controlling for these individual traits and goal difficulty, 
which underlines the robustness of the findings.  
 
Discussion 
We believe these findings shed new light on the dynamics and determinants of 
multiple goal pursuit. The daily-level analyses demonstrated that goal-related 
emotions and goal proximity jointly are critical factors influencing the pattern of 
resource allocation among multiple goals. We found that positive emotions led to 
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increases in subsequent effort in the goal domain to which they are attached, but only 
when individuals were distant from attaining the goal, by diverting resources from 
alternative goals. Instead, positive emotions led to decreases in such efforts when goal 
attainment was near, by triggering a shift of effort to the pursuit of other valued goals. 
As predicted by the model, the opposite pattern of results was found for negative 
emotions following failure in goal pursuit. There, negative emotions were associated 
with a decrease in subsequent goal-directed behavior when goal attainment was far, 
which in turn promoted a shift of effort toward valued alternative goals in place of this 
one. However, as proximity to the goal increased, negative emotions triggered instead 
a rise in effort, which involved a reduction of effort in pursuing other goals. These 
results reflect the operation of feedback processes in which individuals adjust their 
day-to-day goal effort across goals in response to the emotional and motivational 
outcomes of prior goal-directed behavior, and thus the flexible and dynamic way in 
which individuals pursue multiple goals over time. Moreover, these dynamics were 
independent of goal difficulty and individual characteristics that are related to 
persistence in goal striving. 
 
STUDY 2 
The purpose of this study was to provide additional evidence on the proposed process 
underlying multiple goal pursuit, and to replicate the results of Study 1 in a controlled 
experimental setting. In particular, Study 2 tested whether the phenomena observed in 
the first study are caused by changes in individuals’ expectancy of success in reaching 
the focal goal. Also, it used unobtrusive, behavioral measures of effort allocation. 
 
 




Participants and Design 
A total of 165 female undergraduate students (mean age = 21.25 years) took part in 
the experiment in return for $8. Of these, 120 participants were randomly assigned to 
one of eight experimental conditions in a 2 (goal-related emotions: positive vs. 
negative) × 2 (goal proximity: distant vs. close) × 2 (goal relatedness: related vs. 
unrelated) between-subjects factorial design with subsequent effort in related and 
unrelated goals as the dependent variables (n = 15 per cell). The remaining 45 
participants were randomly assigned to one of three control conditions, in which they 
had to perform only one of three tasks, explained in detail later: the lexical-decision 
task, the related-goal task, and the unrelated-goal task. A schematic depiction of the 
experimental procedure is shown in Table 3.2 and detailed below. 
 
Procedure 
Phase I: Activation of Dieting Goals. Upon arrival to the laboratory, 
participants were directed to a waiting room and asked to wait for a few minutes. 
Following the procedure used by Fishbach, Friedman, and Kruglanski (2003; Study 5) 
to activate dieting goals, the waiting room contained a variety of magazines and flyers 
about exercising and dieting scattered around the tables, and nutrition- and dieting-
related posters on the walls. The experimenter pointed at the posters and flyers, and 
told participants not to pay attention to them under the pretence that these materials 
were there for use at a later study. After the waiting time, participants were brought 
into an individual cubicle with a personal computer and informed that they would be 
taking part in several unrelated studies during the 1-hour session. They were also told 
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that they would receive all instructions via a computer. After obtaining participants’ 
informed consent, the experimenter started the computer program and left.  
The first study (in fact, the manipulation check for the effectiveness of the 
activation of dieting goals) was introduced as a lexical-decision task on the computer 
(adapted from Fishbach et al. 2003; Study 5). Participants were told that they would 
first perform a word recognition task, the goal of which was to find out how fast 
people discriminate between words and non-words. Participants were initially given 
six practice trials and then went on to complete 12 experimental trials presented in 
random order. In six cases, the target string was an existing word, and in the 
remaining six cases, it was a sequence of random letters (e.g., hibbt). Of the six 
existing target words, three words were associated with dieting (slim, diet, fat) and 
three were unrelated to dieting (warm, desk, day). Participants in the first control 
group skipped the activation of the dieting goal and their sole task was to do the 
lexical-decision part of the experiment. If the dieting goals were successfully 
activated by our manipulation, response times for the dieting-related words should be 
faster in the experimental group as compared to the control group.  
Phase II: Manipulation of Goal-Related Emotions. After the 
participants in the experimental conditions completed the lexical-decision task, the 
experimenter thanked them and informed them that the second study, an investigation 
on people’s taste perception of current products in the marketplace, would now begin. 
Participants were presented with a 10 oz heaping bowl of potato chips and a glass of 
water. Along with the bowl of chips, participants were instructed to taste the chips, to 
rate them on five taste dimensions listed in the computer (e.g., crunchy, salty), and to 
indicate their purchase intention. They were told to have as many chips as they felt 
necessary to achieve accurate ratings.  
                                                                                                  
 
Table 3.2. Study 2: Schematic Experimental Structure 
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To increase the credibility of the cover story, the importance of accurate 
ratings was emphasized repeatedly. Following prior research (e.g., Herman and Mack 
1975), participants were informed that they would be given 10 minutes to complete 
the task and that, after the chips had been tasted and rated, they could help themselves 
to as many chips as they wished because the lab had “tons of them,” but they were not 
to change their initial taste ratings. The questionnaire was short enough so that it 
could be completed well within the 10 minutes, leaving participants with ample time 
to eat additional chips. After the 10-minute tasting period, the bowl of chips was 
removed and weighed to determine the amount (in oz) of chips consumed. 
Once the tasting part was completed, participants were immediately asked to 
carefully read on the computer screen five reviews about the chips written by other 
consumers (in fact, the emotion manipulation) and to answer additional questions 
about the chips. The stated purpose for reading this information was that the 
researchers were interested in learning how consumer-reviews influence people’s 
judgments. Emotions were manipulated by varying, in the second and fourth 
consumer reviews, the reference value against which participants could compare their 
efforts in self-regulating the amount of chips eaten during the tasting task. In the 
positive-emotion condition, participants read reviews that construed a low reference 
point; that is, the overall position in these reviews was that individuals are, in general, 
unable to control themselves and end up eating large amounts of chips. This, in turn, 
should lead participants to positively appraise their own behavior regarding the 
amount of chips eaten. The reviews that evoked positive emotions read: “Delicious 
chips! But I find that, like most people, I always eat way too many! I can never 
control myself. As soon as I open a pack, I always keep eating more and more until 
the last crumb. Oops!” and “These chips definitely taste good...very good indeed. It's 
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tough to open one of the bags without finishing the whole thing. I can eat an entire 
bag (the large bag, not that itty bitty snack pack) in about 8 minutes. I always get out 
of control whenever I see these chips.”  
In contrast, the negative-emotion condition focused participants on a high 
reference point; that is, the reviews implied that, in general, individuals are able to 
control themselves and only eat a small amount of chips. This, in turn, should lead 
participants to negatively appraise their own behavior regarding the amount of chips 
eaten. The reviews read: “Delicious chips! However, I seldom eat them (I can control 
myself especially with such fat snacks). As soon as I open a bag of chips, I start 
telling myself: ‘Two chips are more than enough.’ And I pretty much stay away from 
them.” and “These chips definitely taste good...very good indeed. However, as much 
as I love the flavor of chips, I have full control and do not eat this stuff at all.” The 
three remaining neutral reviews were identical across conditions (e.g., “Good texture 
and real crispness. The bags aren't half empty and the pricing is great for the quality of 
the chips!”). On the basis of these reviews, and consistent with the cover story, 
participants were then asked to indicate their purchase intention again. 
Phase III: Manipulation of Goal Proximity. Participants were then 
asked to participate in a third, ostensibly unrelated study on body health. They were 
told that the focus of the study was to provide some preliminary data that would help 
the researchers learn more about body health among university students. Participants 
were then informed that a team of researchers from a prestigious medical school had 
recently developed a new measure of body health, the Personalized Health Index 
(PHI). In reality, the PHI was designed for the sole purpose of manipulating goal 
proximity in this experiment. To increase the credibility of the cover story, 
participants were told “the PHI indicates body health after controlling for a variety of 
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different individual characteristics, including age, gender, height, weight, bone 
structure, and muscle mass. It has been shown to be more accurate and reliable than 
other measures, such as the Body Mass Index (BMI), because it takes into account the 
fact that you may be heavy but healthy.”  
Participants were then instructed to enter on the computer the required 
personal information so that their individual PHI could be computed. This included 
information on their age, gender, weight, height, number of exercise hours per week, 
and measures around the waist, shoulders, hips and thighs. To ensure the accuracy of 
the data and to increase the realism, a tape measure and a scale were made available 
for each participant to use in isolation. After entering the relevant data, the following 
information was displayed on the computer screen: (a) current PHI score, (b) optimal 
PHI score, and (c) the time, on average, necessary to achieve the optimal PHI score. 
The optimal PHI score (114 points) was identical for all participants. However, 
depending on the type of experimental condition, their current PHI score was either 2 
points above (close-goal condition) or 11 points above (distant-goal condition) their 
optimal PHI score. Also, in the close-goal condition, participants were informed that, 
on average, an excess of 2 points could be eliminated within 1 or 2 weeks of healthy 
eating and exercise. In the distant-goal condition, participants read instead that, on 
average, an excess of 11 points could be eliminated within 8 or 9 weeks. For control 
purposes, participants were then asked to indicate whether it was important for them 
to attain their optimal PHI score (1 = not at all, 7 = very much). 
Next, expectancy of success toward the focal goal of losing weight was 
measured with four 7-SRLQW LWHPV      “What is the probability that you will 
arrive at your optimal PHI in the recommended time?” (1 = not at all probable; 7 = 
highly probable); “How confident are you that you will achieve your optimal PHI 
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score within the recommended time?” (1 = not at all; 7 = very much); “Do you expect 
to succeed in reaching the PHI of 114 within the recommended time?” (1 = not at all; 
7 = very much); and “Are you optimistic about attaining your optimal PHI score 
within the recommended time?” (1 = not at all optimistic; 7 = very optimistic).  
Phase IV: Measurement of Subsequent Goal Effort. Finally and 
crucially, to examine effort allocation across different goals, participants performed 
either a task related to the focal goal (dieting) or an unrelated-goal task, representing a 
distinct goal domain. In the related-goal condition, participants were told that the 15 
minutes necessary to allow the sensory memory of the food (chips) to fade were over 
and that a second taste perception task could now start. Participants were then 
presented with a tray with five 5-ounce paper cups filled with an aversive drink 
(Apple Cider Vinegar mixed with water) and a glass of water. Apple cider vinegar is a 
drink sometimes used as a weight-loss agent, but it has quite a sour and unpleasant 
taste. Participants were informed that the drink is very effective in burning body fat 
and that the more they drink, the more weight they can lose. Finally, participants were 
asked to taste and rate the drink following a similar procedure as the one used in the 
first tasting task. Although one may desire to consume a weight-loss drink, the 
unpleasant taste of the apple cider vinegar is a great disincentive, and so participants 
must exert effort to drink it. The dependent variable was measured by recording how 
many ounces of the aversive drink participants could make themselves consume. 
There was also an additional control group. Participants in this second group 
performed only the drink tasting task to provide an undistorted baseline against which 
the amount of drink consumed in the experimental conditions could be compared. 
In the unrelated-goal condition, participants were given two unsolvable tracing 
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puzzles7 (see Table 3.2), in what they believed was another, ostensibly unrelated study 
investigating people’s creative ability. This task (adapted from Baumeister et al. 1998) 
has been widely used to measure effort, operationalized as persistence in face of 
frustration. The problem-solving task requires participants to trace over all the lines of 
two (unsolvable) geometric figures without retracing the same line twice and without 
lifting the pen from the paper, as many times as they wish. Participants were given a 
(solvable) practice puzzle first, and then received the two unsolvable puzzles to work 
on. Unbeknownst to them, the length of time they spent working on the puzzles before 
giving up was timed. There was also a control condition. For participants in this third 
control group, the only task was to work on the puzzles. Hence, this control condition 
provided an undistorted baseline against which the persistence in working on the 
puzzles in the experimental conditions could be compared.  
Phase V: Post-Experimental Questionnaire. At the end of the 
experiment, participants completed a questionnaire that included a set of manipulation 
checks (on scales ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much)) and three individual 
difference scales.8 
)LUVWWKHPDQLSXODWLRQFKHFNVIRUSRVLWLYH  DQGQHJDWLYHHPRWLRQV 
= .93) associated with the level of effort exerted toward the amount of chips eaten 
were assessed using the same scales as in Study 1. Perceived level of effort associated 
with WKHDPRXQWRIFKLSVHDWHQZDVWKHQPHDVXUHGE\WKUHHLWHPV  ³'LG\RX
have to restrain yourself from eating the chips?”; “To what extent were you self-
disciplined not to eat too many chips?”; and “How much effort did you make to 
control the amount of chips eaten?” Next, the manipulation check for perceived goal 
                                                           
7 We thank Kathleen D. Vohs for providing the puzzles used in this study. 
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proximity to reach the optimal PHI score was measured with the same two items as in 
Study 1 (r = .80). Perceived effort in drinking the aversive drink (r = .70) and working 
on the puzzles (r = .77) were measured by two items: “Did you force yourself to drink 
the weight-loss drink [to work on the puzzles]?” and “How much effort did you put 
into drinking the weight-loss drink [working on the puzzles]?” As a check on the 
effectiveness of the goal relatedness manipulation, participants were asked to indicate 
the extent to which the drink taste and the puzzle tasks were related to the chips’ 
tasting task, and whether the chips’ tasting task, the drink tasting task, and the puzzle 
task were related to dieting. Finally, participants completed three individual difference 
scales that were used as controls in the subsequent analyses WKHUHVWUDLQWVFDOH  
.82), the brief self-FRQWURO VFDOH      DQG WKH VWDWH VHOI-esteem subscales 
 performance  appearence  social = .62). 
Phase VI: Debriefing. After completing the post-experimental 
questionnaire, a funneled debriefing procedure (adapted from Chartrand and Bargh 
1996) was used to assess whether participants had guessed the true nature of the 
experiment and had suspected any relation between the different tasks. No participant 
showed any awareness or suspicion of the manipulations or the link between the 
different tasks. Participants were then thoroughly debriefed about the purpose of the 
experiment and care was taken to explain the false nature of the PHI feedback and the 
puzzles’ tracing task. The use of deception in this experiment was explained, and all 
questions about the study were clarified. Finally, participants were thanked and asked 
not to discuss the experiment with their colleagues.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
8 The manipulation checks were included at the end of the experiment, to avoid alerting participants to 
the relevance of the manipulated variables for the present study. Further, a pretest (n = 32) was 
conducted where the order of the manipulation checks, either at the end of each task or at the end of the 
experiment, was systematically varied across participants and no order effect was found (all Fs < 1). 




Manipulation Checks  
First, we examined the degree to which the presence of dieting-related flyers and 
posters in the waiting room activated dieting goals. To correct for skewness in their 
distribution, individual response times for recognizing the target words were 
submitted to a natural log transformation (Bargh and Chartrand 2000; Fishbach et al. 
2003). Only correct responses were used in the subsequent analyses (97.3%). A 2 
(prime: diet vs. control) × 2 (target: dieting-related vs. neutral words) ANOVA with 
repeated measures on the last factor yielded the predicted Prime × Target interaction 
effect on the response times, F(1, 131) = 11.47, p < .001. Planned comparisons 
showed that participants in the diet-prime condition recognized dieting-related words 
much faster (M = 565 ms, SD = 150) than those in the control condition did (M = 689 
ms, SD = 140), F(1, 131) = 11.28, p < .001. In contrast, reaction times to neutral 
words did not differ among the conditions (MPrime = 668 ms, SD = 256 vs. MControl = 
677 ms, SD = 147), F < 1. This suggests that the goal of dieting was successfully 
activated in the diet-prime condition, as compared with the control condition.   
Next, to check the emotion manipulation, 2 (emotions) × 2 (goal proximity) × 
2 (goal relatedness) ANOVAs were conducted for self-reports of positive and 
negative emotions. As expected, positive emotions were higher in the positive-
emotion condition (M = 4.91, SD = .99) than in the negative-emotion condition (M = 
3.30, SD = 1.11), F(1, 112) = 72.29, p < .001, and negative emotions were higher in 
the negative-emotion condition (M = 4.66, SD = 1.35) than in the positive-emotion 
condition (M = 2.86, SD = 1.30), F(1, 112) = 55.37, p < .001. In further support of the 
effectiveness of the emotion manipulation, the positive-emotion condition was 
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associated with higher perceived effort during the chips’ tasting task (M = 4.23, SD = 
1.31) than the negative-emotion condition (M = 3.39, SD = 1.61), F(1, 112) = 9.26, p 
< .01. No other effects were significant for all measures. These results also remained 
unchanged after controlling for the amount (in oz) of potato chips eaten. 
The goal-proximity manipulation was also effective. Results of a 2 (emotions) 
× 2 (goal proximity) × 2 (goal relatedness) ANOVA of goal proximity to the optimal 
PHI yielded only a significant main effect of goal proximity, F(1, 112) = 79.96, p < 
.001. Participants indicated being closer to attaining their PHI goal in the close 
condition (M = 5.40, SD = 1.26) than in the distant condition (M = 3.23, SD = 1.37). 
As desired, all participants also reported that it was important for them to attain their 
optimal PHI score (MOverall = 5.08, SD = 1.70) with no significant differences between 
experimental conditions, F(1, 112) = 1.49, p > .20. These results also did not change 
after controlling for participants’ weight. 
Finally, participants in the related-goal condition rated the drink tasting task to 
be related to the chips tasting task (M = 4.33, SD = 1.47), whereas participants in the 
unrelated-goal condition perceived the puzzle task to be unrelated to the chips tasting 
task (M = 2.58, SD = 1.52), F(1, 112) = 39.70, p < .001, as expected. Similarly, 
participants who performed the drink tasting task perceived it to be more related to 
dieting (M = 5.27, SD = 1.18) than those who performed the puzzle task (M = 2.23, 
SD = 1.29), F(1, 112) = 172.91, p < .001. Further analyses showed that participants 
also perceived the chips tasting task to be related to dieting regardless of the 
experimental conditions (MDrink = 4.75, SD = 1.71 vs. MPuzzle = 4.53, SD = 1.52), F < 
1. No other effects were significant for all measures. Taken together, these results 
show that participants perceived the chips tasting task and the drink tasting task to be 
related to the same goal domain (dieting) and the puzzle task to be unrelated to this 
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goal domain, which is desirable.   
 
Effort Allocation in Related Goals  
Our predictions regarding the joint effects of goal-related emotions and goal 
proximity on multiple goal pursuit were first tested by examining the amount (in oz) 
of apple cider vinegar participants consumed. Results of a 2 (emotions) × 2 (goal 
proximity) ANOVA yielded the predicted two-way interaction, F(1, 56) = 41.80, p < 
.001, as illustrated in Figure 3.3A. In support of our reasoning, participants in the 
positive-emotion condition who were close to attaining their focal goal (PHI goal) 
consumed less (M = 2.02 oz, SD = 1.43) than those in the negative-emotion condition 
who were close to attaining their focal goal (M = 4.53 oz, SD = 1.87), F(1, 56) = 
19.86, p < .001. These relationships were reversed when participants were far from 
attaining their focal goal: in the positive-emotion condition participants consumed 
more (M = 4.56 oz, SD = 1.68) than in the negative-emotion condition (M = 1.86 oz, 
SD = 1.17), F(1, 56) = 21.96, p < .001.  
The experimental conditions were also compared to the control condition (M = 
1.48 oz, SD = 1.38) following the procedure recommended by Himmelfarb (1975). 
All conditions were treated as separate groups in a one-way analysis of variance. In 
support of our reasoning, results showed that the amount of apple cider vinegar 
consumed was significantly lower in the control condition than both in the positive-
emotion/distant condition, t(70) = 5.47, p < .001, and in the negative-emotion/close 
condition, t(70) = 5.52, p < .001. Further, no difference existed between the control 
condition and both the positive-emotion/close, t(70) = .96, p > .30, and the negative-
emotion/distant conditions, t(70) = .68, p > .50. 
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Figure 3.3. Amount of apple cider vinegar consumed (A) and puzzle 
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The predicted interaction was also found when analyzing participants’ self-
reports of perceived effort in consuming apple cider vinegar, F(1, 56) = 14.50, p < 
.001, again reflecting the same pattern of results. In addition, these findings did not 
change after controlling for participants’ weight, taste ratings of the drink, and the 
individual difference measures. This provides strong support for the predictions about 
effort allocation to the focal goal. 
 
Effort Allocation in Unrelated Goals  
To test our predictions regarding effort allocation in unrelated goal domains, 
we examined the log of time (in minutes) that participants spent on the unsolvable 
puzzles. Results of a 2 (emotions) × 2 (goal proximity) ANOVA revealed the 
expected two-way interaction, F(1, 56) = 47.62, p < .001. Consistent with our 
reasoning, participants in the positive-emotion condition who were close to attaining 
their focal goal (M = 29.88 minutes, SD = 7.94) persisted for significantly more time 
compared to those in the negative-emotion condition who were close to attaining their 
focal goal (M = 15.75 minutes, SD = 7.06), F(1, 56) = 27.02, p < .001 (see Figure 
3.3B). Again, these relationships were reversed when participants were far from 
attaining their focal goal: in the positive-emotion condition (M = 15.57 minutes, SD = 
6.01) participants quit working on the puzzles much sooner than in the negative-
emotion condition (M = 27.45 minutes, SD = 6.66), F(1, 56) = 20.80, p < .001. 
The experimental conditions were also compared to the third control condition 
(M = 33.10 minutes, SD = 12.36). As expected, results showed that the amount of 
time spent working on the puzzles was significantly higher in the control condition 
than both in the positive-emotion/distant, t(70) = -5.60, p < .001, and negative-
emotion/close conditions, t(70) = -5.61, p < .001. No difference existed between the 
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control condition and both the positive-emotion/close, t(70) = -.48, p > .60, and 
negative-emotion/distant conditions, t(70) = -1.10, p > .25. 
The predicted interaction effect was also found when analyzing participants’ 
reports of their perceived effort in working on the puzzles, F(1, 56) = 13.84, p < .001, 
again reflecting the same pattern of results. These findings also did not change after 
controlling for the individual difference measures. 
 
Mediation Analysis: Goal Expectancy  
Recall that we predicted goal expectancy to be the proximal factor driving these 
effects, and that it would thus mediate the influence of goal-related emotions and goal 
proximity on the effortful pursuit of multiple goals. Mediational analyses were 
conducted to test this prediction (Baron and Kenny 1986). To this end, the two goal-
related emotion conditions were first effect coded as 1 for the positive-emotion 
condition, and -1 for the negative-emotion condition. Likewise, the close condition 
was coded as 1, and the distant condition as -1. The first regression analysis showed, 
consistent with the ANOVA’s, that the Emotions × Goal proximity interaction had a 
significant effect on the amount of apple cider vinegar consumed,  = -.65, t = -6.47, p 
< .001, and the time spent on the puzzles,  = .68, t = 6.90, p < .001. The following 
regression analysis showed that the Emotions × Goal proximity interaction also had a 
significant effect on goal expectancy both in the drink condition,  = -.29, t = -3.11, p 
< .01, and in the puzzle condition,  = -.26, t = -2.55, p < .05. Finally and most 
importantly, when goal expectancy and the squared term of goal expectancy were 
simultaneously entered into the model as predictors of the effortful pursuit of multiple 
goals, we found support for the predicted inverted-U-shaped relationship between 
goal expectancy and the amount of apple cider vinegar consumed ( Expectancy = -.04, t = 
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-.41, p > .65; Expectancy
2 = -.64, t = -7.05, p < .001), and that goal expectancy has 
indeed the predicted U-shaped relationship with the time spent working on the 
unsolvable puzzles ( Expectancy = -.02, t = -.24, p > .80; Expectancy
2 = .60, t = 6.79, p < 
.001). To facilitate the interpretation of this result, they are displayed in Figures 3.4A 
(vinegar) and 3.4B (puzzles). Clearly, the amount of apple cider vinegar consumed 
was lowest at both high and low levels of expectancy in reaching the optimal PHI and 
highest in the middle. The reverse was true for the amount of time spent working on 
the puzzles.  
Importantly, in these latter regression models where goal expectancy was 
included, the interactive effect of emotions and goal proximity was significantly 
reduced both in the drink condition,  = -.33, t = -3.43, p < .01, and in the puzzle 
condition,  = .38, t = 4.27, p < .001, as confirmed by Sobel (1982) tests of mediation 
(ZDrink = 2.84, p < .01; ZPuzzle = 2.39, p < .02). Together, these results provide support 
for the mediational role of goal expectancy between goal-related emotions and goal 
pursuit. The same mediation effects were found when analyzing participants’ self-
reports of perceived effort both in consuming apple cider vinegar and in working on 
the puzzles.  
Similar to the findings of Study 1, the results of Study 2 provide consistent 
evidence for our model of multiple goal pursuit but now in a controlled experimental 
setting. Of importance, the results indicate that the influence of goal-related emotions 
and goal proximity on the selective allocation of effort among different goals is 
mediated by individuals’ goal expectancy, as hypothesized.  
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Figure 3.4. The effect of goal expectancy on the amount of apple cider 
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GENERAL DISCUSSION 
The challenges of juggling multiple goals confront us on a daily basis. We try to 
perform in various life domains: work, home, family, finances, spirituality, sports, and 
social relationships. At the same time, the resources, energy, and time that we have to 
pursue these various goals are limited. The present research sheds light on how people 
address this ongoing juggling act. We have provided converging evidence that 
positive and negative emotions do not uniformly lead to more or less goal pursuit, but 
instead that how the emotions that flow from goal pursuit determine effort allocation 
among multiple goals critically depends on goal proximity. Specifically, when 
attaining a focal goal is distant, positive emotions stemming from prior success in 
goal striving lead to an increase in effort in that domain, by diverting resources from 
alternative goals. In contrast, negative emotions associated with prior failure in goal 
pursuit prompt individuals to disengage from further effort, and doing so leads them 
to re-channel the effort toward other valued goals. These relationships are reversed 
when the goal is close. At that point, positive emotions lead to coasting, impairing the 
further pursuit of the focal goal, and in turn promote a shift of attention and effort to 
alternative goals. Negative emotions, on the other hand, trigger increases in goal 
effort, which entail a reduction of effort in pursuing other goals.  
We also found evidence for a feedback process in which the emotional and 
motivational outcomes of current goal-directed behavior become the input for 
subsequent goal effort, creating a flexible and dynamic system that regulates multiple 
goal pursuit. These dynamics were observed over the course of daily life (Study 1) 
and in controlled experimental settings (Study 2), and both in situations where 
individuals either set goals of their own (Study 1) or were supplied with specific goals 
(Study 2). It was also found that these effects are independent of individual 
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characteristics (Studies 1 and 2), and they were found for self-reported (Studies 1 and 
2) and unobtrusively observed effort (Study 2). Finally, this research provides a 
coherent picture of the underlying process that accounts for these effects, by showing 
(Study 2) how expectancy of goal success mediates the effects of goal-related 
emotions and goal proximity on effort allocation across multiple goals. The 
consistency of the findings across different methodologies and measures is reassuring 
for the proposed model of multiple goal pursuit.  
Although multiple goal pursuit is ubiquitous, and the importance of 
understanding how individuals manage multiple goals has already been recognized 
halfway last century (e.g., Miller et al. 1960; Simon 1967) and recently emphasized 
(Austin and Vancouver 1996; Vohs and Baumeister 2004), the topic has received only 
scant theoretical or empirical attention. We hope that the present research contributes 
to fill this gap, by developing and testing a parsimonious model which accounts for 
how individuals heedfully and adaptively regulate their goal-directed efforts over time 
by continuously monitoring progress across multiple goals, and channeling their 
limited resources toward those goals where effort is perceived as being potentially 
more effective at a given time. The proposed model and findings reconcile two 
opposing theoretical perspectives about emotion’s effects on goal-directed behavior. 
By showing that rather than universally leading to persisting or shifting in goal 
pursuit, both positive and negative goal-related emotions can have these effects, and 
that goal proximity determines this. This demonstrates how positive emotions and 
negative emotions play dual roles in promoting adaptive functioning in multiple-goal 
settings. That is, positive emotions seem to have evolved to encourage people to 
continue behaviors that lead to goal progress (Ford 1987), on the one hand, and 
conserve energy and be open to alternative goals when goal attainment seems certain, 
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on the other hand. Similarly, negative emotions seem to have evolved to help people 
avoid unrealistic persistence toward unattainable goals and re-direct energy to the 
pursuit of new goals (Ford 1987; Wrosch et al. 2003), but also to surmount obstacles 
to the attainment of viable goals. The adaptive utility of these dynamics also has 
positive implications for subjective well-being. Indeed, our model and findings 
suggest that, by being selective in effort allocation, individuals are able to both 
successfully minimize the anxiety and frustration that may result from trying to 
pursue multiple goals at the same time (Ford and Nichols 1987; Riediger and Freund 
2004) and the feelings of emptiness and regret arising from the relentless pursuit of a 
single goal (Dodge et al. 1989). 
The findings also contribute to Carver and Scheier’s (1998) cybernetic model 
of self-regulation, to which they owe much. We revealed that the flow of goal-
directed behavior is determined by both the emotions arising from progress in goal 
pursuit and the current proximity to goal attainment. In this new light, the “car’s 
cruise control” analogy (Carver and Scheier 1998) takes on a different tone. The 
speed at which one drives toward one’s destination depends not only on the difference 
between the current speed and the reference speed (cruise control), as suggested by 
Carver and Scheier (1998), but also on how close or distant one is from getting there 
(goal proximity), as our studies show. In addition, the current research is the first to 
provide empirical evidence for the theorized link between positive emotions and 
coasting in goal pursuit (Carver and Scheier 1998; Carver 2003, 2004). The findings 
also go beyond existing theorizing by demonstrating that individuals only coast in the 
vicinity of the destination. 
The proposed model provides initial insights into the dynamics of multiple 
goal pursuit and there are various avenues for future work. For instance, one possible 
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response to goal attainment or failure in multiple goal pursuit is to modify the level of 
aspiration associated with the focal goal (Dodge et al. 1989; Miller et al. 1960). In 
fact, past success may be followed by increases and failure by decreases in the level 
of aspiration (Festinger 1942; Lewin et al. 1944). This is likely to have implications 
for whether and when coasting and goal termination occur in the context of multiple 
goal pursuit, and thus influence the pattern of effort allocation over time. For 
example, experiencing positive goal-related emotions when one is close to goal 
attainment may not lead to coasting but rather to an increase in the level of goal 
aspiration (e.g., try to lose 10 lb instead of 5 lb). Our consistent pattern of findings 
across the studies suggests that such responses were absent or at least not very 
prominent here. Still, future research is needed to understand when people coast upon 
positive emotions and nearby goals or adapt their desired goal levels upward, and 
likewise when they terminate upon negative emotions and remote goals or adapt 
desired goal levels downward. 
The findings also add to recent research on the behavioral implications of 
emotions, which suggests among others that positive emotions broaden and negative 
emotions narrow individuals’ thought-action repertoires (e.g., Fredrickson 2001). The 
present results suggest that, under certain circumstances, the opposite effects may also 
occur. Consistent with a narrowing effect of positive emotions, individuals who were 
far from attaining a focal goal, and who experienced positive emotions concentrated 
their resources on that goal domain, by diverting cognitive and behavioral resources 
from alternative goals, thus apparently contracting their repertoire temporarily. A 
broadening effect may occur in the domain of negative emotions on the other hand. 
When individuals are far from the goal, negative emotions lead individuals to consider 
and switch to other goals, thus broadening their thought-action repertoires. Future 
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work is needed to examine how this broadening versus narrowing effect operates at 
different levels of goal abstractness. For instance, although a narrowing effect may 
occur at the level of effort allocation across multiple goals (e.g., allocate effort to lose 
weight rather than other goals), within a given goal domain a broadening effect may 
also occur concerning the means used to attain the goal (e.g., reduce caloric intake, 
exercise, join weight-loss support groups, and avoid unhealthy food). 
In conclusion, this research contributes to improved understanding of the 
dynamics of multiple goal pursuit, an important and unexplored aspect of self-
regulation. It shows that, in addition to their independent influences on behavior, 
emotions and goal proximity jointly influence both the resource allocation decisions 
that individuals make in multiple-goal environments and their expectancies of 
success. In this way, the present chapter demonstrates how people manage a shifting 
system of resource allocation to adaptively juggle multiple goals over time. 
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THE PURSUIT OF pleasure is a fundamental motive driving human behavior, its 
influence inescapable and deep (Freud 1920/1950). As consumers, we devote a 
considerable amount of time, money and energy in a quest to experience or own what 
is pleasant. Whether selecting a dessert in a restaurant, choosing between vacation 
destinations, or buying a pair of shoes we often let pleasure govern our day-to-day 
choices by using our positive emotions toward various decision alternatives as 
information to form our preferences toward the specific alternatives. Indeed, there is 
substantial evidence that, on many occasions, consumers use an affect-referral 
heuristic where affective impressions rather than extensive processing of alternatives 
provide the basis for judgments and decisions (Pham 1998; Schwarz and Clore 1996; 
Slovic et al. 2002; Wright 1975). 
Striving for pleasure can make the world more exciting, options more 
attractive and our lives more appealing, but its benefits may also come at a cost. The 
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enthrallment with pleasure can take over our mental processes, color our judgments 
and bias our choices. Indeed, research indicates that positive emotions can make 
evaluations of some alternatives more favorable than if they had been based on the 
product’s merits alone, make us neglect or distort product information that is 
evaluatively inconsistent with our feelings, and be more careless in decision making 
(Adaval 2001; Meloy 2000; Schwarz and Bless 1991; Yeung and Wyer 2004). We 
may be driven to feel good, but by relentlessly seeking happiness we may also fail to 
notice its unwanted consequences on the quality of our decisions. 
To make accurate assessments consumers must be aware that positive affect 
can be informative but can bias the decision process as well. There is mounting 
evidence, however, that when reflecting upon our own mental processes once 
decisions are made, most of us are unable or unwilling to detect that they may be 
tainted by bias (e.g., Pronin, Gilovich, and Ross 2004; Wilson and Brekke 1994). This 
blindness to bias can be particularly strong for positive emotions elicited by the target, 
since it is by acting on these emotions that we make headway on the path to pleasure. 
Although prior research has investigated the conditions under which people, once 
biased, are able to detect and correct cognitive biases (e.g., Meyers-Levy and 
Malaviya 1999; Petty and Wegener 1993; Stapel, Martin, and Schwarz 1998), and the 
strategies that may allow people to avoid emotions from arising (e.g., Elster 2000; 
Larsen and Prizmic 2004), much less is know about consumers’ ability to anticipate 
and prevent their initial affective impressions from tainting their decision processes. 
Questions thus remain as to whether and when consumers will deliberately 
forsake the pursuit of pleasure and dampen (instead of maintain) their positive 
emotions toward one or more of the decision alternatives in order to prevent the 
adverse effects of using the affect heuristic in decision making. It is also unclear how 
                                                                                                  
 89 
effective these emotion regulation attempts are in inoculating consumers’ decision 
making processes against these biases. In this article we address these questions. We 
propose that consumers’ emotion regulation behavior (i.e., dampening or maintaining 
positive emotions) is jointly determined by the complexity of the specific decision and 
the weight attached to the immediate or future outcomes of the decision. Results from 
two studies, using experience sampling (Study 1) and experimental (Study 2) 
methodologies, show that dampening is highest when decision complexity is moderate 
and consumers focus primarily on the future outcomes of their current actions. Results 
also reveal that dampening positive emotions has clear and adaptive implications for 
the depth of decision processing, purchase decisions, and choice confidence. 
 
POSITIVE EMOTIONS AND BIAS PREVENTION  
IN DECISION MAKING 
There are often two minds at work in everyday consumption decisions (Epstein 1994; 
Kahneman 2003). One responds rapidly, automatically and emotionally to choice 
situations as they arise, and infers judgments from these spontaneous affective 
reactions toward the target typically without modification. It is governed by a pleasure 
principle that demands seeking out and maintaining positive affective states. The 
other, slower, effortful and more deliberative, monitors the validity of these responses, 
which it may then accept, modify, or reject. In doing so, it may prevent positive 
emotions from biasing decision processes toward supporting the initial feelings about 
a target. This monitoring function is, however, often quite permissive, allowing 
judgments to remain anchored on initial emotion-based impressions, even when this 
leads to poor or biased judgments and decisions (Kahneman and Frederick 2002). 
Although it might appear rather easy to scrutinize why we feel as we do about a target 
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and such introspection could improve decision processes by making them more 
thorough and less myopic, we are unlikely to do so. This is because people generally 
have limited access to how their own judgments are formed and underestimate their 
own vulnerability to mental biases in judgment (Nisbett and Wilson 1977). There are 
also seldom overt signs, accessible to immediate introspection, that decisions are 
biased. As noted by Wilson and Brekke (1994, p. 121), “Human judgments–even very 
bad ones–do not smell.” 
Most of us, of course, recognize that some past consumption decisions may 
have been tainted by emotions and that other people are a victim of such bias as well. 
But, for any particular decision we are currently in the process of making, the 
monitoring typically reassures us that it is free from bias (Pronin et al. 2004). Rather 
than feeling universally inoculated against it, we are unlikely to find strong traces of 
bias in the decision at hand. This pervasive blindness to bias is consistent with 
evidence showing that, once biased, people only attempt to correct their judgments 
when blatantly instructed to do so (e.g., Wegener and Petty 1995), or when 
conditionally warned to do so if they feel that their judgments might be influenced by 
the context (Stapel et al. 1998). To the extent that product-induced positive emotions 
are compelling, the perception of biasing influences may be even more limited. In 
fact, Wyer and Budesheim (1987) found that people are likely to disregard the biasing 
influence of unfavorable but not of favorable information about a target, even when 
instructed to do so. 
To preclude positive emotions induced by one or more of the alternatives from 
biasing our final decisions, however, it is not always necessary to change our minds 
and modify, undo or reject judgments or decisions that have initially been accepted as 
valid. Wilson, Gilbert, and Wheatley (1998) suggested that people’s ability to avoid 
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unwanted influences on their own judgments may vary as a function of the point in 
the contamination process at which they try to prevent bias. In particular, rather than 
engaging in remedial action once the harm is done, individuals may engage in 
preventive action by either limiting their exposure to potentially biasing stimuli, or 
deliberately preventing their adverse effects on mental processes. Hoch and 
Loewenstein (1991) suggested, for instance, that avoiding situations in which they are 
likely to experience increases in desire towards a product, is perhaps the best way for 
consumers to avoid impulsive behavior. Rook and Hoch (1985) provided evidence 
that consumers use a variety of distancing strategies to ward off temptation, including 
maintaining physical distance from places where desired products are sold. Exposure 
control, however effective as a defensive mechanism, is not without limitations as 
noted by Wilson and Brekke (1994). In consumption contexts, where sources of bias 
abound (e.g., advertising), to control one’s exposure to unwanted information would 
entail functioning in a permanent state of vigilance which, in spite of all our caution, 
would be difficult to sustain. 
A preventive strategy, on the other hand, involves deliberate efforts to 
preclude biasing information to which one has already been exposed from tainting 
one’s judgments and decisions. Given that consumers often face decisions in which 
they experience product-induced positive emotions (e.g., Richins 1997), successful 
prevention of emotion-induced biases will then entail dampening these positive 
emotions before they permeate their mental processes. In this way, dampening can 
contribute to adaptive functioning by allowing consumers to both access the 
evaluative information associated with positive emotions and at the same time limit 
their (potential) biasing effects on information search and processing.  
An important premise underlying the use of dampening to prevent the mental 
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contamination of judgment is that consumers should be generally able to regulate their 
own emotional states. Consistent with this possibility, research indicates that people 
do not always respond passively to their emotions (e.g., Erber, Wegner, and Therriault 
1996; Gross 1999). Rather, they can purposefully modulate the occurrence, duration, 
experience and expression of their emotional feelings. We discuss next the conditions 
under which consumers are likely to maintain their product-induced positive emotions 
or instead to dampen these emotions as a way to prevent the biasing effects of using 
affect referral as a judgment heuristic. We also elaborate on the implications of such 
debiasing attempts for consumers’ decision processes.  
 
Decision Complexity and Bias Awareness 
Whether consumers will ultimately take actions to maintain or dampen their positive 
emotions toward a product is likely to be determined by the extent to which they are 
aware of their biasing effect in judgments and decisions. Indeed, the importance of 
awareness as a prerequisite to mental correction has been emphasized in theories of 
mental control (e.g., Wilson and Brekke 1994). This is because, as already noted, 
people are not especially good at discriminating between biased and unbiased 
judgments. Consumers will only detect the presence of positive emotion-induced 
biases when clues to the adverse effects of these biases are so salient that consumers 
cannot but wonder if such emotions might be contaminating their decision processes. 
We propose that decision complexity may provide such a clue. Specifically, 
we predict that as the choice set grows and thus decisions become more complex, so 
will consumers’ awareness that their positive emotions toward a particular product 
may be biasing their decision behavior. Prior research has shown that consumers 
experience increasing feelings of responsibility for the choices they make as the 
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number of product alternatives grows (Iyengar and Lepper 2000). Indeed, as decision 
complexity increases, both the availability of alternatives and the likelihood of finding 
a potentially superior alternative become more salient (Greenleaf and Lehmann 1995). 
Thus, when faced with more choice consumers should be more concerned about 
potential biases in their judgments (by failing to consider other alternatives) and 
scrutinize their decision behavior more exactingly. In this way, decision complexity 
can help consumers “smell” the presence of positive emotion-induced biases toward a 
preferred product. 
 
Consideration of Future Consequences 
Even when consumers are aware that positive emotions toward a product can color 
their judgments, they must also be motivated to modify their emotional responding 
and trade off their positive emotions for other instrumental goals. Research suggests 
that people generally lack the motivation to scrutinize and modify their own thoughts 
and feelings for many reasons. First, they are reluctant to construe their own 
judgments as biased, as this word implies a number of unpleasant connotations such 
as “prejudice” or “unfairness” (Pronin et al. 2004). Second, they are motivated to 
maintain a positive view of themselves, their judgments, and their decisions (e.g., 
Baumeister 1998; Steele 1988). Third, and perhaps most important, they do not want 
to violate one of the most fundamental human motives–the pursuit of pleasure–as 
dampening would demand. Hence, whether or not consumers attempt to correct for 
salient biases can often be traced to motivational factors. 
We predict that whether decision complexity will ultimately be conducive to 
maintaining or dampening product-induced positive emotions is contingent on 
consumers’ temporal perspective on the consequences of their current decisions. Prior 
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research has shown that individuals differ in the extent to which they consider the 
immediate as opposed to the future consequences of current actions, and that these 
differences can have important motivational consequences for their present decision 
making (Strathman et al. 1994; Trope and Liberman 2003). When confronted with a 
decision, the consideration of its distant (rather than its immediate) outcomes makes 
people more responsive to courses of action that have long-term (as opposed to short-
term) positive benefits (Orbell, Perugini, and Rakow 2004), and more willing to delay 
gratification (Strathman et al. 1994). Relatedly, research on time-inconsistent 
preferences suggests that increases in temporal proximity to a product lead to 
increases in the desire for it and in consumers’ impatience to owning it (Hoch and 
Loewenstein 1991).   
We predict therefore that when consumers focus on the future consequences of 
their decisions, the level of dampening is likely to be highest at moderate levels of 
decision complexity, and lowest at both low and high levels of decision complexity. 
At low levels of decision complexity, where emotion-induced biases are likely to go 
unnoticed, consumers are likely to maintain their positive emotions without a 
moment’s doubt about the potential future costs of a suboptimal choice. At moderate 
levels of decision complexity, where the presence of an emotional bias is likely to be 
detected, consumers with a distal focus will be sensitive to the potential future costs 
stemming from this bias. As a result, they are likely to take actions to dampen their 
product-related positive emotions in an attempt to remove the source of bias. At high 
levels of decision complexity, although the emotion-induced bias is relatively salient, 
the overwhelming cognitive costs of evaluating all alternatives available is likely to 
override the concern for potential future costs associated with a poor decision. Indeed, 
prior research has shown that having too many alternatives, to the extent that it can 
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lead to choice overload, has a demotivating effect on consumers (e.g., Iyengar and 
Lepper 2000).  
In contrast, we predict that when consumers focus on the immediate 
consequences of their current decisions they will be likely to maintain their positive 
emotions toward the product, independently of the level of decision complexity. 
Because these consumers are sensitive to proximal benefits of their actions at all 
levels of decision complexity, they should be uniformly driven by hedonistic motives 
and perceive current decisions as opportunities to achieve immediate gratification by 
acting on their emotions. Efforts to maintain or dampen positive emotions are 
therefore posited to be jointly determined by the awareness effect of decision 
complexity and the motivational role of consideration of future consequences. 
 
The Debiasing Outcomes of Dampening 
Thus far, we have focused on the factors that may lead consumers to deliberately 
attempt to maintain or dampen their positive emotions toward a target in order to 
inoculate their judgments and decisions against the biasing influences of affect. We 
have not yet addressed whether and how these debiasing efforts produce the desired 
effects on consumers’ decision processes. This is important in light of evidence that 
even when people construe their judgments as biased and are motivated to debias 
them they are not always successful in doing so (Petty and Wegener 1993; Stapel et 
al. 1998). Studies on judgment correction suggest that people have difficulty in 
construing the implications of biasing influences for their judgments. They are, as a 
result, often unable to accurately estimate how much correction is needed. For 
instance, people have been found to adjust too much (i.e., correction is larger than 
required and judgments become biased in the reverse direction; Stapel et al. 1998), 
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adjust too little (i.e., the magnitude of the correction is not large enough to fully 
debias; Petty and Wegener 1993), and even adjust without need (i.e., correction when 
no bias is present; Petty and Wegener 1993). Collectively, these findings have led 
researchers to be pessimistic regarding people’s ability to avoid mental contamination 
(e.g., Wilson and Brekke 1994).  
Unlike post-hoc judgment correction, we argue that emotion regulation will 
allow consumers to effectively prevent unwanted influences on their judgments and 
decisions. This is because people are generally cognizant of the valence and intensity 
of their ongoing positive emotions, inasmuch as emotions are accompanied by a 
variety of phenomenological signs (e.g., Frijda, Kuipers, and ter Schure 1989). As a 
result, consumers are more likely to estimate with accuracy the direction and 
magnitude of the required correction, and adjust accordingly. Hence, we predict that 
dampening will be accompanied by adaptive changes in consumers’ decision 
processes that offset the adverse impact of positive emotions: increases in the depth of 
processing, decreases in the likelihood of choosing the emotion-eliciting product, and 
increases in choice confidence. In contrast, we predict that maintaining product-
induced positive emotions will decrease the depth of processing, increase the 
likelihood of choosing the emotion-eliciting product, and be associated with high 
levels of choice confidence. 
 
THE PRESENT RESEARCH 
The present research investigates whether and when consumers maintain their 
product-induced positive emotions, or deliberately forsake the pursuit of pleasure and 
dampen these emotions in order to resist the adverse effects of using the affect 
heuristic. We hypothesized that maintaining and dampening are jointly determined by 
                                                                                                  
 97 
the complexity of the decision environment and the consideration of the future 
consequences of current decisions. Specifically, when consumers focus on the future 
outcomes of their decisions, the level of dampening is likely to be highest at moderate 
levels, and lowest at both low and high levels of decision complexity. In contrast, 
when the focus is on the more immediate outcomes of decisions, consumers will be 
likely to maintain their product-induced positive emotions independently of decision 
complexity. We also examine the implications of emotion regulation for decision 
processes. We now report on two studies with complementary methodologies to test 
these predictions. Our studies used experience sampling and experimental 
methodologies, took place in the field and in the laboratory, and included both chronic 
measures and situational priming of consideration of future consequences. 
 
STUDY 1 
Study 1 tests our predictions in a consequential, naturalistic setting by using an 
experience sampling approach. It examines consumer responses to an actual shopping 
event involving an initial positive emotional response toward a specific product.  In 




Sample and Procedure 
A total of 111 undergraduate students were recruited to participate in this study for 
course credit. All participants attended an orientation session, in which they were 
given a questionnaire to record their feelings, thoughts, and behavior in response to an 
actual shopping event. All participants were instructed that such shopping event 
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should involve an experience where they felt positive emotions toward a specific 
product. It was stressed that it was not important whether they purchased the product 
or not, it was enough that they seriously considered buying it. Participants were also 
told that they should be alone during this event in order to avoid social influences on 
their emotion regulation and decision behaviors. Finally, participants were instructed 
to fill out their questionnaires as soon as possible on the same day the event occurred 
and to return it on the following day. After reading and signing an informed consent 
form, participants received the questionnaire enclosed in an envelope and were asked 
not to open the envelope until they were ready to complete it. Of this initial sample, 
94 participants (78 women, 16 men; mean age = 19.83 years) completed the full 
research protocol, which represents a 93% response rate.  
 
Consideration of Future Consequences 
Approximately two weeks prior to this study, participants completed the 
Consideration of Future Consequences scale (CFC; Strathman et al.’s 1994) during 
large group testing sessions. This 12-item measure provides a reliable and valid 
measure of chronic individual differences in the extent to which individuals are 
influenced by the immediate or the distant outcomes of their actions in deciding how 
to act. Two sample items are: “I often consider how things might be in the future and 
try to influence those things with my day to day behavior,” and “I think that 
sacrificing now is usually unnecessary since future outcomes can be dealt at a later 
time” (reverse-scored). In the present study, the scale haGJRRGUHOLDELOLW\   
and the mean CFC score on a 5-point scale was 3.24 (SD = .72; range: 1.67-4.58).9 
                                                           
9 No significant differences emerged for gender, age, and CFC between these participants and the 17 
participants that attended the orientation session but failed to complete the questionnaire (all F’s < 1). 
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Questionnaire Measures 
The questionnaire first asked participants to provide a brief description of the event, to 
record the date and time of the event, and to describe the type and price of the 
emotion-eliciting product. As a check, participants were then asked to indicate the 
extent to which they had experienced each of six positive emotions toward the focal 
product at the time of this event (enthusiastic, happy, joyful, warmhearted, hopeful, 
optimistic) on seven-SRLQWLWHPV5LFKLQVDQFKRUHGDW³QRWDWDOOYHU\PXFK´ 
= .80).  
To assess participants’ emotion regulation behavior we included an open-
ended question asking whether they had tried to influence their positive emotions 
toward the focal product in any way, and if so to describe exactly what they had done 
and why. Participants were also asked to code their responses as (a) tried to maintain 
or increase, or (b) tried to decrease these positive emotions. In addition, participants 
rated the degree to which they had experienced as number of possible reactions to the 
event in order to capture both dampening (5 items) and maintaining (4 items) of 
product-induced positive emotions (1 = not at all; 7 = very much).10 The order of the 
items measuring dampening and maintaining was systematically varied across 
SDUWLFLSDQWVDQGQRRUGHUHIIHFWZDVIRXQG7KHLWHPVPHDVXULQJGDPSHQLQJZHUH 
= .82): “Did you try to dampen your excitement about the product?”; “Did you try to 
keep your positive feelings about the product under control in order to better 
concentrate on your purchase decision?”; “Did you try not to go for your first good 
                                                           
10 As a test of discriminant validity, we compared a measurement model with the dampening and 
maintaining items loading on separate factors against an alternative model with all items loading on a 
single factor. A chi-square difference test (Kline 1998) provided support for a two-factor solXWLRQ 2 
difference (1, N = 94) = 44.53, p < .001), indicating discriminant validity between the measures. Also, 
both scales were negatively correlated with each other (r = -.62, p < .01). The treatment of maintaining 
and dampening as two distinct constructs is consistent with prior empirical research (Wood, Heimpel, 
and Michela 2003) and with theoretical conceptualizations of emotion regulation (e.g., Parrott 1993). 
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feelings about the product when making your purchase decision?”; “Did you try to 
restrain your positive emotions toward the product, so that they would not influence 
your thinking?”; and “Did you try to remind yourself of reality to bring down your 
positive emotions toward the product?” The items measuring maintaining ZHUH  
.85): “Did you try to keep feeling good about the product for as long as you could?”; 
“Did you try to maintain your positive emotions about the product?”; “Did you try to 
savor your good feelings about the product?”; and “Did you try to enjoy your positive 
feelings about the product to the fullest?” 
Decision complexity was measured by four items (adapted from Chernev 
 ,\HQJDU DQG /HSSHU      ³7R ZKDW H[WHQW GLG \RX KDYH HQRXJK
products to choose from in the store for this product category?” (1 = I felt I had too 
few products; 4 = I had the right number of products; 7 = I had too many products); 
“In your opinion, to what extent did the products in the store represent the full range 
of options available for this product category” (1 = not at all; 7 = very much); “To 
what extent were the differences between the products available in the store for this 
product category hard to judge?” (1 = not at all; 7 = very much); and “How would you 
rate the complexity of this decision?” (1 = not at all complex; 7 = very complex). 
To assess participants’ depth of processing five items adapted from Meyers-
Levy and Peracchio (1996) and Pham (1996) were used (1 = not at all; 7 = very 
PXFK7KHLWHPVZHUH  ³7RZKDWH[WHQWGLG\RXWDNH\RXUWLPHto evaluate 
carefully all the alternatives available in the store?”; “Did you make an effort to 
compare the characteristics of the different products available?”; “To what extent are 
you confident that you evaluated all the alternative products available in the store 
thoroughly”; “To what extent did you follow your inner instincts and feelings when 
making the decision?” (reverse-scored); and “To what extent did you make your 
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decision because it was emotionally satisfying?” (reverse-scored). 
Next, participants were asked to indicate whether they had bought the product 
for which they had initially felt positive emotions. Response alternatives were: (1) 
yes; (2) no, I bought another, similar product in that store; (3) no, I bought another, 
similar product in a different store; or (4) no, I did not buy this product today.  
Participants also indicated their choice confidence with the following two 
items (1 = not at all; 7 = extremely) adapted from Chernev (2003) and Iyengar and 
Lepper (2000): “How certain are you that this product will satisfy you?” and “How 
confident are you that the product you selected is the one that you enjoy the most 
among all of the product alternatives available?” (r = .71). Participants who did not 
buy a product were not asked these questions, as these items do not apply. 
Finally, all participants completed Beatty and Talpade’s (1994) Product 
.QRZOHGJHVFDOH  WRFRQWUROIRUGLIIHUHQFHVLQFDWHJRU\IDPLOLDULW\DQGZHUH
asked to record the date and time at which they were completing the form. In the 
subsequent analyses, we also control for the possibility that the predicted effects 
varied as a function of other relevant individual traits collected during prior large 
JURXSWHVWLQJVHVVLRQV7KHVHLQFOXGHWKH,PSXOVLYH%X\LQJVFDOH  5RRNDQG
Fischer 1995) to control for variations in the tendency to buy spontaneously and 
XQUHIOHFWLYHO\ WKH1HHG IRU&RJQLWLRQ VFDOH    &DFLRSSR DQG3HWW\  WR
control for differing tendencies to engage in and enjoy effortful information 
processing; and the State Self-eVWHHP VFDOH     +HDWKHUWRQ DQG 3ROLY\ 
which has been linked to differences in emotion regulatory behavior (Wood et al. 
2003). Support for our predictions over and above these individual traits would attest 
to the robustness of the findings. 
 




Descriptive Statistics  
Participants reported experiencing positive emotions toward a wide range of products 
(e.g., clothing, consumer electronics, DVDs, computer games), with prices ranging 
from $2.5 to $320 (M = $66.11; SD = $66.02). Overall, participants reported to have 
experienced strong positive emotions toward the focal product during the event (M = 
5.49; SD = .92; range: 4-7). Further analyses assessing the relationship between each 
of these variables and CFC revealed no significant associations, which is desirable. 
 
Dampening/Maintaining  
To test whether decision complexity and CFC influence positive emotion regulation in 
the hypothesized directions, self-reports of dampening and maintaining of product-
induced positive emotions were submitted to multiple regressions with five predictors: 
(1) decision complexity; (2) decision complexity squared; (3) CFC; (4) the interaction 
between 1 and 3, and (5) the interaction between 2 and 3. The results are summarized 
in Table 4.1.  
Importantly and as we hypothesized, the decision complexity squared × CFC 
interaction significantly predicted both dampening and maintaining, showing that the 
relationship between decision complexity and positive emotion regulation varies in 
form as a function of CFC. Figure 4.1 illustrates these significant interactions. In the 
figure, we plotted the predicted values of dampening and maintaining for participants 
scoring 1 SD above and below the mean of decision complexity and CFC, employing 
commonly used regression techniques (Aiken and West 1991). Clearly, for 
participants with high CFC we found support for the predicted inverted-U-shaped 
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relationship between decision complexity and dampening, and U-shaped relationship 
between decision complexity and maintaining. The level of dampening was highest at 
moderate levels of decision complexity and lowest at both low and high levels of 
decision complexity (low to moderate complexity:  = 1.85, p < .001; moderate to 
high complexity:  = -2.25, p < .001). The reverse was true for maintaining (low to 
moderate complexity:  = -1.37, p < .001; moderate to high complexity:  = 1.95, p < 
.001). In contrast, participants with low CFC were predicted to maintain their positive 
emotions toward the focal product independently of the level of decision complexity. 
In support of this prediction, we found that participants with low CFC were less likely 
to dampen (low to moderate complexity:  = -.23, p > .20; moderate to high 
complexity:  = .07, p > .75) and more likely to maintain (low to moderate 
complexity:  = -.28, p > .20; moderate to high complexity:  = .15, p > .55) their 
positive emotions at all levels of complexity. 
In further support of our predictions, this pattern of results was also found 
when analyzing participants’ coding of the open-ended question about whether they 
had done something to influence their product-induced positive emotions. Of the 94 
participants, 58 reported to have deliberately tried to maintain or increase and 36 to 
decrease their positive emotions. Importantly, results from a logistic regression show 
that the decision complexity squared × CFC interaction has the predicted negative 
effect on dampening (B = -.93, SE = .3:DOG 2 (1, N = 94) = 9.34, p < .01). 
                                                                                                  
 
TABLE 4.1. Study 1: Effects of Decision Complexity and CFC on Dampening and Maintaining Product-Induced Positive Emotions 
Dampening  Maintaining  
Predictors 
  t p   t p 
Decision complexity -.14 -1.7 .093  .11 1.18 .24 
Decision complexity squared -.51 -5.93 <.001  .51 4.96 <.001 
CFC .83 7.42 <.001  -.50 -3.81 <.001 
Decision complexity × CFC -.07 -.79 .43  .19 1.93 .06 
Decision complexity squared × CFC  -.81 -6.63 <.001  .53 3.70 <.001 
R2 .54  .36 
F (df), p value 20.33 (5, 88), p < .001  9.70 (5, 88), p <.001 
NOTE.–All variables are mean centered. CFC = consideration of future consequences. 
                                                                                                  
 105 
FIGURE 4.1. Study 1: Effects of Decision Complexity and CFC on Dampening 
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All the reported results did not change after controlling for product 
knowledge, impulsive buying behavior, need for cognition, self-esteem, the level of 
positive emotions experienced toward the focal product, and price of the product, 
which underlines the robustness of the findings. 
 
Depth of Decision Processing 
In support of our predictions, the decision complexity squared × CFC interaction 
significantly predicted depth of processing (  = -.68, p < .001). Among participants 
with high CFC we found support for the predicted inverted-U-shaped relationships 
between decision complexity and depth of processing (low to moderate complexity:  
= 1.78, p < .001; moderate to high complexity:  = -1.94, p < .001). Participants with 
low CFC generally exhibited lower depth of processing (low to moderate complexity: 
 = -.18, p > .35; moderate to high complexity:  = -.20, p > .40), independently of 
decision complexity. 
 
Purchase Behavior  
Fifty seven participants purchased the emotion-inducing product. In support of our 
reasoning, results from a logistic regression indicated that the decision complexity 
squared × CFC interaction significantly predicted the likelihood of purchasing the 
focal product (B = .89, SE :DOG 2 (1, N = 94) = 6.64, p < .02). Specifically, the 
likelihood of purchasing the emotion-inducing product was lowest at moderate levels 
of decision complexity and highest at both low and high levels of decision complexity 
(low to moderate complexity: B = -4.81, SE :DOG 2 (1, N = 94) = 12.31, p < 
.001; moderate to high complexity: B = 5.12, SE :DOG 2 (1, N = 94) = 12.29, 
p < .001). In contrast, participants with low CFC were likely to purchase the emotion-
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inducing product at all levels of decision complexity (low to moderate complexity: B 
= -.64, SE :DOG 2 (1, N = 94) = 1.26, p > .25; moderate to high complexity: B 
= 2.17, SE :DOG 2 (1, N = 94) = 3.53, p > .06). 
 
Choice Confidence 
The decision complexity squared × CFC interaction significantly predicted choice 
confidence (  = -.47, p < .02). Among participants with high CFC we found support 
for the predicted inverted-U-shaped relationships between decision complexity and 
choice confidence (low to moderate complexity:  = .95, p < .05; moderate to high 
complexity:  = -1.90, p < .001). Participants with low CFC displayed relatively high 
levels of choice confidence (low to moderate complexity:  = .04, p > .85; moderate 
to high complexity:  = -.25, p > .45) across all levels of decision complexity. This 
suggests that because people with low CFC are typically sensitive to the immediate 
hedonic consequences of their choices, they assume that by basing their choices on 
positive affect they have performed well.  
 
Dampening as a Debiasing Mechanism  
We predicted that dampening would be an effective mechanism for inoculating 
consumers’ decision making processes and choice behavior against the unwanted 
influences of positive emotions. Lending clear support for our predictions, dampening 
was found to fully account for the influence of decision complexity and CFC on 
consumers’ decision processes and purchase decisions. In brief, results from 
mediational analyses (Baron and Kenny 1986) indicate that when dampening was 
added to the regression analyses as a predictor of the depth of processing, product 
choice, and choice confidence, the parameter estimates for dampening were 
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significant and in the expected directions (depth of processing:  = .64, p < .001; 
likelihood of purchasing the emotion-inducing product: B = -1.72, SE :DOG 2 
(1, N = 94) = 11.85, p < .01; choice confidence:  = .65, p < .001). Importantly, in 
these latter models, the interactive effect of decision complexity squared and CFC lost 
its significance (depth of processing:  = -.16, p > .20; likelihood of purchasing the 
focal product: B = .01, SE    :DOG 2 (1, N = 94) = .00, p > .98; choice 
confidence:  = .14, p > .50). These results provide evidence for the complete 




Study 1 shows that consumers can engage in volitional emotion regulatory processes 
in order to prevent the biasing impact of positive emotions on their mental processes. 
Importantly, they do so when this requires going against the fundamental motive of 
pursuing pleasure. The results demonstrate that decision complexity, to the extent that 
it can increase the salience of biases, and chronic individual differences in 
consideration of the future consequences of current actions, to the extent that they can 
motivate bias correction, are critical factors that jointly determine whether and when 
consumers are likely to attempt to immunize their decisions from the adverse effects 
of initial positive affect toward a product. We also found that dampening allows 
consumers to effectively bring about the intended debiasing outcomes. 
 
STUDY 2 
In contrast to Study 1, which used chronic measures of CFC, Study 2 temporarily 
manipulates consideration of immediate or future consequences of decisions in a 
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controlled experiment. The design of Study 2, also adds important new features. It 
includes unobtrusive measures of both emotion regulation and decision behavior, 
allowing us to trace more precisely the dynamics of dampening, and its effects on 




Participants and Procedure  
A total of 180 undergraduate students (127 women, 53 men; mean age = 20.32 years) 
participated for course credit and were randomly assigned to the cells of a 2 (CFC: 
low or high) × 2 (product-eliciting emotions: positive or neutral) × 3 (decision 
complexity: low, moderate or high) between-subjects factorial design with emotion 
regulation and decision behavior as the dependent variables. The inclusion of a 
neutral-emotion condition provided an undistorted baseline against which 
participants’ responses in the positive-emotion condition could be compared. A 
schematic depiction of the experimental procedure is shown in Table 4.2 and detailed 
below. The entire procedure was presented on a personal computer, using the software 
program Authorware 6.0 (Macromedia Inc. 2001). 
 Phase I:  Manipulation of CFC. The first study was introduced as the 
first of two unrelated studies to be performed during the experimental session. 
Participants were asked to participate in the development of a Life-Event Inventory 
that would be used to assess the variety of life events that college students often 
experience in their lives, by describing two different types of life events. 
                                                                                                  
 
TABLE 4.2. Study 2: Schematic Experimental Structure 





Life-Event Inventory (Part I): Description of a 
real life experience where a positive outcome 
was attained because the future (high-CFC 
condition) or the immediate (low-CFC 
condition) consequences of one’s behavior 
were used as guides for current actions. 
 
Manipulation of 






Exposure to a positive-affect-eliciting ad for a 
digital camera in the positive emotions 
condition or a nonaffect-eliciting ad in the 
neutral condition.  
 
Manipulation of product-





Description of subsequent choice task. 
Decision complexity was manipulated by 
varying the number of alternatives in the 
choice set + Life-Event Inventory (Part II): 
Description of a real life consumption 
experience of participants’ choice. 
 
Manipulation of decision 
complexity + Measurement 
of emotion regulation 
behavior  
Recall of positive as opposed to 





Choice task based on a product × attribute 
matrix. 
Measurement of decision 
behavior and choice 
Amount of processing + Selectivity 
in processing + Pattern of 




Post-experimental questionnaire Manipulation checks Manipulation checks 
 
Phase VI Debriefing 
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On this pretense (in fact, the manipulation of CFC), participants in the high-
CFC conditions (low-CFC conditions) were first asked to remember and describe a 
recent positive event in which they focused on the future (immediate) implications of 
their behavior and used them to guide their current actions. In this way, CFC was 
manipulated by priming participant’s focus on the immediate versus future 
consequences of their current decisions. To check whether this was an important and 
positive event for them, participants were asked, “To what extent was this situation 
important for you?” (1 = not at all; 7 = very much) and “How positive or negative was 
the outcome of this situation for you?” (1 = negative; 7 = positive). On average, 
participants recalled an important event (M = 6.19) with a positive outcome (M = 
5.78). Next, participants were told that because recalling one event influences the way 
people recall other events, they would only be asked to recall and describe the second 
life event at a later time.  
Phase II: Manipulation of Product-Eliciting Emotions. In the 
meantime, participants were asked to participate in an unrelated study about how 
consumers make decisions in actual shopping situations, in which they first happen to 
see an advertisement for a product and only later enter a store in order to learn more 
about it and make a purchase decision. Participants were asked to imagine that they 
wanted to buy a digital camera and were shown an ad for a digital camera on the 
computer for 60 seconds (in fact, the manipulation of product-eliciting emotions). 
Consistent with prior research on persuasion (e.g., Soldat and Sinclair 2001; 
Aaker and Williams 1998), product-eliciting emotions were manipulated by using 
print advertisements as emotional stimuli to evoke either positive or neutral emotions 
toward a focal product. More specifically, positive emotions were evoked by three 
venues: (a) emotional images (e.g., people smiling), (b) vocabulary choice, phrasing, 
                                                                                                  
 112 
and tag lines (e.g., “capture the happiness”), and (c) color scheme (e.g., bright colors). 
In the neutral conditions, a nonaffect-eliciting ad was designed by including: (a) 
neutral images (e.g., images of buildings), (b) neutral vocabulary, phrasing and tag 
lines (e.g., “take pictures”), and (c) a black-and-white color scheme. To ensure that 
the ads were only manipulating participants’ emotions towards the product but not 
their level of product information, no specific information about product 
characteristics was included in any of the two ads.11 
Phase III: Manipulation of Decision Complexity and Measurement 
of Emotion Regulation. After seeing the ad, participants were informed that they 
would now be asked to make a selection from a set of digital cameras (including the 
camera featured in the ad). Decision complexity was manipulated by varying the 
number of alternatives included in the choice task (Payne, Bettman, and Johnson 
1993). In the low-complexity condition, participants were told that they would have 4 
digital cameras to choose from. In the moderate-decision complexity condition, the 
number of digital cameras was 8. In the high-complexity condition, the number of 
digital cameras was 16, which is in line with prior research (e.g., Chernev 2003). In 
all conditions, participants were also told that for each camera they would have 
information on 5 attributes.  
Then, in line with the procedure adopted by Yeung and Wyer (2004), 
                                                           
11 A pretest (n = 50) was conducted to establish whether these two versions of the ad indeed differed in 
the extent to which they induced positive or neutral emotions toward the digital camera featured in the 
ad, without altering participants’ mood. Participants were asked to indicate their feelings toward the 
GLJLWDOFDPHUD   DQG WRZDUGWKHDG  RQWKHVDPHVL[HPRWLRQLWHPVXVHGLQVWXG\
Participants were DOVRDVNHGWRLQGLFDWHKRZWKH\IHOWDWWKDWPRPHQWLQWHUPVRIWKHSRVLWLYH  
DQGWKHQHJDWLYH  DGMHFWLYHVIURP:DWVRQ&ODUNDQG7HOOHJHQ¶V3$1$6VFDOH
As intended, the results confirmed that the positive-affect-eliciting ad (compared to the nonaffect-
eliciting ad) elicited more positive emotions toward the digital camera (M = 4.4 vs. 2.62; p < .001) and 
the ad (M = 4.76 vs. 3.53; p < .001). Importantly, the effects of the ad manipulation on emotions toward 
the camera remained significant (p < .05) after controlling for emotions toward the ad. Finally, there 
were no differences in mood between the two ad conditions (Positive affect: M = 3.28 vs. 3.25; ns.; 
Negative affect: M = 1.67 vs. 1.8; ns.). 
 
                                                                                                  
 113 
participants were told that, on many occasions, consumers only enter a store to check 
the features of a product some time after they have seen it advertised. To simulate 
these conditions participants were asked to perform an unrelated task. This unrelated 
task (in fact, the measurement of emotion regulation) was introduced as the second 
part of the Life-Inventory Event study. Specifically, participants were now asked to 
recall and describe a second autobiographical memory of their choice about a past 
consumption experience. This procedure was adapted from Erber and Erber (1994), 
who have shown that affect-incongruent recall is an effective tool for affect 
regulation. References to more negative (positive) consumption experiences were 
considered indicative of participants’ attempts to dampen (maintain) their positive 
emotions. Again, participants rated the extent to which this event had been important 
for them (1 = not at all; 7 = very much), and coded the event as positive or negative 
with the following two items (r = .72): “How positive or negative was this 
consumption experience for you?” (1 = negative; 4 = nor positive, nor negative; 7 = 
positive) and “How did this situation make you feel?” (1 = bad; 7 = good). 
Phase IV: Choice Task. Following the completion of the Life-Event 
Inventory study, participants were presented with a computer-based information 
acquisition system similar to Mouselab (Payne et al. 1993) developed specifically for 
this study. They were presented with an interactive computer product choice 
simulation and were asked to select a product from a product × attribute matrix. 12 
Participants were first given a practice trial. Next they were presented with the 
product × attribute matrix for choosing a digital camera. Product information was 
                                                           
12 To determine which product attributes to use, a pretest (n = 46) was conducted whereby participants 
ranked 20 attributes for digital cameras on their relevance and importance. The top seven attributes 
were retained for the study (megapixels, price, optical zoom, base memory, digital zoom, design, and 
red-eye reduction), with the two most important attributes (megapixels and price) held constant across 
conditions to control for scenarios where one attribute overwhelmingly dominates the others. 
Information about these two attributes was provided as part of the task description. 
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displayed in rows and attribute information displayed in columns. The matrix had 20 
cells (4 products × 5 attributes) in the low-decision-complexity condition, 40 cells (8 
products × 5 attributes) in the moderate-decision-complexity condition, and 80 cells 
(16 products × 5 attributes) in the high-decision-complexity condition. Information 
about the attribute values was hidden behind opaque boxes. Moving the mouse cursor 
over a box revealed its content, and the information remained visible until the cursor 
was moved out of the box. Thus, information was available for only one box at a time. 
When designing the product × attribute matrix, the product characteristics 
were specified in such a way that there was a uniform distribution of attribute levels 
across all attributes and alternatives (Lurie 2004). All products in the set received the 
same number of highest ratings, second ratings, third ratings, and so forth, until the 
lowest ratings. To control for potential effects of inter-attribute correlation (Payne et 
al. 1993), the average inter-attribute correlations was around zero. Also, the camera 
featured in the ad was slightly less attractive relative to other alternatives in the choice 
set (i.e., its total rating across all five attributes was one unit lower than other 
cameras). Hence, we expect that participants will only choose this alternative when it 
has a hedonic value that offsets its lower functional value (i.e., when dampening of 
product-induced positive emotions does not occur). In contrast, we predict that 
participants who dampen their positive emotions and those in the neutral-emotion 
conditions will generally not choose this alternative. A randomly generated three-
letter and three-digit name identified each digital camera. The product name and the 
position of the camera featured in the ad on the product × attribute matrix were 
systematically varied across participants, and no order effects were found. Finally, the 
products in the limited-choice conditions were rotated, such that for every product 
encountered in the extensive-choice condition there was an equivalent possibility of 
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the same product being encountered in the limited-choice conditions. 
To test our predictions that dampening positive emotions impacts decision-
making processes, and building on prior research (Lurie 2004; Payne et al. 1993), the 
main dependent variables in this task pertain to (a) the amount of processing, (b) 
selectivity in processing, and (c) the pattern of processing. Specifically, the total 
amount of processing was assessed by the relative number of acquisitions (RACQ). 
This measure captures the average number of times information items were opened 
during the decision process as a fraction of the total information available. An 
additional measure that relates to the amount of processing effort is the average time 
spent per item of information acquired (TPERACQ).  
Selectivity in processing was measured by the relative attention devoted to the 
advertised product, assessed by the proportion of the total time acquiring information 
that was spent in cells involving the advertised product (PTAP). Two additional 
measures related to selectivity are the log of variances in the proportions of time spent 
acquiring information on each alternative (VAR-ALTER) and on each attribute 
(VAR-ATTRIB).  
Finally, a measure indicative of the overall information search pattern, defined 
in terms of the sequence of information acquisitions (by attribute vs. by alternative) 
was included (PATTERN). This measure is obtained by calculating the number of 
alternative-based transitions minus the number of attribute-based transitions divided 
by the sum of these two types of transitions. This index ranges from -1 (indicating 
only attribute-based processing) to +1 (indicating only alternative-based processing). 
A PATTERN score indicating more alternative-based processing (e.g., a higher value) 
is interpreted as indicating greater depth of processing.  
Phase V: Post-Experimental Questionnaire. At the end of the 
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experiment, participants completed a questionnaire that included a set of manipulation 
checks and control variables. First, the manipulation check for product-specific 
HPRWLRQV      VHOI-UHSRUWV RI GDPSHQLQJ      DQGPDLQWDLQLQJ     
positive emotions toward the focal product, the manipulation check of decision 
FRPSOH[LW\  VHOI-UHSRUWVRIGHSWKRISURFHVVLQJ  DQGVHOI-reports of 
choice confidence (r = .74) were completed using the same scales as in Study 1. As a 
check on the effectiveness of the CFC manipulation, participants were also asked the 
IROORZLQJ WKUHH TXHVWLRQV     ³:KHQ FRQIURQWHGZLWK D GHFLVLRQ SHRSOH FDQ
focus more on the short-term or on the long-term outcomes of their behavior? When 
choosing a digital camera, did you…” (1 = focus more on the short-term outcomes; 7 
= focus more on the long-term outcomes), “When choosing a digital camera, to what 
extent did you…” (1 = consider your immediate satisfaction with the digital camera; 7 
= consider your satisfaction with the digital camera in the future), and “To what extent 
was your choice for a digital camera only influenced by the future consequences of 
your decision?” (1 = not at all; 7 = very much). Next, participants were asked to 
indicate their level of involvement with the choice task (adapted from Pham and 
Avnet 2004) on two seven-point items anchored at “strongly disagree/strongly agree” 
(r = .67): “I did not take the task of choosing the digital camera seriously” (reverse-
scored) and “I really chose a digital camera as if I actually needed to buy one.” Finally 
and for control purposes, participants completed Beatty and Talpade’s (1994) Product 
.QRZOHGJH6FDOH   
Phase VI: Debriefing. After completing the post-experimental 
questionnaire, a funneled debriefing procedure (adapted from Chartrand and Bargh 
1996) was used to assess whether participants had guessed the true nature of the 
experiment and had suspected any relation between the different tasks. No participant 
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showed any awareness or suspicion of the manipulations or the link between the 




Manipulation Checks  
As expected, participants in the high-CFC condition (M = 5.04) reported to be more 
focused on the long-term outcomes of their decisions than those in the low-CFC 
condition (M = 2.66; F(1, 168) = 289.57, p < .001). Also, the positive-affect-eliciting 
ad produced more positive emotional responses toward the digital camera relative to 
the nonaffect-eliciting ad (M = 4.32 vs. 2.77; F(1, 168) = 85.88, p < .001). The 
manipulation for decision complexity was also effective. Increasing the number of 
alternatives generally increased participants’ perceptions of decision complexity from 
3.08 to 4.06 to 5.24 in the 4-, 8-, and 16-alternatives conditions, respectively (F(1, 




In support of our reasoning, we found a three-way (CFC × product-elicited emotions 
× decision complexity) interaction for participants’ ratings of the positivity of their 
recalled consumption events (F(2, 168) = 3.17, p < .05). As can been seen in Figure 
4.2, within the positive-emotion conditions, participants in the high-CFC condition 
recalled less positive consumption experiences in moderate decision complexity 
contexts relative to those in low (t(168) = -4.74, p < .001) and high (t(168) = 4.51, p < 
.001) decision complexity contexts. In contrast, there were no significant changes in 
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the positivity of the recalled consumption events for participants in the low-CFC 
condition across low, moderate, and high decision complexity contexts (t’s < 1). 
Within the neutral-emotion conditions no differences were found (t’s < 1).  
 
FIGURE 4.2. Study 2: Effects of Decision Complexity and CFC on Recall of 
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Control/Low CFC Control/High CFC
 
 
 An additional measure, indicative of the type of positive emotion regulation 
used, consists of participants’ self-reports of dampening and maintaining. Providing 
additional support for our reasoning, results from separate 2 × 2 × 3 ANOVAs 
showed a significant three-way interaction for dampening (F(2, 168) = 4.63, p < .02) 
and maintaining (F(1, 168) = 3.13, p < .05), again reflecting the same pattern of 
means (see Table 4.3). In addition, the results reported above did not change after 
controlling for product knowledge and the level of positive emotions experienced 
toward the focal product. 
                                                                                                  
 
TABLE 4.3. Study 2: Means as a Function of Product-Induced Positive Emotions, Decision Complexity, and CFC 
  Positive emotions  Neutral emotions 




 High  
complexity 
 Low  
complexity 




























Manipulation check of CFC  2.64  4.98  2.71 5.22  2.69 5.18  2.69 4.96  2.67 4.89  2.53 5.04 
Manipulation check of 
product-eliciting emotions  
 4.37 4.19  4.42 4.39  4.24 4.28  2.88 2.86  2.71 2.66  2.90 2.62 
Manipulation check of 
decision complexity 
 3.03 3.22  4.08 4.05  5.28 5.13  2.92 3.17  4.07 4.03  5.23 5.32 
Positivity of recalled 
consumption event  
 4.80 4.83  4.73 2.80  4.77 4.73  3.60 3.57  3.53 3.47  3.50 3.53 
Dampening (self-reports)  2.84 3.13  2.72 4.97  2.81 2.99  2.48 2.39  2.55 2.57  2.51 2.48 
Maintaining (self-reports)  4.10 4.02  4.07 2.32  4.03 3.95  2.85 2.77  2.88 2.87  2.80 2.82 
Involvement in choice task  4.10 4.00  4.17 4.13  4.07 4.03  3.93 3.87  3.97 3.90  4.03 3.93 
RACQ  1.82 1.92  1.73 3.91  1.53 1.60  2.90 3.07  2.14 2.09  1.83 1.93 
TPERACQ  .98 1.01  .91 1.28  .87 .89  1.15 1.17  1.08 1.13  1.00 1.02 
PTAP  .32 .30  .31 .10  .33 .32  .23 .24  .15 .14  .08 .05 
VAR-ALTER  .0074 .0069  .0088 .0013  .0138 .0116  .0043 .0030  .0071 .0073  .0086 .0073 
 
                                                                                                  
 
TABLE 4.3. Continued 
  Positive emotions  Neutral emotions 




 High  
complexity 
 Low  
complexity 




























VAR-ATTRIB  .0219 .0198  .0234 .0017  .0317 .0293  .0123 .0090  .0131 .0153  .0227 .0204 
PATTERN  -.26 -.25  -.32 .33  -.44 -.39  -.08 -.05  -.16 -.19  -.27 -.24 
Depth of processing 
(self-reports) 
 2.97 3.01  2.92 4.97  2.63 2.76  3.87 3.93  3.79 3.88  3.36 3.40 
Choice confidence  
(self-reports)  
 5.30 5.23  5.27 5.83  5.10 5.07  4.37 4.40  4.23 4.17  3.67 3.13 
NOTE.–CFC = consideration of future consequences. RACQ = relative number of acquisitions. TPERACQ = time per acquisition. PTAP = proportion of time 
on the advertised product. VAR-ALTER = variance in the proportion of time spent per alternative. VAR-ATTRIB = variance in the proportion of time spent per 
attribute. PATTERN = index reflecting relative amount of attribute-based (-) and alternative-based (+) processing. n = 15 for each cell. 
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Depth of Decision Processing  
Overall, participants reported to be involved during the choice task (Moverall = 4.01). 
Participants made on average 95 acquisitions per choice set with an average time per 
acquisition of 1.04 seconds, and they spent 22% of their time acquiring information 
on the advertised digital camera. To determine how CFC, product-elicited emotions, 
and decision complexity in a choice set influence information acquisition, we ran a 2 
× 2 × 3 MANOVA on the aforementioned six processing measures. The predicted 
three-way interaction emerged for all six measures: RACQ (F(2, 168) = 8.81, p < 
.001); TPERACQ (F(2, 168) = 4.71, p < .02); PTAP (F(2, 168) = 7.01, p < .01); 
VAR-ALTER (F(2, 168) = 3.93, p < .03); VAR-ATTRIB (F(2, 168) = 4.27, p < .02); 
PATTERN (F(2, 168) = 10.28, p < .001). The means by condition are given in Table 
4.3.  
Specifically and as hypothesized, within the positive-emotion conditions, 
moderate relative to both low and high decision complexity contexts were associated 
with more information acquisitions (moderate vs. low: t(168) = 6.39, p < .001; 
moderate vs. high: t(168) = -7.40, p < .001), more time spent on each item of 
information acquired (moderate vs. low: t(168) = 4.47, p < .001; moderate vs. high: 
t(168) = -6.52, p < .001), lower focus on the advertised camera (moderate vs. low: 
t(168) = -7.00, p < .001; moderate vs. high: t(168) = 7.73, p < .001), less selectivity 
for alternatives (moderate vs. low: t(168) = -3.48, p < .01; moderate vs. high: t(168) = 
6.43, p < .001) and attributes (moderate vs. low: t(168) = -3.75, p < .001; moderate vs. 
high: t(168) = 5.74, p < .001), and more alternative-based processing (moderate vs. 
low: t(168) = 6.83, p < .001; moderate vs. high: t(168) = -8.43, p < .001) for 
participants in the high-CFC condition. That is, the results showed that individuals 
that were focused on the future outcomes of their current choices adapted to moderate 
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decision complexity environments by slowing down processing, decreasing selectivity 
in processing, and moving toward more alternative-based processing. 
In contrast, again within the positive-emotion conditions, participants in the 
low-CFC condition generally acquired few items of information, spent little time per 
item of information acquired, spent more time on the advertised camera, were 
selective in processing per alternative and attribute, and processed by attribute across 
all levels of decision complexity (see Table 4.3). The values for TPERACQ, VAR-
ALTER, and VAR-ATTRIB (high vs. low complexity: all |t’s| > |1.98|, all p’s < .05), 
but not for RACQ, PTAP, and PATTERN (high vs. low complexity: all |t’s| < |1.6|, all 
p’s > .11), became significantly more pronounced in high complexity contexts.  
In line with prior decision research, within the neutral-emotion conditions, 
increasing levels of decision complexity were generally associated with decreased 
information processing, increased selectivity, and increased attribute-based processing 
for both participants in the high- and low-CFC conditions (high vs. low: all |t’s| > 
|2.15|, all p’s < .04).  
The results for self-reports of depth of processing reflected the same pattern of 
means (see Table 4.3). Also, the general pattern of adaptivity in depth of processing 




A Categorical Analysis of Variance confirmed that product choice was affected by 
GHFLVLRQ FRPSOH[LW\ DQG &)&       p < .03). Indeed and as expected, 
planned contrasts revealed that within the positive-emotion conditions, participants in 
the high-CFC condition were less likely to choose the advertised camera in moderate 
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GHFLVLRQFRPSOH[LW\VHWWLQJVWKDQZHUHWKRVHLQORZ  p < 
 DQG KLJK GHFLVLRQ FRPSOH[LW\ VHWWLQJV       p < .01). In 
contrast, low-CFC participants were generally likely to choose the advertised camera 
(73%, 73%, 87%, all p’s > .90) in the low, moderate, and high decision complexity 
conditions. The fact that participants chose the camera featured in the ad, despite it 
being a slightly less attractive option, attests to the strong biasing effects that positive 
emotions elicited by decision alternatives can have in consumption contexts.  
Within the neutral-emotion conditions, there was considerable heterogeneity in 
the chosen camera for participants across all decision complexity and CFC conditions. 
Overall, participants in these conditions did not choose the advertised camera 
(Moverall = 10%).  
 
Choice Confidence  
Consistent with the findings of Study 1, in the positive-emotion conditions choice 
confidence was highest when participants engaged in dampening (see Table 4.3). In 
the neutral-emotion conditions, higher levels of decision complexity were associated 
with lower choice confidence both for high- (high vs. low complexity: t(168) = -2.02, 
p < .05) and low-CFC conditions (high vs. low complexity: all t(168) = -3.65, p < 
.001).  
 
Dampening as a Debiasing Mechanism  
Replicating the results of Study 1, dampening was found to significantly impact the 
depth of decision processing, product choice, and choice confidence in the predicted 
directions (all p’s < .05). Central to our predictions, dampening was found to fully 
account for the influence decision complexity and CFC on these behaviors. 
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Discussion 
Study 2 extends the findings of Study 1 by showing that situational and chronic 
individual differences in consideration of future consequences influence emotion 
regulation and decision behavior in a similar manner. Unlike in Study 1, in this study 
detailed emotion regulation behaviors and decision processes were measured directly 
and unobtrusively in a controlled laboratory setting. The fact that the results closely 
mirror those of Study 1 provides converging evidence for the spontaneous use and 
effectiveness of dampening as a debiasing mechanism. 
 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Consumers often experience positive emotions in their everyday consumption 
decisions. Letting these emotions be our guides when forming judgments and making 
choices is, on many occasions, a smart decision rule. However, positive emotions can 
also be misleading. Results from two studies provide converging evidence that, 
although typically governed by pleasure, consumers do sometimes deliberately 
regulate their positive emotions downward in order to prevent the biasing effects that 
using the affect heuristic can have on their mental processes. Such strategic 
dampening of positive emotions occurs even when this violates the fundamental 
hedonic motive of pursuing pleasure. We have found that consumers’ attempts to 
dampen their positive emotions toward a focal product critically depend on decision 
complexity, on the cognitive side, and on consideration of future consequences, on the 
motivational side. Specifically, consumers that are more focused on the future than on 
the immediate outcomes of their currents actions are more likely to dampen such 
positive emotions in moderate rather than in small or large choice sets. Of importance, 
we also found that these regulation attempts are effective in inoculating consumers’ 
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decision processes against the adverse influences of positive emotions. Our results 
show that dampening leads to changes in the depth of decision processing, product 
choice, and choice confidence and, in doing so, produces adaptive consumption 
behaviors and outcomes. These effects were observed over the course of daily life 
(Study 1) and in controlled experimental settings (Study 2), and both in situations 
where differences in consideration of future consequences were chronic (Study 1) or 
situational (Study 2). This pattern of results was also independent of individual 
differences in need for cognition, impulsive buying, self-esteem, and product 
knowledge (Studies 1 and 2), and was found for self-reported (Studies 1 and 2) and 
unobtrusive measures of emotion regulation and decision behavior (Study 2). The 
consistency of the findings across different methodologies and measures is reassuring 
for the importance of the proposed dynamics of bias prevention in making affect-
based consumption decisions. 
These findings contribute to research on consumer judgment and decision 
making in several ways. First, they show that consumers can spontaneously identify 
the need to protect their decision processes from the biasing influences of positive 
emotions, and deliberately engage in attempts to do so. The fact that consumers 
initiate preventive debiasing efforts on their own is particularly impressive in light of 
evidence that bias correction is not a default response and only occurs in the presence 
of blatant or conditional warnings (e.g., Wegener and Petty 1995; Stapel et al.1998). 
Second, the results demonstrate that these efforts to regulate positive emotions toward 
a target have clear cognitive and behavioral consequences which contribute to 
adaptive functioning in consumption contexts. We found that whether consumers 
maintain or dampen their product-induced positive emotions has different 
implications for how they reach decisions, which choices they make, and ultimately 
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how they feel about these choices. Thus, rather than engaging in remedial action after 
judgments are biased–an often ineffective strategy (e.g., Petty and Wegener 1993; 
Stapel et al. 1998)–we show that consumers can anticipatorily prevent their initial 
affective impressions from tainting their decision processes and, in this way, not let 
biased judgments emerge in the first place. 
These results provide initial insights into the dynamics of bias prevention in 
affect-based judgments and there are many avenues for future work. For instance, 
alternative strategies for avoiding bias include controlling one’s exposure to biasing 
stimuli or preparing oneself prior to anticipated exposure (Hoch and Loewenstein 
1991; Wilson et al. 1998). Although these may not always be feasible, desirable or 
successful they are nonetheless used (e.g., using the remote control to manage 
exposure to advertising). Future research is needed to understand how frequently 
different strategies are employed, the conditions that may lead consumers to use a 
particular strategy and their implications for consumption outcomes. 
The findings also contribute to research on predecision processing. Meloy 
(2000) found that consumers in a positive mood distort sequentially presented product 
information to support a prior preference for one alternative. We extend this finding 
by specifying conditions under which consumers deliberately dampen their positive 
emotions toward a tentatively preferred product in order to avoid such distortion and 
the ensuing suboptimal decisions.  
Our results also add to recent research on the behavioral implications of 
emotions suggesting that positive emotions broaden individuals’ thought-action 
repertoires (Fredrickson, 2001). Our results qualify this view by identifying 
boundaries to this broadening effect. In particular, we found that, in decision making, 
positive emotions elicited by a specific target can narrow individuals’ attention and 
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increase selectivity in decision making. Evidence for broadening was only obtained 
when individuals deliberately attempted to overcome this narrowing effect via 
dampening. Further research is needed to examine whether the eliciting factors and 
the consequences of different emotion regulation strategies emerge for other positive 
emotions and motivational principles beyond the ones that we have studied here. For 
example, different emotions may pose distinct emotion regulatory challenges, and the 
consequences of emotion regulation may vary according to whether the specific 
emotion being regulated is excitement, joy, hope, or some other positive emotion. 
In conclusion, the present research sheds new light on consumers’ ability to 
monitor and control their judgment and decision processes in the service of their long-
term goals. It shows that consumers selectively use their repertoire of emotion 
regulatory responses to adjust their decision behavior to the varying demands and 
biasing influences of consumption environments, with an appreciation of the 
differential costs and benefits of dampening and maintaining positive emotions. In 
this way, the present article demonstrates that although consumers prefer to see la vie 
en rose, they do sometimes take off their rose-colored glasses. 
                                                                                                  
 















EMOTIONS PERMEATE ALL aspects of human life. Emotions infuse goals with meaning, 
from the deepest wants to fleeting desires. Emotions guide actions, from lasting 
commitments to immediate choices. Emotions color perception, from memories of the 
past to expectations about the future. They provide us information about the world, 
from our inner selves to the external environment, from people to products. 
The principle that consumers are motivated to feel good has dominated 
scholars’ understanding of the interplay between emotions and consumer behavior. 
According to this pleasure principle the goals that we pursue, the states of the world 
that we prefer, and the options that we choose are those that allow us to maximize 
pleasure and minimize pain. Interestingly, despite the power and ubiquity of the 
pleasure principle, research has also suggested that neutrality rather than pleasure, and 
stability rather than movement, are the hallmarks of adaptive emotional functioning. 
According to this view consumption is governed by a principle of hedonic 
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homeostasis (from the Greek homo meaning “same” and stasis meaning “fixity” or 
“lack of movement”): as soon as consumers experience happiness or sadness, these 
deviations from a baseline level of affect are corrected automatically by counteracting 
psychological mechanisms. 
The previous chapters provided evidence that both these principles, pleasure 
and homeostasis, can and do govern the flow of consumer behavior. Research 
reported in Chapter 2 shows that regulatory focus influences whether or not 
consumers reiterate those behaviors that led to pleasure in the past. Results from three 
studies show that a promotion focus increases consumers’ tendency to attempt to 
repeat in the future what they have enjoyed in the past. Specifically, consumers with 
promotion pride reported higher intentions of returning to a store where they had 
previously experienced pleasure (i.e., felt pride in negotiating a discount), presumably 
in an attempt to repeat this outcome. In contrast, consumers with prevention pride 
forsook the immediate pleasant experience of returning to a satisfactory store in an 
attempt to obtain better consumption outcomes. 
Chapter 3 shows that, in multiple-goal consumption environments, whether or 
not goal-directed behavior is congruent with the pleasure principle or with the 
principle of hedonic homeostasis is determined by goal distance. Results from two 
studies show that when consumers are far from goal attainment their behavior is 
consistent with the pursuit of pleasure, with positive emotions leading to the 
persistence of effort and negative emotions leading to the discontinuation of effort and 
its reallocation to alternative goal domains. Conversely, when consumers were close 
to goal attainment, their actions were congruent with hedonic homeostasis. In such 
cases, positive emotions stemming from progress in a goal domain led to a reduction 
of effort in that domain and thus to a reduction in positive feelings. Negative emotions 
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stemming from lack of progress in a goal domain led to an increase in goal-directed 
effort in that domain, and therefore to a decrease in negative emotions. 
Chapter 4 provided another perspective on the operation of both principles–
pleasure and hedonic homeostasis–in shaping consumer behavior. Results from two 
studies show that, although consumers generally pursue pleasure in their decisions 
and choices, sometimes they purposely dampen their positive emotions in order to 
achieve a state of neutral affect conducive to more deliberative decision processes. 
Evidence showing that consumers sometimes avoided immediate pleasure in order to 
adapt their decision process to situational demands clearly demonstrated that 
consumers can not only be guided by a principle of hedonic homeostasis but, more 
importantly, that their consumption choices can become more adaptive by doing so. 
As such, the findings reported in the preceding chapters suggest that the 
affective system can be highly versatile and adapt to variations in consumers’ goals 
and environmental demands by oscillating between distinct patterns of affective 
functioning. More specifically, to meet shifting contingencies the affective system (a) 
may or may not follow the pleasure principle, (b) may or may not follow the principle 
of hedonic homeostasis, or (c) may alternate between these two principles. 
In this concluding chapter I take a step further and outline the fundamentals of 
a model in which both principles–pleasure and hedonic homeostasis–are elements of a 
more general system by which consumers continuously adjust how they respond to 
consumption emotions in order to produce the right responses, about the right stimuli, 
at the right time and, in this way, maximize the adaptive value of their emotions in 
consumption. Although the ideas presented in this chapter remain to be explored and 
are to some extent speculative, I suggest possible connections with extant empirical 
research. 
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TWO TRADITIONS IN THE STUDY OF AFFECTIVE 
FUNCTIONING 
 
The Pleasure Principle 
There is little doubt that the desire to experience pleasure is one of the most 
fundamental human motives. Philosophers from ancient Greece (e.g., Aristippus, c. 
435-356 B.C.), through 17th- (Hobbes 1651/1982) and 18th-century Britain (e.g., 
Bentham 1789/1948), to 20th-century Austria (e.g., Freud 1920/1950) have 
emphasized the importance of hedonic pleasure in the geography of human life and its 
intrinsic link to well-being. Freud (1920/1952) termed this desire to achieve and 
maintain pleasant states the pleasure principle. As he succinctly put it: “our entire 
psychical activity is bent upon procuring pleasure and avoiding pain” (p. 365, 
emphasis in the original). 
Biological, linguistic, and psychological perspectives on emotions suggest that 
individuals’ desire for pleasure represents a universal human tendency with clear 
behavioral correlates. Indeed, research has provided evidence for the evolutionary 
(e.g., Johnston 1999) and the biological (e.g., Cacioppo et al. 2000) bases of 
approaching pleasure and avoiding pain as general dimensions of human response. 
Anthropological research and referential studies of language have found that the 
expressions “feeling good” and “feeling bad” are common to the vocabulary of all 
known human languages (e.g., Lutz and White 1986; Russel 1991, 2003; Wierzbicka 
1999). Research on the psychology of emotions also suggests that feelings of pleasure 
and pain are the only irreducible dimensions of affective experience (Frijda 1999). 
There is also considerable evidence for the pervasiveness of the pleasure 
principle in consumption. Research has found that consumption is generally 
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associated with positive emotions (Derbaix and Pahm 1991; Richins 1997), and that a 
variety of consumption activities are purposely directed toward the pursuit of pleasure 
(Holbrook and Hirschman 1982). In fact, the concepts of pleasure and displeasure are 
fundamental to many theories of consumer behavior, including judgment (e.g., Adaval 
2003; Pham et al. 2001), decision making (e.g., Luce 1998; Pham 1998), consumption 
emotions (e.g., Bagozzi, Gopinath, and Nyer 1999), and mood regulation (e.g., Cohen 
and Andrade 2004). The maximization of pleasure is, for example, a central principle 
guiding consumers’ judgment and decision making and often provides a common 
yardstick in terms of which disparate options are compared (Pham 2004). Consistent 
with this ‘feelings-as-information” hypothesis, research has demonstrated that 
consumers often use their current positive emotions toward a target to infer their 
attitudes and preferences, and generally choose the options that elicit more positive 
emotions (e.g., Pham 1998; Schwarz and Clore 1996). Research has also found that 
consumers not only strive for pleasure but, importantly, that they also engage in 
deliberate attempts to manage their affective experience in order to maintain and 
protect positive states. Efforts to maintain a positive mood have been found to 
influence, for instance, variety-seeking (e.g., Kahn and Isen 1993), and how 
consumers process product information (e.g., Adaval 2001; Meloy 2000) and 
persuasive messages (e.g., Wegener and Petty 1994). The allure of pleasure in 
consumption is perhaps nowhere more apparent than it is in research showing that 
consumers sometimes act against their own better judgment, and are even willing to 
incur future costs in order to maximize their immediate pleasure. For instance, Hoch 
and Loewenstein (1991) have suggested that impulsive consumption is primarily 
driven by an attempt to eliminate the pain associated with not buying a desired 
product. 
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In sum, the pleasure principle conceptualizes the affective system as a 
mechanism for identifying sources of pleasure and pain in consumption environments. 
According to this perspective, consumer behavior is primarily directed at attaining 
and protecting positive hedonic states. It therefore predicts that affective functioning 
is unidirectional and unvarying: consumers always approach sources of pleasure (e.g., 
buy the products that elicit positive feelings) and avoid sources of pain (e.g., not 
repurchase products that have led to disappointment). 
 
The Principle of Hedonic Homeostasis 
Despite the currency of the pleasure principle, a second tradition in affect research has 
emerged that emphasizes the role of affective balance and constancy in promoting 
adaptation and governing consumer behavior. This homeostatic principle postulates 
not only that affective states tend toward stability but, more importantly, that a 
number of psychological mechanisms are in place that actively preserve balance and 
constancy by monitoring and correcting deviations (positive or negative) from 
baseline levels of affect. 
The notion that affective balance and constancy can be functional is integral to 
various philosophical perspectives on emotion. From Aristotle to the Stoics, from 
Descartes to Kant, philosophers have identified the negative implications that can 
arise from being too euphoric or dysphoric, and have questioned the pursuit of 
pleasure as a desirable end. This idea was well expressed by the Stoic philosopher 
Epictetus: “If you have received the impression of any pleasure, guard yourself 
against being carried away by it . . . . take care that the charm of it, and the pleasure, 
and the attraction of it should not conquer you” (quoted in Hadas 1961, p. 96-97). 
Philosophers as early as Hippocrates (c. 450-380 B.C.) have also suggested that 
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organisms tend toward balance and equilibrium, a property that forms the basis of 
homeostatic processes. 
In consumer research, the principle of hedonic homeostasis is central to 
optimum stimulation level (OSL) theory. Research in OSL has demonstrated that 
consumer behavior is often instigated by a desire attain to a satisfactory (homeostatic) 
level of stimulation obtained from the consumption environment or from consumers’ 
internal states (Steenkamp and Baumgartner 1992; Steenkamp, Baumgartner, and Van 
der Wulp 1996). Consumers are assumed to have idiosyncratic preferences for a fixed 
set point level of stimulation (optimum stimulation level). Deviations from this set 
point are accompanied by negative feelings and have been found to trigger attempts to 
reestablish homeostasis by reducing or increasing stimulation (e.g., Steenkamp and 
Baumgartner 1992). Hedonic homeostasis is, therefore, the primary regulatory 
mechanism implicated in OSL theories: it is the desire to reduce the negative feelings 
elicited by departures from the optimum stimulation level and to return to a 
satisfactory level of affect that activates discrepancy-reduction processes. In a number 
of studies Steenkamp and Baumgartner (1992) have provided considerable evidence 
that consumers’ OSL is systematically related to a wide range of exploratory 
consumer behaviors, including curiosity-motivated behavior, variety-seeking, and 
risk-taking. 
The homeostasic construct is also fundamental to psychological theories of 
affect regulation. For example, Solomon's opponent process theory (Solomon, 1980) 
proposes a physiological basis for the operation of homeostatic processes in affect 
regulation. It clearly states that individuals possess physiological mechanisms to 
“oppose or suppress many types of emotional arousal or hedonic processes, whether 
they are pleasurable or aversive” (p. 698). The experience of positive or negative 
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affect arising from physical stimuli activates a balancing process that produces an 
affective reaction of equivalent magnitude but opposing hedonic tone. A well-known 
example described by Solomon (1980) refers to the affective reactions that unfold 
during parachute jumping: the early intense fear experienced before and during the 
free-fall is, after a safe landing, followed by intense feelings of elation and joy. 
Despite its ability to explain affective responses to physical stimuli, there is however 
suggestive evidence that opponent process theory performs less well in accounting for 
the pattern of emotional reactions to psychological events (Sandvik, Diener, and 
Larsen 1985).  
Forgas, Johnson, and Ciarrochi (1998) hypothesized that people spontaneously 
manage their moods over time in order to ensure that their daily mood fluctuations 
remain within a limited range and thus maintain affect control. Support for this model 
was obtained in several studies (Forgas and Ciarrochi 2002) showing that, following 
an initial positive or negative mood induction, participants first produced mood-
congruent responses which, over time, were replaced by mood-incongruent responses 
(see also Sedikides 1994). This temporal sequence of mood-congruent followed by 
mood-incongruent processing suggests that individuals spontaneously reacted to 
deviations from a baseline neutral affective state by attempting to reestablish 
homeostatic balance.  
Similarly, Larsen (2000) proposed a model of mood regulation which draws 
on principles of cybernetic control. In his Control Model of Mood Regulation 
individuals are assumed to have a desired affective state (fixed hedonic set point), and 
to actively take actions to minimize departures from this desired state in a volitional 
attempt to control their feelings. In a different context, Erber and Erber (2001) have 
also hypothesized in their Social Constraint Model of Mood Regulation that people 
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may adapt to social constraints by regulating their affective states toward neutral 
affect. Evidence for this model was obtained in research showing that participants 
with a positive or negative mood selected mood-incongruent material in an attempt to 
neutralize their mood when anticipating social interaction with a stranger (Erber, et al. 
1996). 
Although focused on the regulation of goal-directed behavior rather than of 
affect per se, Carver and Scheier’s (1998) cybernetic control model also has 
homeostatic implications for affect regulation. According to this model, discrepancies 
between individuals’ current states and their desired goals, signaled by positive or 
negative emotions, elicit corrective self-regulatory responses that return the system to 
homeostatic balance. Because the reduction of discrepancies is likely to be 
accompanied by a decrease in positive or negative emotions, a shift toward neutral 
affect may occur as a byproduct of behavioral self-regulation. 
In sum, the principle of hedonic homeostasis conceptualizes the affective 
system as a mechanism for monitoring discrepancies from a fixed hedonic set point. 
Deviations from this set point arising from positive or negative emotions are predicted 
to trigger counteracting discrepancy-reduction processes directed at reestablishing 
affective balance. According to this perspective, whether or not consumers 
deliberately pursue pleasure is a function of their current affective state. Negative 
emotions are a signal that consumption stimuli or outcomes are undesirable and that 
consumers should identify and pursue more desirable ones (e.g., by engaging in 
exploratory behavior). Positive emotions also signal an undesirable state that must be 
corrected: they may contaminate consumers’ mental processes (Chapter 4), reduce 
their sensitivity to new stimuli, or produce excessive levels of stimulation (Steenkamp 
and Baumgartner 1992). 
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AN ALLODYNAMIC MODEL OF AFFECT 
The principles of pleasure and of hedonic homeostasis represent two contrasting 
perspectives on the fundamental dynamics of the affective system. The hedonic 
tradition of the pleasure principle views affect as a system for signaling sources of 
pleasure and pain in the consumption environment that directs consumers toward 
positivity. It states that consumers invariably pursue pleasure in their consumption 
activities. The homeostatic tradition views affect as a system for signaling 
discrepancies from a fixed baseline level of affect that activates discrepancy-reducing 
responses once such deviations emerge. It states that consumers minimize the 
occurrence affective experiences above or below a fixed hedonic set point as a means 
of optimizing their consumption outcomes. Given the seeming inconsistency between 
these two perspectives, a critical question is whether these views are really mutually 
exclusive or can instead be integrated. 
I conjecture that thinking about affective functioning as an allodynamic 
system may help bring together these accounts. Berntson and Cacioppo (2000) 
introduced the concept of allodynamic regulation to describe psychophysiological 
regulatory processes where (a) homeostatic regulation towards a regulatory set point 
may occur but may also be actively inhibited, and where (b) both the set point and the 
response characteristics of the regulatory system can be flexibly adjusted to meet 
shifting environmental demands. The notion of allodynamic regulation thus represents 
a more flexible and adaptive conceptualization of regulation that encompasses a 
variety of regulatory processes, including homeostasis, heterostasis, and allostasis 
(regulatory processes in which only the regulatory baseline may be adjusted to 
varying circumstances; Sterling and Eyer 1988). 
An allodynamic perspective may offer an important advance over prior 
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conceptualizations of the affective system: it suggests that the pattern of behavioral 
response to emotional signals may be variable rather than fixed in order to maximize 
adaptation of consumer responses to existing or anticipated demands. In this way, it 
subsumes the contrasting principles of pleasure and of hedonic homeostasis, both 
entailing relatively fixed patterns (approach pleasure vs. maintain a hedonic set point) 
of how consumers respond to experienced emotions. 
The notion, proposed in this chapter, that the pattern of allodynamic regulation 
that operates for psychophysiological processes may also characterize the regulation 
of consumers’ behavioral responses to emotion is consistent with multilevel analyses 
of the affective system that emphasize the links between psychological and visceral 
processes (Cacioppo et al. 2000; Panksepp 2000). Research suggests, for instance, that 
somatovisceral activity, which is integral to allodynamic physiological regulation 
(Berntson and Cacioppo 2000), may also elicit emotional experiences (Cacioppo et al. 
2000). More recently, Sterling (2004) argued that emotional experience and 
expression may be central elements underlying the modulation of human physiology. 
As he put it (p. 34): “human physiological regulation depends powerfully on a host of 
high-level neural mechanisms . . . [including] multiple emotions.” 
 
Mechanisms of Allodynamic Regulation 
Berntson and Cacioppo (2000) identified six distinct mechanisms by which 
psychophysiological regulation can occur in allodynamic systems. I conjecture that 
the processes and mechanisms of psychophysiological regulation may reflect a 
broader set of regulatory principles that may also apply to the regulation of 
consumers’ behavioral response to experienced emotions (here termed affect response 
curve). Specifically, the adaptive regulation of the affect system may entail changes in 
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the following regulatory parameters of consumers’ affect response curve: (a) hedonic 
set point, (b) sensitivity, (c) linearity, (d) dynamic range, (e) temporal dynamics, and 
(f) stability. As such, an allodynamic perspective suggests a number or mechanisms 
that may introduce versatility in the linkage between consumers’ emotional 
experiences and their behavioral responses, to which I now turn. I explore here the 
utility of the six mechanisms proposed by Berntson and Cacioppo (2000) beyond the 
somatovisceral/neural into the affective/cognitive domain of consumer functioning, 
following a research tradition of multilevel integrative analyses of human behavior 
(Cacioppo et al. 2000). 
 
Hedonic set point 
In everyday life consumers encounter a wide variety of consumption environments. 
From the highly pleasant environment of visiting a theme park or eating in a 
restaurant with friends, through the neutral environment of collecting clothes from the 
dry cleaner, to the negative environment of complaining about a defective product, the 
emotional valence of consumption contexts fluctuates enormously. Accordingly, the 
type of affective reactions and behavioral responses that are likely to be optimal in 
each consumption situation may also vary. An allodynamic conceptualization of 
affective functioning would suggest that consumers strive towards attaining an 
optimal hedonic set point by adjusting it upward or downward to meet the demands of 
the task at hand. In doing so, they may be able to maximize their consumption short- 
and long-term consumption outcomes such as enjoying to the fullest pleasurable 
experiences and experiencing regret and the disappointment associated with bad 
decisions. From this perspective, optimal adjustment of the hedonic set point would 
entail adopting a higher (more positive) set point when the consumption context 
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elicits primarily positive emotions (e.g., having fun in a theme park) than when it is 
primarily neutral (e.g., going to the dry cleaner) or negative (e.g., complaining about 
an unsatisfactory service encounter). In other words, whereas regulating emotions 
towards a negative set point when spending a pleasant time in theme park would 
perhaps be maladaptive, when complaining about a defective product it would be 
maladaptive failing to do so and instead trying to feel good (pleasure principle). 
Adopting a fixed hedonic set point (principle of hedonic homeostasis) would preclude 
adaptation altogether. 
 
Sensitivity and Linearity  
Consumption situations do not differ only in their valence but, importantly, also in the 
diagnosticity and goal relevance of emotions (e.g., Pham 1998). While in some 
consumption contexts experiencing positive emotions is the desired end (e.g., going 
on holidays), in other environments consumers may pursue other goals for which 
feelings may not be diagnostic (e.g., buying financial products). Thus, maximizing 
consumption outcomes over time may entail oscillating between pursuing pleasure, 
avoiding pain, maintaining a hedonic set point, or deliberately avoiding behavior to be 
influenced by emotions altogether. An allodynamic view suggests that the link 
between emotions and behavior may be regulated by varying the sensitivity (the 
intensity of emotions required to elicit a behavioral response) or the linearity (extent 
to which consumers’ behavioral response is constant across the entire range of 
emotions) of the affect response curve. For instance, when on holidays consumers 
may have highly pleasurable experiences because they are more sensitive to their 
feelings. As a result, they approach and avoid more vigorously pleasant and 
unpleasant consumption stimuli, respectively (steeper affect response curve). On the 
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other hand, consumers may maximize their holiday experience by being highly 
responsive to their positive emotions while disregarding negative affectively-laden 
stimuli (non-linear affect response curve). 
 
Dynamic Range 
Consumer behavior is subject to a variety of social influences (Dahl, Manchanda, and 
Argo 2001; Lowrey, Otnes, and Ruth 2004) and social situations have been found to 
vary in the norms governing the acceptable range of emotional experience and 
expression (Erber et al. 1996). Accordingly, optimal functioning in consumption 
environments may require the regulation of behavioral responses to experienced 
emotions such as the extent to which emotions are expressed and shared. The 
allodynamic hypothesis suggests that consumers may be able to regulate the emotion-
behavior link by adjusting the dynamic range of their affect response curve. The 
notion of dynamic range reflects the difference between the upper and lower levels of 
behavioral response across all possible levels of experienced emotions. In other 
words, affect response curves with a narrower dynamic range are associated with 
more restrained behavioral responses than curves with a broader dynamic range. For 
instance, when having dinner in an expensive and formal restaurant consumers may 
restrain their emotional expression irrespective of the intensity of their feelings (e.g., 
if they are dissatisfied with part of the meal they are likely to moderate the tone of 
their complain or may even not complain at all). In contrast, when having lunch in a 
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Temporal Dynamics 
The influence of emotions on consumer responses may differ in its latency and 
persistence which, in turn, may vary across consumption stimuli and environments. 
Research on the use of feelings as sources of information (e.g., Pham 2004) 
emphasizes that, in order to maximize consumption outcomes, consumers should be 
selective in their reliance on feelings to form judgments and make decisions. 
Accordingly, an allodynamic perspective on affective functioning suggests that 
adjustment in the temporal dynamics (latency and persistence) may provide a 
mechanism for matching the behavioral impact of emotions to their informational 
value. Thus, for instance, consumers may attempt to limit the duration of their 




Allodynamic adjustments in the emotion-behavior link may not only occur 
momentarily to meet the demands of the current consumption environment but may 
also involve processes by which consumers optimize their behavioral response to 
emotions over time to meet a similar set of environmental conditions that are 
repeatedly encountered. This type of regulation occurs through changes in the stability 
of the behavioral response to experienced affect. Stability refers to the reproducibility 
of the affect response curve under comparable stimuli conditions. By varying the 
stability of their response to experienced emotions in a specific consumption 
environment, consumers may be able to reproduce behaviors that have led to 
favorable consumption outcomes in the past and discard dysfunctional responses. For 
example, consumers that generally respond to feelings of disappointment with a 
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service provider by switching to a different provider may realize that they can obtain 
better outcomes by complaining (e.g., obtain a refund) and, as a result, modify their 
response in subsequent service encounters. 
Taken together, these six regulatory parameters may afford consumers a high 
level of flexibility in adjusting the linkage between experienced emotions and 
behavioral responses to meet shifting environmental demands. In doing so, an 
allodynamic perspective on the affective system suggests the possibility of 
complementarity between the two seminal principles of pleasure and of hedonic 
homeostasis, which have to date developed separately, and frames these principles 
within a broader model of affective functioning. 
 
EVIDENCE FOR THE ALLODYNAMIC MODEL OF AFFECT 
Thus far, I have outlined the fundamental processes of allodynamic regulation, but did 
not address an evidentiary base. I believe that there are some lines of suggestive 
evidence that point to something like allodynamic regulation at the center of 
consumers’ affective functioning. 
 
Daily Fluctuations in Emotional States 
The principles of pleasure, hedonic homeostasis, and allodynamic regulation all imply 
distinct patterns of daily variation in ongoing affect. If affect operates according to the 
pleasure principle we should observe unidirectional efforts to achieve and preserve 
positive affect only interrupted by particularly negative events. Support for the 
homeostatic model would, instead, imply observing a relatively constant level of 
affect set around a hedonic set point and defended against discrepancies through the 
activation of discrepancy-reducing responses. A pattern of varying levels of affect 
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continuously adjusting to shifts in environmental demands would be consistent with 
allodynamic functioning. Therefore, the analysis of daily fluctuations in people’s 
emotional states provides an informative window into the operating dynamics of the 
affective system. 
Several studies, using daily diary and experience sampling methods, have 
examined the pattern of people’s ongoing affective experiences over time, both hourly 
and daily (e.g., Kahneman et al. 2004, Reis et al. 2000). Together, these studies 
provide substantial evidence that, far from evidencing increasing levels of positivity 
or remaining stable around a hedonic set point, affect fluctuates markedly over the 
course of the day and across days: affect ranges from positive to negative and these 
variations can be fleeting or lasting. In this way, the results appear to suggest that 
individuals’ affective functioning is perhaps regulated according to allodynamic 




Research on hedonic adaptation also appears to provide suggestive evidence for the 
operation of allodynamic processes in affective functioning. The concept of hedonic 
adaptation refers to processes that attenuate the emotional intensity of affectively-
relevant stimuli (positive or negative) by adjusting the baseline to which stimuli are 
compared. In hedonic adaptation this baseline is adjusted so that repeated or continued 
stimuli lose much of their emotional power over time (Helson 1947). Frederick and 
Loewenstein (1999) have suggested that two distinct mechanisms may produce 
adaptation: (a) processes that reduce people’s affective reaction to stimuli by varying 
the level of stimulus intensity that is perceived as neutral, which they termed shifting 
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adaptation levels and (b) processes that reduce people’s general affective reaction to 
stimuli, which they termed desensitization. Brickman and Campbell (1971) have 
described hedonic adaptation as a “hedonic treadmill” which “condemns men . . . to 
seek new levels of stimulation merely to maintain old levels of subjective pleasure, to 
never achieve any kind of permanent happiness or satisfaction” (p. 289). 
Several studies have found evidence for these two types of hedonic adaptation. 
For example, Brickman, Coates and Janoff-Bullman (1978) found that winning 
between $50,000 and $1,000,000 did not significantly increase lottery winners’ level 
of happiness relative to a control group one year after the event. Similar dynamics 
have been observed across a variety of positive and negative events including 
cosmetic surgery (Young, Nemecek, and Nemecek 1994) and bereavement (e.g., 
Wortman, Silver, and Kessler 1993). 
Research has also found evidence for hedonic adaptation in consumption. For 
example, Hoch and Loewenstein (1991) suggested that adaptation processes are 
integral to impulsive behavior (time-inconsistent preferences). In particular, they 
argued that proximity to a product induces a process of adaptation by which 
consumers’ become habituated to the notion of possessing the not-yet-purchased 
product. This adaptation is accompanied by a shift in consumers’ reference point and 
a feeling of deprivation that can only be reduced by acquiring the product. 
Clearly, the processes of shifting adaptation levels and desensitization seem to 
parallel two mechanisms underlying of allodynamic regulation: adjustments in the 
hedonic set point and changes in the sensitivity of the affect response curve, 
respectively. There are, however, two important differences. First, the processes of 
hedonic adaptation pertain to the link between stimuli and affective experience. In 
contrast, our characterization of the allodynamic is focused on the link between 
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experienced emotions and behavioral responses. Second, and perhaps more important, 
while hedonic adaptation is typically conceptualized as invariably entailing a 
reduction in people’s sensitivity to affectively-relevant stimuli, allodynamic 
regulation may produce both increases and decreases in consumers’ sensitivity to their 
feelings to match environmental demands. 
 
Mood-As-Input Model 
Research by Martin et al. (1993) on the motivational implications of moods suggests 
that the influence of moods on behavior is contingent on the criteria used to interpret 
them. In their studies, participants in a positive or negative mood were instructed to 
perform a variety of tasks under two different conditions. In one condition participants 
where instructed to continue as long as they enjoyed the task. In a second condition 
participants were asked to continue until they felt that they had made sufficient 
progress toward the task’s goal. When told to continue until they no longer enjoyed 
the task, participants in a negative mood stopped sooner than those in a positive 
mood. However, when told to continue until they felt they had made sufficient 
progress, participants in a positive mood stopped sooner than those in a negative 
mood. In other words, participants’ behavior was determined by the extent to the 
pursuit of pleasure or task performance was the active goal. Thus, this finding seems 
to corroborate the allodynamic notion that consumers’ behavioral response to 
experienced emotions, rather than being fixed, is sensitive to variations in the task at 
hand. 
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Repurchase Behavior, Multiple Goal-Pursuit, and Emotion 
Regulation 
Research reported in Chapters 2, 3 and 4 also appears consistent with the operation of 
allodynamic processes. It was found that rather than uniformly pursuing pleasure or 
invariably regulating their affective state toward a hedonic set point, consumers 




The pervasiveness of emotions in shaping consumers’ judgments, decisions and 
choices underscores how crucial for consumption it is to have an affective system that 
is flexible and that activates the right behavioral responses, to the right stimuli, at the 
right time. Three empirical chapters (Chapters 2-4) provided evidence showing that 
consumers’ behavioral response to experienced emotions can be highly versatile and 
adapt to variations in consumers’ goals and environmental demands by oscillating 
between distinct patterns of affective functioning. 
In this closing chapter I extended this a step further, by exploring and 
outlining a conceptualization of affect as an allodynamic system. I conjectured that an 
allodynamic perspective on affect may provide a way of reconciling the seemingly 
opposing principles of pleasure and of hedonic homeostasis by showing how they can 
both represent complementary processes of a more general model of affective 
functioning. More importantly, the allodynamic hypothesis may expand prior 
conceptualizations of the affective system by suggesting that the pattern of affective 
response may be variable rather than fixed. 
Although allodynamic processes confer high versatility and adaptiveness, 
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there may be limits and costs as well. An important limit of adaptation was identified 
in Chapter 4: for adaptation to occur individuals must perceive both the need for 
adjustment (i.e., environmental demands that must be met and require changes in 
affective response) as well as the direction and magnitude of the required adjustment. 
Yet, this does not always occur and Chapter 4 described some of the cognitive and 
motivational factors that may account for this phenomenon. Failure to adapt to 
environmental demands may be associated with costs. It may, for instance, have 
negative consequences for the quality of decision making (Chapter 4) or degrade 
people’s ability to enjoy a pleasurable event (Brickman and Campbell 1971). Even 
when allodynamic adaptation is successful, its versatility is not unlimited and costless. 
McEwen (1998) introduced the concept of allostatic load to describe the physiological 
cumulative wear and tear of an adaptive system as a result of its continuous 
adjustment to match shifting environmental demands. Such erosion may also occur, I 
suggest, in the affective system and, as a result, disrupt people’s adaptive capacity, 
decrease subjective well-being, or even produce adverse physiological consequences 
(e.g., stress). 
Much remains to be done to develop and test the proposals offered here. I have 
not, for instance, specified the factors that determine which regulatory parameters of 
the hedonic response curve individuals adjust and which explain differences in the 
magnitude and direction of these changes. Further research is also needed to examine 
the meta-cognitive processes that underlie allodynamic functioning and when these 
processes occur. How and when do people perceive the need to adjust their hedonic 
response curve? How are the parameters of adjustment selected? These questions, 
though important, remain unaddressed in the present analysis and await further 
conceptual and empirical attention. 
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In conclusion, this dissertation sheds new light on the role of positive emotions in 
consumption and on how consumers can respond flexibly and adaptively to these 
emotions. It provides evidence on the mechanisms by which adjustments in 
consumers’ response to experienced emotions may take place, their limits, and some 
of the underlying processes. In this way, this dissertation demonstrates that the 
meaning of emotions is not unique but that it can vary in response to ongoing 
motivations, that emotions do not only influence consumers but are also shaped by 
consumers, and that pleasure is not the only path, but that the path to good 
consumption decisions often entails leaving pleasure. 
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Samenvatting (Summary in Dutch) 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 






ZAL IK WEER teruggaan naar dat restaurant wat me zo goed beviel? Zal ik die leuke 
schoenen kopen? Zal ik zo hard blijven werken en sparen, of meer gaan genieten van 
het leven en meer uitgeven? Kleine verleidingen, belangrijke keuzes en nu en dan 
lastige dilemmas, dit zijn de vragen die verweven zijn in ons dagelijks leven, en 
emoties komen er overal in voor. Maar hoe beïnvloeden emoties deze consumptie 
beslissingen? Doen we altijd wat nú goed voelt of doen we soms wat slecht voelt maar 
beter is op de langere termijn? Wanneer luisteren we naar onze emoties en wanneer 
proberen we ze te vermijden? Dit zijn de vragen die dit proefschrift probeert te 
beantwoorden.  
In de psychologie van consumptie, met zowel vreugde als trots, met zowel 
verrukking als hoop, vereist het behandelen van deze vragen het begrip over de rol 
van positieve emoties in het vormgeven van de belevingen, oordelen en keuzes van 
                                                           
13 I thank Fleur Laros for kindly translating this summary into Dutch, and Ralf van der Lans for his 
helpful comments.  
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consumenten. De aanname dat consumenten gemotiveerd zijn om zich goed te voelen, 
zich naar plezier en weg van pijn te bewegen, heeft de psychologische theorieën over 
de rol van emoties in consumptie en dagelijks leven gedomineerd. Het heersende 
denkbeeld wat voortkomt uit dit plezier principe is dat het goed is om je goed te 
voelen, dat consumenten altijd de opties kiezen die meer positieve gevoelens 
oproepen, en dat het vermogen om positieve emoties te genereren onveranderlijk 
wordt beloond met gunstige gedragingen zoals loyaliteit.  
In dit proefschrift ga ik verder dan het plezier principe betreffende menselijke 
motivatie en beargumenteer dat, in tegenstelling tot het altijd volgen van plezier of 
onveranderlijk herhalen van keuzes die voor plezier zorgden in het verleden, 
consumenten niet altijd positieve emoties nastreven en deze soms zelfs proberen te 
vermijden om andere consumptiedoelen te behalen. Mensen komen niet altijd terug 
naar de plaatsen die ze goed bevallen of kopen niet altijd de producten waar ze van 
houden, hoe sterk hun gevoelens ook zijn. Het doel van dit proefschrift is dan ook om 
te onderzoeken hoe mensen hun emotionele reactie en gedrag aanpassen om aan de 
motivationele en situationele eisen van de huidige taak te voldoen. Om de 
mogelijkheden van emotionele reacties te begrijpen, zie ik gevoel als een veelzijdig 
systeem wat individuen een rijk repertoire aan affectieve antwoordmogelijkheden 
biedt die flexibel kunnen worden toegepast.  
Hoofdstuk 2 van dit proefschrift stelt vast dat, in tegenstelling tot de algemene 
aanname dat positieve emoties in het algemeen leiden tot gunstige gedragsintenties, 
gevoelens van trots de herhalingsaankoopintentie van consumenten kunnen 
verminderen. Resultaten van drie studies tonen aan dat de invloed van trots op de 
herhalingsaankoopintentie afhankelijk is van de zelf-regulerende doelen van 
consumenten, maar dat dit alleen het geval is bij consumenten met sterke gevoelens 
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van trots. Meer specifiek, van consumenten met hoge preventie trots is het minder 
waarschijnlijk dat ze overgaan tot een herhalingsaankoop dan diegenen met een hoge 
promotie trots, terwijl er geen verschil is tussen consumenten met lage promotie trots 
en lage preventie trots. 
Hoofdstuk 3 presenteert en test een model met meerdere doelen dat 
specificeert hoe individuen selectief hun inspanning verdelen over meerdere doelen in 
de tijd. Het model voorspelt dat de keuze van individuen om hun inspanning te gaan 
vermeerderen, verminderen, het huidige doel opgeven, of een ander doel gaan 
vervolgen, afhangt van zowel de emoties die uit de doelvooruitgang vloeien en de 
nabijheid van het behalen van het toekomstig doel. Resultaten uit twee studies 
ondersteunen het voorgestelde model: zij laten zien dat positieve en negatieve 
doelafhankelijke emoties niet algemeen leiden tot het vasthouden of veranderen van 
doel verworvenheid leiden, maar in plaats daarvan dat beide tegengestelde effecten 
kunnen hebben op doelgericht gedrag afhankelijk van de nabijheid van het doel. 
Om effectief te functioneren moeten consumenten subjectieve invloeden, die 
tot foute of suboptimale beoordelingen en beslissingen leiden, kunnen vermijden. In 
tegenstelling tot de algemene aanname dat mensen blind zijn voor hun eigen 
gekleurde denkbeeld, laat hoofdstuk 4 zien dat consumenten deze kunnen opsporen en 
hun beslissingsproces kunnen beschermen tegen de gekleurde invloeden van positieve 
emoties. Zij doen dit door hun positieve emoties ten opzichte van een aanvankelijk 
geprefereerd product te onderdrukken. Resultaten van twee studies laten zien dat deze 
onderdrukking zowel wordt bepaald door de complexiteit van de op handen zijnde 
keuze en het gewicht van de directe of toekomstige resultaten van de keuze. Deze 
onderdrukking komt het meest voor wanneer de complexiteit van de beslissing 
gemiddeld is en consumenten zich voornamelijk richten op de toekomstige resultaten 
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van hun huidige acties. De resultaten brengen ook aan het licht dat onderdrukking van 
emoties duidelijke en adaptieve gevolgen heeft voor de diepte van het 
beslissingsproces, aankoopbesluit, en vertrouwen in de keuze. 
Samengevat betekenen de resultaten uit deze hoofdstukken dat het affectieve 
systeem erg veelzijdig kan zijn en zich kan aanpassen aan veranderingen in doelen 
van consumenten en eisen uit de omgeving door te fluctueren tussen verschillende 
patronen van affectief functioneren.  Meer specifiek, om te voldoen aan veranderende 
omstandigheden kan het affectief systeem (a) wel of niet worden aangedreven door 
plezier (plezier principe), (b) wel of niet worden gedreven naar een basisniveau van 
affect (principe van hedonische homeostatis), of (c) afwisselen tussen deze twee 
principes. Hoofdstuk 5 gaat een stap verder en schetst de principes van een algemener 
model van affectief functioneren dat probeert deze schijnbare tegenstelling van de 
formuleringen op de fundamentele processen van het affectieve systeem te verenigen: 
het plezier principe en het principe van hedonische homeostatis.    
Op deze manier demonstreert dit proefschrift dat de betekenis van emoties niet 
uniek is maar dat het kan variëren als reactie op motivaties van consumenten, dat 
emoties niet alleen consumenten beïnvloeden, maar ook gevormd worden door 
consumenten zelf, dat plezier niet de enige weg is, maar dat de weg naar goede 
consumptie beslissingen vaak het onderdrukken van plezier inhoudt. 
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